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Introduction 
 
1. Two events  
On June 6, 2013 The Guardian and The Washington Post published the extent of United 
States surveillance operation under the secret programme PRISM. The United States 
government since then is pursuing the arrest of Edward Snowden, who is responsible 
for the revelations. On August 21, 2013, a military court convicted Chelsea Manning for 
35 years on 20 charges, including espionage, for leaking secret documents to Wikileaks. 
Julian Assange, the founder of Wikileaks, remains in the confines of Ecuadorian 
embassy, fearing arrest if he walks out. The Wikileaks and the PRISM revelations 
brought to the public light the capacity USA has developed, not only in gathering 
private data, but also in its ability to eaves drop on diplomatic conversations of other 
nations. At the same time Wikileaks also highlighted the state’s ability to maintain 
secrecy on its own affairs; some of them extra-legal.  
The revelations point out three directions that secrecy policies of the state have taken, in 
years following the terrorist attacks of 9/11: the state has developed an enhanced 
capacity to gather private, personal and diplomatic data, while keeping its own data 
secret. At the same time, the state is becoming increasingly intolerant against acts of 
whistleblowing that reveals its secrets. It is argued that such revelations put the state at 
risk by aiding the enemy, shows disbelief in the democratic structures, and in its ability 
to correct any aberrations that might result from an extension of secretive policies.1 The 
whistleblowers,2 on the other hand, argue that although the state is right in keeping 
                                                             
1 https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130620/18182823551/obama-administration-has-declared-war-
leakers-claims-any-leak-is-aiding-enemy.shtml   [Accessed Oct. 26, 2013]  
2 I take for granted in the introduction that these acts qualify the requirements of Whistleblowing. This is 
not an assumption for the thesis, but something I prove later on in chapter 4. Till then for the sake of the 
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some secrets, the revelations relates to that part of classified information that  impinges 
on some of the fundamental interests of the citizens; i.e. the information is of a sort that 
citizens ought to know.3 Additionally, it is the citizens who should decide what kind of 
information ought to be kept secret.4 Thus, rather than aiding the enemy these 
revelations seek to uphold the rights of the citizens,5  and creates a vibrant, transparent 
and strong democracy, devoid of corruption.6 
2. The context 
These two events have generated contrary responses from people either side of the 
political platform. Some have argued that these events threaten the security of the 
country, aid the terrorists, and thus ought to be termed as anti-national.7 The 
incarceration of Chelsea Manning has been celebrated in these quarters. On the contrary 
civil liberty groups have challenged the response of the state to the leaks. They suggest 
that the revelations are in national interest since they uphold the constitutional values; 
the revelations expose the threats to civil liberties from the state. Such revelations ought 
to be protected under freedom of speech. Some of them characterize the act akin to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
argument I will assume that these acts are Whistleblowing, thus rebutting the claim of those critiques 
who argue that these revelations aim to aid the enemy, and thus are anti-national.  
3 http://www.policymic.com/articles/47355/edward-snowden-interview-transcript-full-text-read-the-
guardian-s-entire-interview-with-the-man-who-leaked-prism [Accessed Aug. 10, 2013] 
4 Ibid  
5 Ibid 
6 http://wikileaks.org/About.html. [Accessed Oct 25, 2013]  
7 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/23/nsa-director-snowden-hong-kong [Accessed Oct. 
31, 2013] 
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Pentagon Paper revelations by Daniel Ellseberg, and suggest that these leaks ought to 
be seen as an act of civil disobedience. 8 
The contrary responses can be only understood by situating them in the context from 
where they emerge. The event hanging in memory behind the responses is that of 9/11. 
The event not only affected the victims of the attacks, but also the way the debate on 
civil liberties has been conducted since. It has been asserted that the nature of civil 
liberties cannot be the same as it was before 9/11, since there is a danger of an 
existential threat, from an invisible enemy, capable of striking at any time. This enemy, 
the terrorist, cannot be identified in a particular form, does not follow the normal rules 
of the game, or allude to the principles of the war. It does not discriminate between 
civilians or the security forces. They do not have a necessary political agenda for 
change, but they wage war because they hate ‘our’ way of life, i.e. ‘our’ liberties, 
modern values etc. Since terrorists undertaking the 9/11 attacks were muslims, it was 
also alleged that this is a form of religious jihad against the west and its values. Thus, in 
order to counter this threat, which lies as much ‘within’ us, in form of aliens, as much as 
‘without’, requires alertness. The need to vigilant arises out of a basic prospect of fear, 
grounded in the need to safeguard ourselves against existential threats.  
In the wake of 9/11, the popular mainstream discourse argued for a need to balance 
liberty against security. This discourse not only populated the debates in the media, and 
the parliaments9 of various countries, it also found credence in the work of some legal 
                                                             
8 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/07/john-lewis-civil-rights-edward-snowden [accessed 
Oct. 31, 2013]. For Brownlee, while the act of Snowden fulfills all the requirements of civil disobedience, 
except that Snowden did not submit to the law and so if he does so the act will comply with the 
conception of civil disobedience. For more see http://blog.oup.com/2013/08/is-edward-snowden-a-
civil-disobedient/ [Accessed Oct. 31, 2013] Also see Danah Boyd: Whistleblowing is the new Civil 
Disobedience https://medium.com/surveillance-state/9a53415933a9 [Accessed Oct. 31, 2013] 
9 Michaelsen (2006)  
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theorists.10 It was contended that times of emergency (and the period post 9/11 
represents one) requires prompt, effective and efficient response. To cater to the 
demands of efficiency and effectiveness civil liberties should not be seen as inalienable, 
but should be calibrated against the existential requirements of security.11 Such 
calibration can be done on a scale, where the requirements of civil liberties can be 
balanced against the needs of security. Treating rights as ‘trumps’ imposes heavy 
burdens in responding to security threats, which gets slowed down in the cumbersome 
requirements of realization of rights. Thus, rights should be stripped of their 
deontological status and treated on an equal footing with the concerns of safety. In the 
absence of such revisions, in the words of Richard Posner, the constitution becomes a 
suicide pact that allows trumping of rights at its own peril.12 Under this reading, rights 
limitations of a minority are allowed to the extent that it makes the majority feel safer. 
This is based on a consequentalist account of rights. Such reading allows the theorists to 
argue for torture in extreme cases, extra-ordinary renditions, data mining and wire-
tapping in order to serve the requirements of security.13 This largely mirrors the 
popular discourse14 that followed 9/11 which suggested that terrorists should not have 
human rights, because in threatening the rights of others they do not respect rights in 
general. And, people who do not respect rights cannot claim for their own legal rights.   
The response from the state has largely mirrored such theorization. It is not my 
contention here to prove whether the theory justified the practice or vice-versa, or 
                                                             
10 Posner (2006), Posner & Veremeule (2007)  
11 Posner (2006)  
12 Ibid  
13 ibid 
14 In suggesting this point I do not want to say that Posner necessarily agrees with this mainstream view 
point, but the consequences of the view point are the same. But there is a marked distinction, while for 
Posner no one’s rights are trumps, but in the mainstream discourse, the rights of those who respect rights 
are considered as trumps, while those of the terrorists are not.  
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whether there is indeed a linkage between the two. It is sufficient to argue that, even if 
the two events are disconnected, security policies have not deviated from this line of 
reasoning. The wars in Afghanistan, in Iraq were argued as a response to thwart the 
dangers that emerged from terrorism and external threat. A spate of new anti-terror 
laws followed in countries around the world. Some of these laws allowed for wide scale 
surveillance with minimum controls. The executive power has seen a manifold increase, 
and the amount of information that has been classified as secrets has gone up 
considerably since 9/11.15 Additionally, revelations showed the presence of detention 
sites like Guantanamo and Abu Gharib where alleged suspects were tortured and 
detained without trials.  
The wide scale violations of civil liberties due to extra-legal methods have been 
critiqued by civil libertarian groups and some political and legal theorists.16 It has been 
argued that the quest for security has led to a severe compromise of the human rights of 
individuals. The state has been given an unrestrained hand that has led to severe 
violations; such violations go against the very values of human rights and democracy 
much cherished in the west. The protection of these values cannot be done by 
undermining the very same values that one seeks to protect.  It is only in this context 
that we can make sense of the revelations done by Wikileaks and Edward Snowden.  
3. Publicity and Secrecy 
The whistleblowers narrative, if right, provides a troubling account of the practice of 
governmental secrecy and its impact on the lives of the citizens. This rendition does not 
criticize governmental secrecy per se; secrecy practices are only illegitimate in so far as 
they impinge on the rights and obligations of the people. Under this interpretation, 
                                                             
15 http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-
control/ [Accessed Oct. 31, 2013] 
16 Dworkin (2002), Waldron (2003), Luban(2005), Cole (2003) 
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secrecy is a necessary fact which democracies ought to take into account. In other 
words, the fundamental concern is not with secrecy, but what follows from the practice 
of it. Secrecy allows for information to be withdrawn from the public sphere that should 
ideally belong to it. It provides the necessary maneuver for agencies to work, sometimes 
extra-legally, outside their constitutional mandates. Because secret agencies have 
outstripped their own constitutional mandate, without any correlative controls,17 they 
need to be submitted to citizens’ assessment. Transparency, under this account, opens 
up the state institutions for a public review. Citizens’ appraisal entails a critical scrutiny 
of security services and lays down constraints between legitimate and illegitimate 
action. 
3.1 Is secrecy compatible with the publicity requirements of democracy?   
Political philosophers have not adequately studied the practice of governmental 
secrecy, barring a few exceptions.18 Largely the study of secrecy has come from legal 
scholars who have tried to delineate the practices of secrecy which results from the 
institutional design of democracies.19 Others have tried to study secrecy from the 
perspective of enhanced power of the executive,20 or from the incentives that hidden 
information provides them with.21 Curiously, the revelations by Wikileaks and Edward 
Snowden have not evoked much response on the practice of secrecy within state 
                                                             
17 Edward Snowden in an interview suggests that the internal system of checks and balances does not 
work. For more details see http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/18/edward-snowden-us-
would-have-buried-nsa-warnings-forever [accessed Oct. 27, 2013]   
18 Sagar(2007, 2009), Bok (1983), Bobbio (1987)   
19 Pozen(2010), Fuchs(2006),  
20 Mohinyan (1999) 
21 Stiglitz (1999)  
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institutions.22There have been concerns raised, by a few scholars, on threats to liberty 
that arises out of the state discourses of security,23 but the linkages, barring a few 
exceptions,24 do not allude to the fact of secrecy. The reason for the lack of theoretical 
analysis can be cited in the way political philosophy has approached the issue of 
secrecy. Principally, political philosophy rejects the argument of ‘reasons of state’ 
argument for secrecy in favour of publicity.25 Having argued for the ideal26 
requirements of publicity, secrecy, in my reading, is seen as an aberration that arises in 
non-ideal conditions with imperfect institutions that do not confirm to the norms of 
publicity. The problem thus is not with the theory but with the deviation of the practice 
from the theory. Thus, it seems that political theory has nothing much to offer in regard 
to actual practices of democracy. At best some theorists have argued for an enhanced 
role for citizens’ participation in deliberations on policy making,27 or institutional 
designs that will counter excessive secrecy.28 Yet, secrecy per se, in the words of 
Norberto Bobbio, represents a deviance between ‘democracy as it is’ and ‘democracy as 
it should be’.29 Thus, neglecting to study secrecy in its own regard, with respect to its 
                                                             
22 Some responses to Wikileaks revelations do not study the practices of secrecy in itself , but argue that 
Wikileaks kind of organizations create new form of accountability structures (Moore, 2011) or radicalize 
the right to know ( Zizek (2011)  Giri (2010a, 2010 b)  
23 Dworkin (2002), Waldron (2003, 2006, 2011) 
24 Sagar (2007, 2009)  
25 Kant(1795), Bentham (1843), Rawls(1993,1999)   
26 The ideal and non-ideal distinction made throughout the thesis does not ascribe to the one made in 
Rawls (1999). For the purpose of the thesis, the ideal concerns of full transparency is what political 
institutions ought to establish in order to count as democratic, while non-ideal requirement allows for the 
fact of secrecy i.e. the day to day functioning of democracy requires that some practices need to be kept 
secret. The ideal works as a principled stand point from where the workings of democracy can be judged 
and critiqued. Under this reading secrecy is a problem only at the non-ideal level.  
27 Gutmann & Thomson (1996)  
28 Ackerman ( 2004)  
29 Bobbio (1987)  
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nature, its space in democracy and how it impacts democratic institutions represents a 
huge void in political philosophy that needs to be corrected. This thesis does not claim 
to have addressed this question in totality. Secrecy is a complex concept, and its space 
within democracy needs much more study than the current dissertation can undertake. 
In this context, the dissertation aims to stimulate further research in this direction.  Its 
goal is to study the problem of governmental secrecy, the discourse in which it is 
situated, the way democratic institutions aims to counter its excesses, and argues that in 
absence of countervailing institutional design Whistleblowing cases ought to be treated 
as a form of moral disobedience.  The questions in this thesis have been mainly 
influenced by the debates that have surrounded the events which followed the 
Wikileaks revelations by Chelsea Manning.  
In order to understand the main concerns of this dissertation we need to understand the 
question that the revelations open up for political philosophy:  should democratic states 
keep secrets? The moment we ask this question we assume that there are no prima facie 
reasons to accept secrecy. On the contrary secrecy practices ought to be treated with 
suspicion. Principally, this suspicion is grounded on the very fundamental premise that 
imparts legitimacy to democracy as a form of government viz. the will of the people. 
The question can thus be reiterated in the following manner: if democracies govern on 
behalf of its citizens, why should it keep secrets from them? Consent can only be 
grounded in a state when public offices are open to scrutiny by the citizens. Secrecy, 
under this reading, violates the possibility of such scrutiny and hence is illegitimate. In 
the face of secrecy, citizens can neither play an active role in the affairs of the state, nor 
keep track of activities. Such an argument, based on a delegated role of representation, 
assumes either direct or deliberative forms of participation.30 But, even if we allow that 
                                                             
30 Pateman (1976), Habermas (1989), Gutmann & Thomson (1996). On the concept of representation see 
Pitkin (1967), Urbinati & Warren (2008). For debates on forms of representation also see Rehfeld (2005) & 
(2006), Mansbridge (2003),  Saward (2010) , Runciman (2007)  
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXVI Cycle                                    PhD Candidate: Manohar Kumar 
  
Page 18 
 
public offices should be based on a trusteeship model of representation,31 the only way 
judgement can be entrusted to the representatives is by holding them accountable for 
their actions.32 Transparency in public affairs ensures that public offices are not usurped 
to serve individual or narrow sectarian interests.  
Publicity is required to check the unrestrained powers of the state. This premise is 
based on the fundamental interest in the protection of civil liberties and rights. It is 
argued that the threats to civil liberties come not only from external sources but from 
states too. Since the state is the only entity endowed with legitimate violence, it can turn 
its violence upon citizens or dissidents when it deems them as a threat to its own 
existence. In order to curb the potential abuses of this power, laws and government 
actions emanating from them ought to be public. In fact, such laws should be only those 
that rational people deliberating with each other have publicly agreed, know and 
accepted, and know that others accept it too.33 Thus, any coercion on the governed 
ought to be a product of laws that emerge from the same consent. Thus, this requires 
that any curb on fundamental civil liberties ought to be justified to those whose liberties 
are being restricted. The publicity of the law and the need for a rational justification 
curbs the arbitrary interference by the state.  
Thus, publicity is required not only for fulfillment of political obligations of the citizens, 
but also to ensure that their rights have not been illegitimately limited. But, does the 
principled point of publicity preclude any form of secrecy in a democracy? What, if any, 
are the justifying grounds of secrecy? If secrecy is justified how should it be 
                                                             
31 Burke (1790), Schumpeter (1976), Sartori (1987), Manin (1997) argue in varied ways for either complete 
independence or of relatively independence of the representatives from their electorates’ view points.  
32 Pitkin (1967)  
33 This is the fundamental idea behind the publicity principle of Rawls. For more see Rawls (1999) esp. pp. 
115, and see Political Liberalism, especially the part on three levels of publicity. Rawls (1993: 66-71)   
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accommodated with the normative requirement of publicity? This is the first question 
the thesis explores. 
This way of asking the question already lays down possibilities and the manner 
through which it can be answered. The need to accommodate secrecy with publicity 
already assumes that the concepts under analysis are rival in nature; the presence of one 
excludes the possibility of another. But, is there an irresolvable tension between secrecy 
and publicity in a democracy? So, if we address the question regarding democracies’ 
need to keep secrets in the affirmative, then we need to address the concern of the 
rivalrous nature of secrecy, if we are not to discard publicity altogether. Thus, we need 
to prove that the publicity requirement indeed accommodates the need for secrecy. 
Publicity, in this version, is treated as a default position for democracy and secrecy is an 
aberration; though a necessary aberration. If we are able to prove that publicity can 
indeed accommodate secrecy, it takes care of the requirement of the fact of secrecy, 
elucidated by the whistleblowers. To demonstrate this point, we need to show that 
secrecy is not only a fact in a democracy, that it should be accommodated just because 
of its empirical necessity, but the justification of secrecy comes from the very premises 
that democracy is built upon. We also need to prove that in conditions where there is an 
actual conflict, democracy does have the necessary institutions and values to resolve 
such conflicts.  
3.2 The need for secrecy  
The justification of secrecy in a democracy stems from two sources: (a) security, and (b) 
the need for better quality deliberation. Secrecy is justified on grounds of security.34 The 
line of reasoning is as follows: One of the basic functions of a democratic state is the 
protection of its citizens against internal as well as external threats. States in order to 
fulfill this function need to keep some of its operations secret. The operations are of a 
                                                             
34 Thomson (1999), Sagar(2007), European Convention of Human rights (1950)  
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nature that revealing them will defeat their very end. The information cannot be shared 
with the citizens without the enemies accessing it at the same time. Cases like troop 
movements along the border, surveillance represent some examples of this kind of 
secrecy. Secrecy, in this argument, preserves the fundamental interest of security of the 
citizens by ensuring normal functioning of the democratic institutions. This argument 
can also be represented in the following manner: the very reason for which citizens 
have consented to form a state is to preserve their security and liberty. The state can 
only fulfill this duty in some cases by maintaining secrecy.  
Yet, this argument does not allude to a fundamental suspicion in the powers of the state 
to threaten citizens’ interests. Some theorists thus argue that secrecy is justified only 
when the policy, under which information has to be concealed, itself has gone through a 
process of public deliberation between free and equal citizens.35 Thus, under this 
reading, publicity requirement itself accommodates the need for secrecy; publicity does 
not require that all the information of the state ought to be public, but only the general 
policy that covers secrecy. The complete compliance with the ideal of publicity, under 
this model, goes against certain other democratic requirements which people have 
reason to uphold. Thus, publicity accommodates the need of secrecy, at the non-ideal 
level of daily practices of the state.  
The other justification for secrecy comes from the fact that it allows for better quality 
deliberation. Secrecy allows for policy makers to not play to the gallery of individual or 
sectarian interests. They can invoke better reasons, revise their positions, deliberate 
without undue pressures and come out with better quality decisions.36  
 
 
                                                             
35 Gutmann & Thomson (1996)  
36 Gutmann & Thomson (1996), Thomson (1999), Chambers(2004)  
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4.  The problems with secrecy 
Theoretically, thus, publicity and secrecy are not incompatible at the level of democratic 
institutions. Yet, at the level of practice the problem of secrecy still remains. This is the 
contention of the whistleblowers. The contention even goes further to claim that the 
existing institutions cannot control the abuses that result from secrecy. It is this lack of 
checks, both prospectively and retrospectively, that justifies the act of whistleblowing. 
This charge of the whistleblowers though requires further examination. It is this 
contention that defines my next set of inquiries. Thus, we need to ask: what are the 
problems that can emerge from the state practices of secrecy? Why do these problems 
occur in the first place? Does it have to do with the nature of secrecy or with the 
freedom that secrecy allows individuals with?  
To answer these questions the thesis proceeds in the following manner: first I explicate 
a theoretical understanding of secrecy and its particular characteristics. Secrecy allows 
for an action or information to be hidden without being known to others, thus, allowing 
for freedom to act, without any correlative constraints. It allows for spaces of maneuver 
and deception. The particular problems of secrecy arise from this very nature. I then go 
on to demonstrate this analysis with empirical examples of how secrecy impinges on 
the rights of individuals, and in some instances subtracts important information that 
might be required to fulfill political obligations of citizens. Such a conception of secrecy 
emerges from the dominant conception of security that sees the relationship between 
security and liberty as a form of balance. The balance model argues for deference to the 
judgement of the executive at times of emergency, since it is they who due to their 
secrecy and expertise can provide a quick, efficient and effective response to the threats. 
Under this reading, the lack of expertise, and the lack of information regarding the 
nature of security threats makes courts and the legislative ineffective in handling 
security situations.  
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5. Can democratic institutions control excessive secrecy?  
Even if we have demonstrated that secrecy constrains the realization of rights and 
obligations, the analysis would be incomplete in the absence of demonstrable reasons 
that show that state institutions do not have the necessary means to overcome them. 
Representative democracy is based on the fundamental idea of checks and balances, 
whereby any extension in the power of one branch is kept in check by other branches. 
So it needs to be demonstrated that these mechanisms might not work in some 
instances. This leads to the third question: whether the existing institutions of judiciary, 
legislative and a vibrant press37 can control the excesses that result from executive 
practices of secrecy? According to the balance model these institutions do not have 
sufficient role to play during emergency. Yet, liberal scholars argue for an enhanced 
responsibility of judiciary and the legislative through oversights, and vigilance on the 
part of media to counter the excesses. But, in the face of secrecy, can these institutions 
provide the correlative checks that these theorists think they can?  
Edward Snowden in his interview contends that they cannot. There are three 
conclusions one can draw from his contention with differing impacts for future 
analysis. Firstly, his contention can be taken as that of an insider. Even an insider 
account can raise suspicions regarding his motives. Secondly, his contentions, if true, 
might just represent the way secret agencies function, but not how they ought to 
function. Thirdly, it can be argued that while in this case the constitutional bodies could 
not control the excesses, which if they had functioned properly they would have been 
able to. And finally, we can conclude that the hidden nature of secrecy allows the 
executive to even subvert democratic controls over their actions. To explicate what 
                                                             
37 Press is not an institution of state but can work towards ensuring accountability of the state by 
revealing its wrong doings.  
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indeed is the case, we need to peruse the various proposals that seek to control 
executive excesses, and evaluate them against the specific hidden nature of secrecy. 
Secrecy allows information to be known by those who possess it, by virtue of it the 
executive can act as a gatekeeper over who has access to information. If this is true then 
other branches can only have information when the executive provides them with it.  
6. Is Whistleblowing an act of civil disobedience?  
The gatekeeper role of the executive regarding information control opens up a paradox 
for democracy. For democracy to function it needs secrecy, yet it ought to be able to 
maintain control over excessive practices, through its institutions. But if the information 
is only accessible to those who are to prone to abuse it creates a conundrum which 
cannot be solved through existing mechanisms of democratic control. This contention 
needs to be examined and the thesis will examine it further. But, if the contention is 
found true, then we need to find how democracy can be salvaged from such 
conundrum. The revelations by the whistleblowers seem to show a way. By dissenting 
against wrong practices of secrecy, they aim to communicate to the citizens about such 
wrongdoings. This contention leads me to ask the final question of the thesis: is 
whistleblowing an act of last resort to salvage democracy against excessive practices of 
secrecy? In fact we need to ask whether acts like Wikileaks ought to be termed as 
whistleblowing or should fall under the category of civil disobedience. To show what 
the case is, the thesis will analyse the existing theories of whistleblowing and civil 
disobedience and see the categories under which Wikileaks and PRISM revelations fall.  
7. Chapter Plan  
The thesis has the following stages: first, the democratic need for secrecy is explained. 
Second, limitations of secrecy for democratic functioning are examined. Third, the 
justification for secrecy, on grounds of security, is critically examined by analyzing the 
mainstream discourse of security. Four, existing democratic institutions and 
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instruments are perused for their efforts to limit the practices of secrecy. Five, 
innovative institutional proposals to curb secrecy are examined for their practicability. 
And finally, a case for civil disobedience is made, when all proposals to curb secrecy 
fail.  
In short the thesis can be summarized in the following sentences: Secrecy is a 
prerequisite for democracy due to the requirement of security. The current conception 
of security and the concomitant practices of secrecy create democratic deficits: deficits 
which cannot be filled through the existing democratic instruments and institutions. 
Absent any prior instrument to curb secrecy, democracies ought to allow for civil 
disobedience, when classified information protects unjust practices.  
The first chapter looks at the democratic implications of secrecy. State secrecy is often 
justified on the grounds of security. It is often argued that states in order to keep its 
citizens secure need to withdraw some information from the public domain, lest it spills 
over to the enemy. This justification though causes a few problems for democratic 
theory at the level of principle and practice. Principally democracy ought to confirm to 
the norms of publicity. Democratic procedures and institutions ought to be open for 
public scrutiny.  
Secrecy deviates from the ideal requirement of publicity in democracy. Yet it does not 
pose a problem of justification in non-ideal settings. It would only be problematic if we 
do not weigh the demands of publicity with the requirement of security. State is 
entrusted with the function of protecting the life, liberty and property of individuals. In 
doing so, it has to keep a check on any possible infringements on security. In non-ideal 
settings, the state would be justified to use secrecy if it helps in fulfilling its functions of 
security. The thesis acknowledges the claims of security and argues that any democratic 
theory should accommodate the demands of secrecy to the ideal of publicity. Yet, it 
argues that publicity should be the norm against which requirements of secrecy should 
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be judged. Secrecy should not be the default principle in a democracy. To this end, the 
thesis casts a window of suspicion on the governmental practices of security and 
secrecy.  
Secrecy claims have to be put to scrutiny for their democratic implications. To this end, 
first the thesis conceptually defines secrecy in general and its practices by the executive 
in particular. Then it charts out its implications. Secrecy, by its nature, limits the 
information only to the one who possesses it. This ensures not only a control over ways 
to use the information, but also over those who do not possess it. It thus has particular 
implications for the enjoyment of rights of the citizens, the democratic checks and 
balances and fulfillment of the political obligations on the part of the citizenry. It can 
also work as a smokescreen behind which the unjust practices of the executive can be 
hidden. These aspects are discussed in detail in the thesis.  
The second chapter details out the mainstream conception of security. The mainstream 
conception of security is represented by the balance model. The tradeoff thesis is a 
particular way to implement the principles of the balance model.  For the balance 
model, the aim of public policy should always be to achieve an optimum balance 
between the claims of liberty and security. This chapter argues that the particular way 
of framing the model gives more credence to security at the expense of liberty, thus 
violating the requirement of neutrality which the model assumes. Allowing rights to be 
open to calibrations with the demands of security has particular consequences for civil 
liberties without any correlative epistemic warrant that such curbs will make people 
secure. The chapter also argues that the balance model has important distributive 
implications for it does not account for the rights of the minority.   
The responsibility of achieving the balance, in the model, lies with the executive, 
especially in times of emergency. It is argued that in times of emergency, legislative and 
judiciary ought to defer their decisions to the executive, given its efficiency and 
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effectiveness in handling emergency and its access to information. This is called the 
deference thesis. The deference thesis allows for a relative autonomous functioning of 
the executive, free from the constraints of the judiciary and legislative. It thus provides 
legitimacy for the practice of secrecy in the functioning of the executive.  
The model is based on the prospects which people fear. Security is conceptualized on 
the basis of such a fear in the minds of the people. Public policy then ought to limit such 
prospects of fear, but in doing so the model is willing to limit rights, without proper 
guarantees to those whose rights are being limited. This has particular problems 
regarding responses to such a policy. Security reasons often evoke uncritical response 
because they appeal to people’s deep held anxieties. Even courts and legislative are not 
averse to such fear. If the object of fear is hidden from public and only accessible to the 
executive, it could be used to generate favourable responses to policies which the 
executive deem fit. Secrecy can then easily be justified under such a conception of 
security.  
The third chapter seeks to analyse institutional responses and innovative solutions 
proposed by legal and political theorists in order to curb secrecy. First the normative 
requirement of publicity is laid out through a reading of the classics. This normative 
requirement serves as limitation on which any institutional responses can be evaluated. 
It is argued that democratic theory ought to weigh the need for secrecy to the normative 
requirement of publicity. Any institutional solution ought to take the normative criteria 
as its benchmark in order to succeed. Institutional responses, if they have to be 
successful, have to accommodate the legitimate need for secrecy along with a 
practicable way to limit the unjust practices which ensue due to it. In this regard the 
chapter evaluates the proposal for legislative oversight by Bruce Ackerman in ‘The 
Emergency Constitution’, the various proposals for Judicial oversight, and the role the 
media can play (especially under the equilibrium model interpretation of it) in curbing 
executive secrecy. I argue that most of the institutional responses seem to fail in this 
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regard. Either they leave too much scope for secrecy without providing practical 
pathways to confront it, or they lean heavily in direction of publicity without leaving 
any scope for legitimate secrecy.  
The fourth chapter analyses whistleblowing as a case of civil disobedience. Ideally 
public policies ought to comply fully with the demands of publicity. In non-ideal 
circumstances full compliance is often not possible. Partial compliance would entail that 
the practice of secrecy is justified. Absent proper justification the practice cannot be 
legitimate and ought to be curbed. Democratic institutions ought to be able to curb the 
excessive practices of secrecy, especially when those practices are linked to unjust acts 
and limit the balance of powers among institutions. Yet often citizen groups and 
institutions are not able to limit secrecy owing to the absence of information. Existing 
designs of institutions often fail to curb these excessive practices. It thus opens up a 
democratic dilemma. The dilemma can be specified as follows: ‘democracies need 
secrecy, but do not have instruments to challenge the malpractices due to excessive 
secrecy’.  
The dilemma cannot be resolved by the instruments of democratic self-correction. If 
democracies have to correct the deficit caused by secrecy, it ought to create other 
instruments. In the absence of such instruments we need to look beyond an 
institutionalist understanding of democracy. Current understandings have to look at 
the practices of dissent as a way to correct the necessary deficits in the democratic 
process. Dissent, if done not with the purpose to subvert existing institutions, but to 
expose their wrong-doings ends up in strengthening democracy. It is in this context we 
need to study acts of Whistleblowing as genuine cases of dissent. Whistleblowing, in 
conditions of secrecy, normally exposes the wrong-doings of an institution, or reveals 
practices that deviate from the constitutional requirements. I argue that it is to 
Whistleblowing cases that we ought to bring our attention if any attempt to salvage 
democracy from excessive secrecy has to be successful. The chapter presents an 
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alternative reading of Whistleblowing than has been usually the case. It argues that 
whistleblowing ought to be read as an act of civil disobedience when the revelations 
highlight gross wrong-doings, reveal the exorbitant powers of the executive that 
compromises democratic checks, and show instances of manipulation under the veil of 
secrecy.  
Civil disobedience ought to be a right when normal instruments of democracy fail to 
curb the injustices which results from excessive secrecy. In conditions of excessive 
secrecy, public disclosures by citizens or state officials of classified documents which 
reveal the unjust practices of the state ought to be categorized as an act of civil 
disobedience. Civil disobedience is justified when the act is done publicly, on behalf of 
the citizens and seeks to reveal unjust practices of the state. It ought to be an instrument 
of the last instance when all the normal modes of engagement and redress of injustice 
have been exhausted.  
It can be argued that secrecy, when used as a cover for unjust acts, breaks the social 
terms of cooperation, whose rules are codified and enacted through an institution. The 
institution, here the executive, breaks the social compact which binds it. An act of civil 
disobedience, enacted as a last resort, is aimed at correcting such a deficit. Rather than 
betraying the trust of democratic institutions, civil disobedience instates vitality in 
them. Similarly, if secrecy hides the unjust practices of the state which compromises the 
rights and obligations of the citizens, civil disobedience exposes the lack of guarantee of 
rights or provides information to fulfill political obligation.  
Secrecy creates an epistemic asymmetry between the citizens and the executive. It 
allows for forms of control and exercise of unchecked power. This has particular 
problems for democracy in general. An act of disobedience, in these circumstances, 
reveals this deficit, the deviation of the democratic institution away from the 
constitutional norm. I call this form of disobedience as epistemic disobedience. The 
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disobedient fulfills his moral duty by exposing the informational asymmetry that 
protects the wrong-doers, and the democratic deficit within the institution. In doing so 
the disobedient moves beyond narrow constraints of legal duty, which binds her to the 
oath of secrecy, to fulfill their obligation to the citizens. In doing so, she refuses to be 
complicit in the harms done. It can be argued that by having access to the information 
the whistleblower is made complicit in the harm, if she maintains silence. In this case 
the moral duty to disobey (a refusal to take part in the harms) overrides the narrow 
constraints of legal duty. The second argument in favour of disobedience arises out of 
autonomy. Secrecy severely compromises the autonomy of citizens, exposing them to 
interferences in their liberty (sometimes even without their notice). The revelation of 
secrecy practices provides the ground for citizens and civil society groups to assess the 
losses in their autonomy, and is a basic precondition if the lost autonomy has to be 
indeed restored.  It does not directly follow from the argument that civil disobedience 
indeed to be successful ought to reach out to those whose autonomy has been curtailed. 
While that necessarily should happen, but in this instance, disobedience is used as a 
communication about a deficit, about a wrong practice. The communication is not 
necessarily aimed at a specific individual, but to the various actors in society viz. civil 
society, legislative, judiciary etc. who are in a position to pick up the information and 
act upon it. Such change can only happen at the level of politics at the level of 
institutions and public sphere. Civil disobedience is just the beginning of this politics, 
and provides with the most important resource to carry on the activity for the desired 
political change. It is in this regard the chapter claims the Wikileaks and PRISM 
revelations by Edward Snowden be seen as an act of epistemic disobedience.  
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Chapter one 
Democratic implications of secrecy 
 
The problem of secrecy has been widely studied in the recent years. It is generally 
accepted that secrecy in the affairs of the state is not a good thing, but necessary for the 
good of security. It is argued that for democracy to function properly, it needs to protect 
itself from external and internal threats. Security requires that sensitive information be 
not open to public, lest it spill over to the enemy. Stationing of troops, sites of military 
nuclear power, or intelligence gathering by the secret services are examples of this kind. 
For this reason, the functioning of the secret services is constitutionally mandated, and 
their informational resources are exempted from sunshine laws that require functioning 
of the executive to be open for public scrutiny. Thus, state secrecy privileges, especially 
executive privilege, are enshrined in the constitutions38. Yet, in the period post 9/11- 
with the discourse of security taking a precedent-39 the exemptions sought by the 
                                                             
38 It is a mistake to assume that the executive privilege and the secrecy privilege which comes with it are a 
product of the constitution. As Mark J Rozell suggests “Executive privilege is an implied power derived 
from Article II. It is most easily defined as the right of the president and high-level executive branch 
officers to withhold information from those who have compulsory power—Congress and the courts (and 
therefore, ultimately, the public). This right is not absolute, as executive privilege is often subject to the 
compulsory powers of the other branches.” (2002:404)  
 
39 One of the markers of the enhanced requirements of security is the enhanced defence budget 
expenditures of the countries around the world. Taking the example of US Zedner says : “It is estimated 
that the US security market generated $29.1 billion in revenue in 2006 from ‘the threat of terror’, of which 
about 70 per cent came from federal, state, and local government contracts, and current estimates suggest 
that this will double by 2010.” (Zedner 2009: 102). See also http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-
secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/print/ [accessed  Oct. 15, 2013].  
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executive has grown exponentially.40 It is argued that the risk of threats have gone up 
due to an invisible enemy with the potential of striking at any time. This enemy, cannot 
be defined in terms of a territory, or does not have particular features, and does not 
follow the old rules of combat thus combating the threat presupposes a different 
response.  
The response to the threat has resulted in a spate of new laws in the US and other 
countries.41 Surveillance operations, data mining etc. have been on the rise on an 
unprecedented scale. It thus becomes imperative to look at the implications of the 
discourse of security on the functioning of democracy. In order to understand it, I will 
highlight two key concepts: security and secrecy. Security is one of the fundamental 
grounds used by secret agencies for classifying state documents. With the number of 
such classification on the rise, it becomes imminent to understand what this conception 
of security entails and how it structures the functioning of the state. It is equally 
necessary to understand the implications of secrecy for the democratic functioning of 
institutions, and its impacts on the liberties of citizens. In this chapter, I will 
demonstrate the democratic implications of secrecy.  
Before embarking on my argument some qualifications need to be made. The concept of 
secrecy will be understood in relation to the democratic functioning of the state. I leave 
out cases of secrecy that concern individuals (for whom secrecy might be a way to 
                                                             
40 A study done by Washington Post shows that there has been an exponential rise in exemptions under 
state secrecy privileges. See http://www.aofs.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/100820-TWP-america-
top-secret1.pdf [Accessed Oct. 15, 2013] 
 
41  The attacks of 9/11 followed a spiteful of anti-terrorism legislation all across the world. Homeland 
Security Act, 2002, Patriot Act and amendment in National Defence Authorisation Act in USA, Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001, Terrorism Act 2008 in UK, Australian Anti-terorism act, 2005, 
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act in India are some of the examples of such kind of acts.  
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preserve their privacy), secret societies and groups.42 The minimum interest in 
individual secrecy, if any, would have to do with cases of surveillance, data mining and 
data gathering. For this matter privacy is a more helpful concept than secrecy, and I 
would allude to it if required. Thus, in this chapter I do not draw on a whole sale 
analysis of the concept, but limit it to the cases of executive secrecy. By executive I mean 
that branch of the state which deals with the day to day functioning of the state 
apparatus. This branch is responsible for the execution and enforcement of the 
constitutional laws, as mandated by the legislature or as interpreted through the 
judiciary. It is thus responsible for maintaining public order. This could be the branch of 
defence, the secret services, police, education, health etc. Executive secrecy deals with 
the secrecy imminent in the functioning of this branch of the state.  
 
1. Secrecy: A conceptual analysis 
X is a secret if and only if an agent A having information I intentionally43 withholds it 
from being revealed to others. Holding a secret requires four definite characteristics:  
a)  agent A knows I,  
b) I is not known to anyone else other than A,  
c) I is intentionally hidden from others, and  
d) the veridic claims of  I can only be ascertained by A.   
The claims of veracity have to be treated with a bit of caution and a qualification is in 
order before we proceed. I can be kept secret even if A is uncertain about the truth value 
                                                             
42 For a wholesale analysis of individual and group secrecy look at Simmel(1906). For the need for 
individual secrecy see Bok(1983)  
43 The intentional aspect of secrecy has also been highlighted by Bok (1983) 
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of I. For I to be kept secret, it need not be true. It might be completely false or uncertain. 
I need not be a piece of knowledge and need not stand up to the epistemological 
scrutiny of truth. I can be kept away from others just because the truth content is not 
known by A or she is uncertain about it.  It is instructive to see that while the veridic 
claims of information I cannot be tested, but the veridic claims of the statement, that 
particular information, albeit uncertain or false in its content, has been kept secret can 
be verified. Possession of truth value by A with respect to I does not always have to do 
with the truth content of I but with the truth content of the possession of I. From the 
ensuing observations, one can also claim that it is only A who is potentially able to 
ascertain the veracity of I. A is thus in a position to use I as they deem fit, and given 
favourable circumstances to ascertain the veracity of I.  
1.1) Intentionality aspect of secrecy  
The type of secrecy under consideration here is intentional.44 A knows that she knows 
and that others don’t know45 and makes sure that they don’t know, till the point A 
wants to reveal it. Thus intentionality protects a range of actions. Secrecy, in this sense, 
can allow for a range of actions to be undertaken which would not have been possible 
without the active subtraction of information from the public domain. Troop 
movements or surveillance operations, if known, can defeat the very purpose of the 
action. On the other hand, secrecy can also be used to thwart the capacity of rational 
decisions of others. Intentional secrecy creates a control over informational resources. 
Such control opens up a wide range of action for A. It empowers A to utilize 
information for her own end or the end of the others. This creates an asymmetry in 
                                                             
44 A might not know something but might not be aware of the knowledge of it. It belongs to the category 
of unknown knowns. But this is not part of the analysis here.  
45 A might be mistaken in the belief that others are not aware of the secret, but in his knowledge it is just 
her who knows about the secret. Sometimes A herself can be the origin of the secret and would be the 
only one knowing about it.  
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power relations between A and others. Such power asymmetry, if used for the ends of 
others who have access to the knowledge of the existence of such asymmetry, as 
happens in constitutionally mandated executive secrecy privileges can be beneficial to 
others, but it can also lead to manipulation or control. It does not necessarily follow, 
that holding I directly empowers A to act; an act to be actualized requires other set of 
conditions to be in place. Manipulation, is not directly a product of secrecy, but is 
enabled due to the presence of the secret information. For manipulation to take place, 
secrecy might be a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. Secrecy, being the 
enabling condition, can allow A to reorder other circumstances for manipulation to be 
successful. Others can thus be made to believe things which are contrary to the fact. By 
actively subtracting information from others or providing them with insufficient or 
wrong information A hampers the capacity of an autonomous agent to make rational 
decisions and have control over one’s own choices. Under secrecy, what the agent 
believes to be a product of rational choice might have been tampered with, due to the 
active interference of A.   
Let us try and make sense of the above theoretical considerations with an empirical 
example. One of the main reasons for the war with Iraq, as cited by the USA and its 
allies was the possession of weapons of mass destruction by the Iraqi regime. After the 
occupation of the country by the allied forces, the information turned out to be 
completely false.46 There could be multiple scenarios which will highlight the 
theoretical point under discussion. It might have been the case, that there was no 
information received by the US agencies about their being any presence of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) and they deliberately chose to mislead the public about it 
being the case by creating such information.47 The second scenario would be that they 
                                                             
46 See http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7634313/ [accessed Oct. 25, 2013]  
47 Fresh evidence claims that MI 6 and CIA were told by the Iraqi foreign ministry before the war about 
the absence of active weapons of mass destruction. See 
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received false information which they took to be true and tried to work on it. In fact, the 
information carried out by the media houses about the presence of WMD always 
suggested reliable sources, but never went on to specify who those sources were in the 
first place. So even if, the second scenario does hold it specifies our case that holding 
information does not necessarily mean that it is true. Even if the state was misled into 
believing, it still was in complete possession of the instruments in order to verify its 
claim, which it did not do so for reasons outside to do with the nature of information 
itself. This enhances my claim, that it is the agent who possesses the information, and 
the only one in perfect position to assign a truth value to it. This was not done in the 
case mentioned above and false information was taken to be true. Or it might be the 
case that the information was always known to be false but action was initiated due to 
reasons other than those to do with the possession of information itself. Since the 
sources and the proofs for making the case of WMD was kept secret, the state could act 
as it deemed fit without any recourse to the truth of their being such a case. In fact, 
there are enough reasons to believe that truth was sidestepped to undertake other ends. 
This is a particular case, where the aspect of secrecy allows for a realm of action which 
has nothing to do with the truth content of the information. In fact information can very 
well be manufactured or non-existent but the opacity of secrecy allows even the non-
existent information to be hidden.  
1.2) Secrecy in institutions  
The analysis till now has been at the level of individuals but secrecy in the case of 
government is institutional and cannot be understood by generalizing individual 
practices of secrecy. Institutions have to do with certain set of rules and practices 
comprising of multiple set of people working on different designated tasks. In 
democracies, such an institution is the executive.  Secrecy at the institutional level does 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/18/panorama-iraq-fresh-wmd-claims [accessed Oct. 
25, 2013] 
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not mean that the existence of I is a common knowledge among all the employees of the 
secret services. The information I being kept secret is institutional and is maintained by 
the agents who are responsible for maintaining or gathering the information. The 
condition of common knowledge does not hold though all the individuals in the 
institutions might potentially have it. In fact, it might be the case that different secret 
agencies hold separate information, which might not be accessible to the other.48  
Secrecy at the level of institutions thus protects the range of actions and information 
within that institution. It grants freedom to individuals working within those 
institutions, to execute certain actions without being known. Any abuses which result 
from such protected actions are due to the way the institution itself functions. In 
democracies, it is assumed that the institution ought to have certain internal and 
external checks on their actions. While the external checks are absent as we will see 
later, internal checks means that we can attribute intentionality to the action to an 
individual or groups within an institution particularly mandated for such tasks. Having 
said that, the sphere of actions of an individual within the institution is not limited by 
the assigned task to them, in fact, the possession of I opens up other incentives and 
possibilities of action that might run contrary to their duty within the institution. 
Individuals might want to trade information for their personal benefits with enemies or 
might be discontent with the content being kept secret. Spying is an example of the first 
kind, while cases of conscientious objection, moral disobedience exhibit the second 
kind. Individuals can dissent believing that the actions protected under the secret run 
contrary to the stated objectives of the institution and do harm to those it seeks to 
protect. They can specify reasons for their dissent; reasons which have nothing to do 
with personal incentives or rewards, reasons which are public in nature, work towards 
                                                             
48 This was evident in the 9/11 case whereby the CIA had information which could have been used by 
FBI to thwart the terrorist attacks. See 9/11 commission report for more on this http://www.9-
11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf [Accessed Oct. 15, 2013]  
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fulfilling their obligation to fellow citizens, and seek to preserve the democratic 
institutions of the country. These cases will be considered in chapter 4 of the current 
dissertation.  
 
2. The democratic need for secrecy49  
Is secrecy justified in democracy which is a system based on transparency, on the 
consent of the governed?  Should not the decisions of the state and its actions be open 
for public review and criticisms? If decisions in democracy are legitimated in the name 
of the governed, is it then, not a paradox that some of the decisions need to be kept 
away from them? The paradox is because, in the words of Bobbio, there is a perceived 
difference between ‘democracy as it should be’ and ‘democracy as it is’.50 It is the gap 
between the ideal of democracy- as a system which promises openness, transparency- 
and the actual practices of it. Yet it is not so paradoxical if we take into consideration 
that the justification for secrecy comes from within the democratic process itself which 
mandates the requirement of certain secrets through the constitutional process.51 
Secrecy thus becomes internal to the functioning of the democratic process itself; and to 
some extent a prerequisite for undertaking some activities which might not be 
undertaken, if they are publicly declared. The problem of secrecy and its contrast to 
publicity works within democracy itself, and not external to it. ‘The conflict’ as 
Thomson argues ‘is not primarily between secrecy and democracy but arises within the 
                                                             
49 The analysis just reasons that justify the legitimate practice of secrecy in a democracy. It does not take 
into account Max Weber’s (1978) account of state secrecy that sees it as an instrument of state power, or 
the account of Mark Neocleous (2002) who suggests that there are no independent basis for state secrecy 
other than the reasons of state. He has criticized this aspect of secrecy. The analysis in this chapter though 
suggests that some secrecy is justified for the legitimate purpose of security. See also Neocleous (2008)  
50 (Bobbio, 1987) 
51 (Sagar 2007) 
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idea of the democratic process itself. Some of the best reasons for secrecy rest on the 
very same democratic values that argue against secrecy.’52 The argument thus runs that 
ideal of publicity can co-exist with secrecy in a democratic system; some levels of 
secrecy is seen as compatible with the ideal of democratic government.53  
What are those levels of secrecy which would be compatible with democracy? When 
would we say that a secret is justified? The answer lies in policies which might not be 
carried out effectively without the need for secrecy; policies for the effective fulfillment 
of which secrecy is a must. Yet these policies are public which, according to Thomson,  
.. citizens would consent to if they had an opportunity. The most familiar examples are in foreign policy 
and law enforcement. If the Dayton negotiations on Bosnia had been open to the press and all the terms 
of the final agreement fully disclosed, the leaders would almost certainly not have been able to reach an 
agreement. Or if the plans for a sting operation to catch drug dealers were revealed even after it took 
place, the safety of informers and future operations of a similar kind would be jeopardized.54 
 We clearly see here in the above statement, three strands of justifications emerging for 
secrecy. I will call them the arguments for: a) security, b) deliberation enhancing 
reasons, and c) effectiveness. These arguments do not stand alone, but might require 
each other to justify themselves. So a security policy might need to be secretive for it to 
be effective at all. Similarly, a closed chamber discussion might be required on certain 
policy matters for policy makers to approach the best possible solution. The argument 
of effectiveness runs throughout the other two justifications. In fact, it might be apt to 
                                                             
52 Thomson (1999:182) 
53 (Sagar 2007) 
54 Thomson(1999:182). Similar kinds of reasons were invoked in the Reagan memorandum when it was 
arguing for the case of executive privilege regarding secrecy in some of its affairs. It allowed for secrecy 
in the cases where information might impair the national security, the deliberations of the executive 
branch or might impair some of the functions of the executive as mandated in the constitution. (Rozell, 
2002)  
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suggest here, that it is because there was a warranty that the act would be secret, that 
made these acts possible in the first place.  Let us run through these arguments in detail.  
2.1) Secrecy for security  
The first justification for secrecy stems from necessity and effectiveness. If the 
democratic institutions are to be protected they should be secure.55 Paraphrasing what 
he calls a moderate version of Machiavelli, Bernard Williams provides a reason 
generally cited in favour of maintaining governmental secrecy: 
The responsibilities of government are sufficiently different from those of private individuals to make 
governmental virtue a rather different matter from that of individuals--or rather (and this is very much 
the point) from that of individuals who are being protected by a government. In particular, any 
government is charged with the security of its citizens, a responsibility which cannot be discharged 
without secrecy, and which it will be lucky if it can discharge without force and fraud. 56  
This is precisely the kind of argument that lays ground to what Williams calls the ‘anti-
tyranny’ argument famously advocated by liberals; this argument casts suspicion on the 
acts of state endowed with enormous power. This excessive power needs to be 
controlled lest it violates the very rights and liberties for which the state has been 
created. Yet, in order to enjoy life and liberties, citizens have to be assured that the basic 
institutions of democracy are protected, that their life is secured from both external and 
internal threats. This existential requirement entails the need for vigilant institutions of 
defence and internal security that guards against potential threats, and thwarts them. 
When the state has to take action against criminals, mafias, drug cartels etc. or track the 
movements of the terrorists; these actions require a certain level of secrecy, for publicity 
will endanger the effectiveness of such policy. It is thus argued that institutions like the 
                                                             
55 Bok (1983)  
56Bernard Williams 
http://omero.humnet.unipi.it/matdid/637/WIlliams%20Truth%20politics%20selfdeception.pdf 
[Accessed Aug. 30, 2012] 
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secret services are not an exception, but are necessary for the very functioning of 
democracies.57  
Executive secrecy is derived from the prerogative or the function designated 
constitutionally to the executive. This prerogative, according to Locke, allows the 
executive “to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription 
of the law, and sometimes even against it”.58 The prerogative is required  
..for since in some governments the lawmaking power is not always in being, and is usually too 
numerous, and so too slow, for the dispatch requisite to execution; and because also it is impossible to 
foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all accidents and necessities that may concern the public, or to 
make such laws as will do no harm, if they are executed with an inflexible rigour, on all occasions, and 
upon all persons that may come in their way; therefore there is a latitude left to the executive power, to 
do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe.59  
Executive prerogative thus is a logical outcome of the expertise and the assigned 
function of the executive. Their expertise allows them to assess situations of emergency 
better and respond to them, sometimes in extra-legal ways. Though, it is not clear 
where Locke would stand on governmental secrecy, but the need for it can be derived 
from his support for executive prerogative. The prerogative allows for discretions on 
the part of the executive, if they are done for the public good. The logical need for 
secrecy can be laid down as follows: i) Security is a necessary good. ii) State is bound by 
the contract to ensure the self-preservation of its citizens, iii) The executive is the arm of 
the state designated for the purpose of security, iv) Self-preservation in times of 
necessity requires secrets to be maintained on certain acts of the executive.  
                                                             
57 Sunstein 1986, Solove 2008, Sagar 2009, Moore 2011, and Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
58 Locke (1980: 84)  
59 idem 
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National security matters require public judgements to be deferred to the executive. Not 
all acts of the executive are thus open to public scrutiny. The need for secrets from the 
citizens is twofold: effectiveness and expertise. Effective fulfillment of a security policy 
sometimes requires secrecy for a secret operation that cannot be made public without 
letting the enemy know about it at the same time. On the other hand, the expertise 
argument requires that judgements on matters of national security be taken by people 
who have the requisite knowledge on the matter. The citizens neither have sufficient 
information nor the expertise to provide for meaningful inputs. Only the executives are 
in such a position to decide upon the actual existing nature of the threat.60 The 
effectiveness argument justifies the requirement for secrecy, while the expertise 
argument justifies the need to defer judgement to the executive. Thus, since the citizens 
are not aware of every security policy, they ought to surrender their judgement to the 
executive.  
2.2) Deliberation enhancing reasons for secrecy 
Secrecy enhances the quality of deliberation for the following two reasons: i) it enhances 
the quality of decisions,61 and ii) protects the privacy of the participants. Public 
deliberations might bring representatives to subscribe to particular interests, rather than 
invoke public reasons. ‘Publicity’ suggests Bok,  
‘tempts participants to rigidity and to posturing, increasing the chances either of a stalemate in which no 
compromise is possible, or alternatively, of a short-circuited and hasty agreement. To pull back from an 
opening offer, often made for bargaining purposes only, might be interpreted, if done in full public view, 
as giving in.’62   
‘The public nature of the debate’, contends Chambers, ‘forces speakers to make general 
appeals, but there is little or no critical accountability to ensure that those appeals are 
                                                             
60 (Posner and Vermeule 2007). 
61 (Elster 1995, Gutmann and Thomson 1996, Chambers 2004, Sunstein 1986, Dryzek, 2000) 
62 Bok (1983: 184)  
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well reasoned.’63The reasons presented in public would be shallow or pertain to narrow 
interests of the representatives’ own constituencies thus resorting to demagoguery. 
Interest groups would be able to influence the way decisions are being taken. The 
decision makers might not be interested in upholding the virtue of truth but will strive 
to gain support for their cause; manipulation and pandering being their means.64 The 
quality of deliberation would generally improve when the officials deliberate in secret; 
they can fearlessly play out their reasons, revise their positions and better appreciate 
others’ reasons.65 Widely different and contrasting positions can thus be resolved and 
reconciled. Similarly, if the representatives have to carry on deliberations in private they 
have to be assured that their tentative proposals are not made public.66 Doing otherwise 
will compromise their basic freedoms and also restrict their participation.  
 
3. Problems with secrecy  
The particular problem with secrecy appears due to its very nature; an apparent conflict 
ensues with the values of publicity in democracy. Secrecy by its very nature resists 
publicity; it can only do so by denying itself. The moment the secret is told, it no longer 
remains one. The content of the secret and its existence can only be known to the agent 
who keeps the secret. This highlights peculiar epistemological properties. The truth is 
then only accessible to the agent, who keeps secrets. This also means that it is not 
accessible to others apart from the agent; thus the truth about existence or non-existence 
of secret information or an act cannot be verified by the non-knower.  As highlighted 
before, the access to a secret puts the knower in a privileged position with respect to the 
non-knower, especially when the informational good in question is rivalrous in nature 
                                                             
63 Chambers (2004:398) 
64 Ibid 
65 Gutmann and Thomson (1996) 
66 Bok (1983) 
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or the information might impact the non-knowers’ life in adverse ways. For example, a 
trade secret can put the knower in an advantageous position vis –a -vis their rivals. Or 
take the example of an individual, who suffers from a communicable disease, 
intentionally hides the information from all those who might potentially get infected. If 
a person suffering from HIV keeps the information secret, she might be harming the 
health of their sexual partners, especially when they engage in unprotected sexual 
intercourse. Thus, secrecy might advantage its knower not only in a profitable sense, 
but it also enables the person to inflict harm on others67. Lacking adequate checks, the 
secret keeper can continue harming the interests of others and exercising power over 
them. This power is enhanced when the secret keeper have access to information of 
others.  It creates asymmetry in the power relations. Cases like data mining, 
surveillance etc. exemplify the problems with such asymmetry. Corporations and 
security agencies are able to access secret details of the population while being able to 
hide knowledge about themselves under veils of secrecy.68 
  Secrecy also provides a fertile ground for deception as mentioned before. The knower 
can selectively decide to leak, or withdraw certain sets of information from others. 
Partial sets of information can be disclosed or withheld in order to tell a coherent story 
that the deceiver wants the hearer to follow. The non-knower does not have full set of 
information to make considered judgements in such circumstances.  
 Secrecy can debilitate judgement, not only on the part of the non-knower, but also for 
its keeper. As Sisella Bok points out:  
Secrecy can harm those who make use of it in several ways. It can debilitate judgement, first of all, 
whenever it shuts out criticism and feedback, leading people to become mired down in their own 
stereotyped, unexamined, often erroneous beliefs and ways of thinking. Neither their perception of a 
problem nor their reasoning about it then receives the benefit of challenge and exposure. Scientists 
                                                             
67 Simmel (1906)  
68 Moore (2011) 
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working under conditions of intense secrecy have testified to its stifling effect on their judgement as 
journalists, police agents, and spies, or about living incognito for political reasons, have described similar 
effects of prolonged concealment on their capacity to plan and to choose, at times on their own sense of 
identity.69  
This is an important epistemic point which needs to be highlighted. Secrecy means that 
one cannot put one’s own beliefs and knowledge to the test of others. It excludes the 
possibility of alternative view-points to come in contradiction with one’s own held 
beliefs. Secrecy thus resists one of the basic preconditions of knowledge formation; the 
test with alternative facts and ideas. The knower thus has to depend on one’s own 
epistemic resources and judgement; which might be limited or constrained. It might 
create a certainty in one’s own knowledge. But such knowledge might not necessarily 
be grounded in reason and could lead to self-deception, thus being inimical to the 
interests of the secret keeper. 
 
4. Implications for democracy  
The general pitfalls of secrecy, highlighted above, have important implications for a 
democracy governed by the rule of law. These problems generally emerge due to the 
deference to the judgement of the executive.  
4.1) Balance of Powers is compromised: 
 Democracy is based on the principle of balance of power, whereby, any branch of the 
state should not have so much power as to override other branches. Any potential or 
real misuse of power needs to be controlled by other branches of the state. Under 
conditions of secrecy, the executive branch, is the one who holds excessive power by the 
virtue of being in the position to not only access secret information, but also by 
                                                             
69 Bok (1983:25)  
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precluding control over the use of that information. “An indication of power”, suggests 
Moore “is the ability to forcibly demand access to information about others while 
keeping one’s own information secret.”70 This executive privilege compromises the 
balance of power between the different branches of the state, and tilts it in the favour of 
the executive. The Iran-contra affair is a case in point: where not only the legislative was 
not informed but its decisions were also overlooked.71 Access to information puts the 
executive in the position to decide on the potential harms of disclosing the content of 
the information. The internal checks are generally missing or reinforce the existing 
trends in maintaining secrecy.72  
4.2) Excessive Power of executives can lead to manipulation 
 Being the sole arbiter, over deciding to disclose or suffocate the disclosure of 
information, gives the executive enormous amounts of power over the informational 
resources. Secrecy often denies the legislature and the policy makers of important bits 
of information. Executive can and does utilize the information to influence the 
legislative in matters of public policy. The Iran- Contra affairs showed that secrecy was 
used to subvert the legislative policy, hide an act which was not authorized by the 
congress and then pressurize the congress into affirming support for the Contras. One 
of the major motives in the Iran-contra affair was to influence the legislative towards 
supporting the Contras, a move which was initially thwarted by the legislative. It was 
hoped that by keeping the support of the Contras in secret, the congress will be left with 
no other option than to support them in the later stage. The idea was to manipulate the 
public opinion and the opinion of the congress towards the support.73  
                                                             
70 Moore (2011:2) 
71 Thomson (1999) 
72 Fuchs (2006) 
73 Parry et.al (1988) 
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The executive can also resort to selective leaks from time to time, in order to orient 
public support in their desired policy direction.74 An example from the 2011 ACLU 
report corroborates this point of view:  
“In September 2009, Bob Woodward of the Washington Post obtained a leaked copy of a confidential 
military as-sessment of the war in Afghanistan that included General Stanley McChrystal’s opinion that 
more troops were necessary to avoid mission failure. The purpose of this leak was undoubtedly to 
manipulate the policy debate by putting public pressure on President Obama to comply with the 
commanding general’s preferred strategy.”75  
The obfuscation due to secrecy allows the executive to watch and control the behaviour 
of the public (through the existence of surveillance technologies), and wield power over 
them.76  Secrecy thus works as a blind and a tool for social control, manipulation and 
indoctrination.77 The informational resources required to control the excesses of the 
executive are unavailable to the citizens. In fact, they might be quite unaware that such 
an excess is occurring in the first place. It is not only the act of wielding power that is 
hidden but also the knowledge that such an act exists in the first place. The citizens in 
such circumstances are doubly disadvantaged. Firstly, as a citizen who are unaware of 
what the state does in their name, which is the political obligation of citizens qua 
citizens, and secondly, they are unaware of the fact of how secrecy meddles with their 
own rights. This creates uncertainty in the level of action while fulfilling their political 
                                                             
74 Fuchs (2006), Berman (2009). 
75 Stanley and German (2011: 13).  
76 “If we take the pair command/obedience as the epitome of the asymmetrical power relationship, the 
more hidden from sight the person who commands, the more terrible he is (the subject knows that there 
is someone looking at him but does not know exactly where he is).” (Bobbio 1987:  90)  
77 “Privileged access to the sources of relevant knowledge makes possible an inconspicuous domination 
over the colonized public of citizens cut off from these sources and placated with symbolic politics.” 
Habermas cited in note 28 (Chinen 2008 : 106 ) 
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obligation and while ascertaining the guarantees of their own rights. Thus the question 
arises a la Bobbio ‘who controls the controllers’ under such conditions? 
4.3) Usurpation of public office by private interests 
Secrecy might allow public officials to go scot free when they use their office to further 
personal or sectarian interests that conflict with the public good.78 Public officials or 
legislatures might be influenced by powerful private factions and sectarian groups thus 
allowing some groups to usurp government functioning.79 This is often the case with 
corruption where a certain group or an individual is favored over another, due to 
conferral of some private benefits to the public employee. Lacking any review or checks, 
information might be withdrawn or not revealed to shield public officials from any 
forms of critical scrutiny or prosecutions.80  
4.4) Political Sovereignty is compromised 
Secrecy compromises one of the basic tenets of democracy- sovereignty based in the will 
of the people. Sovereignty requires autonomy for individuals to make choices. 
Information is a basic prerequisite to exercise autonomy; especially on matters which 
have implications for the lives of the individuals. Secrecy, with regards to security or 
otherwise, denies the individual a basic right to know and act on their own. It denies 
them the epistemic warrant to take decisions. Rather, the judgement is deferred to 
                                                             
78 Sunstein (1986) 
79 Interestingly, Sunstein shows that at times  the justification for secrecy in deliberations might be 
required to so that a particular group having ‘intense preferences’ might want to orient the policy in their 
preferred direction. (ibid) 
80 Stiglitz (1999), Moynihan (1999), Fuchs (2006).  In the Reynolds case the judiciary was refused any 
insight into the case citing crucial national security information, but in the end it was about shielding 
some neglect on the part of some officials. For more analysis see Fisher (2007) 
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experts, who by the virtue of being in an epistemic superior position to judge the 
circumstances of action, can render certain actions of secrecy necessary. Deference 
opens up an ethical, political and epistemic conundrum, since the consent of the citizens 
is never sought for, but implicitly assumed. The recent case of the usage of drones as a 
weapon of war is a case in point. The use of drones was completely kept secret from the 
American public, while their impact on the civilian population and enemy combatants 
was widely reported in the news media; drones as an official policy was not assented 
till recently. This led to secret assassinations and huge damages to civilian life and 
property. It can be asked whether the American public would have assented to this 
policy, if the policy was made public. The citizens of the state are being implicated in a 
policy where their consent has been assumed. Citizens thus become part of the harms 
done by their state in their names. Ignorance of the affairs of the state does not reduce 
the culpability of the citizens in any manner, but it only enhances it, for it shows the 
double failure of political obligation on the part of the citizens. Not only they should 
refuse to be part of the harms done by the state in their name81, but they should be 
aware when such harms are being committed and seek to redress those wrongs, if 
possible. In order for this to be possible, information and knowledge of the affairs of the 
state is a must; which any condition of secrecy does not fulfill, instead judgement on 
important matters of national security is handed over to the experts.  
Deference to the judgement of experts82, owing to their superior epistemic position 
opens up a ‘democratic deficit’. The judgement of the expert does not betray democracy 
                                                             
81 According to Mill ‘A person may cause harm to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and 
either way he is justly accountable to them for the harm.’(1991:15).In case of secrecy, though it can be 
assumed that this inaction is due to the lack of information.  See also Pogge (2008) for why it is a duty of 
the citizens to refrain from harms being done in their name.  
82 This deference to the experts stems not from “the traditional contempt for the common people as an 
irrational crowd, incapable of making rational decisions even in its own interest, unable to raise its eyes 
so that instead of staring at the ground of its own daily necessities it might contemplate the blazing sun of 
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by belittling citizens’ rational abilities; on the contrary it celebrates it.83 The argument in 
favor of expertise is not that the citizens do not have the critical faculties in order to 
judge the circumstances for themselves. The justification is that the experts have better 
epistemic grounds to assess facts, as they are given. They possess the required skill, 
technical know –how, resources and the crafts of the trade in order to make better 
judgement, especially during the time of emergencies. The courts have continuously 
shown this tendency to defer to the judgement of executive when it comes to matter of 
national security. One of the reasons cited by courts is the lack of expertise of the court 
to correctly asses the matter in hand.  
 
This argument has several problems from the perspective of democratic theory: i) It 
assumes, and the assumption is correct, that decision making in democracy can be at 
times messy,84 and  sometimes democratic processes have to be subverted if we ought 
to take efficient and quick decisions. Secrecy is thus sought to speed up the decision 
making process. The messiness of the democratic decisions arise out of various stake 
holders who have to be integrated in the process of decision making, and their consent 
to be sought in the decision. This might require time as well as reaching out to those 
various stakeholders. But here, it is argued that at the times of the emergency the 
executives might not have enough time to deliberate and reach out to wider audiences. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the common good. Rather it stems from an objective recognition of its ignorance, or rather its lack of 
scientific know-how, of the unbridgeable gulf which separates the expert from the lay-man, the 
competent from the incompetent, the technician's or scientist's laboratory from the high street.”(Bobbio 
1987: 92).  
83 ibid 
84Citing the case of the affidavits filed by the FBI officials and the Department of Justice on disclosures of 
the information on the detainees held post 9/11, Festner suggests that executive agencies working on 
national security matters often think the sunshine laws and the openness required under them to be ‘at 
best a burden and, at worst, a threat to their work’. (2006, 892)  
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Thus, they would have to be trusted while making decisions. While it is true that during 
emergencies decisions cannot be made in a deliberative manner and not all concerns 
can be taken into account, but those emergency decisions ought to be open for 
retrospective deliberations. The problem with executive deference is that deference 
becomes a norm even in non-emergency circumstances. They are not open to debate 
and checks in normal circumstances and also not to retrospective evaluation post 
emergencies. This is problematic because, it transpires of a fundamental anti-democratic 
behaviour, if not outright paternalism and calls for good faith85. The problem in essence 
is not whether the experts can be trusted, to make fair laws and take just decisions, but 
whether the procedures entailed above are fair and just.  
 Epistemic resources in democracy are widely scattered among different agents and 
actors.86 There is a wide diversity in these resources across the population which is 
brought together when democracies need to take decisions. Democracy rests on the 
assumption of rational epistemic beings coming together and making decisions, not 
necessarily the true ones. Decisions are an outcome of a collective process- competing 
judgements are put to scrutiny and accepted after long deliberations. Democratic 
decisions are considered epistemically fallible.87 Arriving at truth is not necessarily the 
criterion which binds them, though truth can be the normative benchmark on which 
decisions can be judged. Secrecy does not fulfill the condition of fallibility- decisions are 
not put up for public scrutiny; rather the judgement of a group of experts is adhered to. 
This violates one of the basic tenets of democracy, and can create inefficient decision 
making.88 Citizens and other arms of the state do not have enough epistemic warrant to 
                                                             
85 Sagar (2007) 
86 Anderson (2006)  
87 ibid 
88 Sunstein shows that those decisions are generally efficient where people from different strand points 
and dissenting voices are allowed to contest and put forward their claims. The possibility is not allowed, 
especially in closed groups where like minded people generally echo each others’ ideas. (2002) Secrecy 
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trust the judgement of the executive, and to know whether the decisions are: (a) not 
faulty, and (b) not meant to justify narrow sectarian or group interests. Writing on the 
pentagon papers case, Hannah Arendt argued that it was a closed group of individuals, 
who were supposed to be the ones deciding on the security policy. These individuals 
had enough confidence on their own built technocratic models and rationalities to allow 
any fact to interfere or to correct their judgements. So even when the facts necessarily 
pointed to the opposite direction, they were unwilling to use them. This was one of the 
potential reasons for disasters in the campaigns in Vietnam, where the war was carried 
on just to live up to an image of the superpower, without any ascription to the basic 
facts on the ground.89 She argues that belief in their own technocratic models and 
rational beliefs might lead experts to discard any facts that   state to the contrary.90 The 
example suggests two things about the aspect of secrecy which are deeply troubling: 
Secrecy can distort the judgement of the individuals or even group, and executives are 
not averse to this kind of failures, in fact are quite prone to them. b) Judgment 
formation in important policy matters might be impaired in the process. It is not that 
judgments of executives cannot be error prone; though it ought to be so, given its 
consequences for others. The disturbing aspect is that errors creep in because contrary 
opinions are not allowed while making decisions. Dissenting opinions, even when they 
are wrong, present alternative facts and might lead one to deliberate upon their own 
firmly held convictions.91  Contrarily, decisions taken in closed minded groups are often 
less efficient or erroneous.92 The justification for secrecy, on the grounds of efficiency 
and expertise, runs thin when epistemic properties of secrecy are analysed. There are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
allows for such a like minded group to be formed who generally disregard any sense of dissenting 
opinion.  
89 Arendt (1972) 
90 ibid 
91 Mill (1991)  
92 Sunstein (2002)  
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enough epistemic reasons to doubt these claims, for secrecy precludes any forms of 
fallibility of judgement. Even if fallibility is taken into consideration and corrective 
steps are taken in the future, the citizens do not have the warrant that it indeed is the 
case. Citizens do not have any epistemic basis to ground their trust in the executive. On 
the contrary, the abuses due to secrecy when revealed in the long run might betray even 
the minimal trust of the people in democratic institutions.93 
4.5) Might not lead to better quality deliberation:  
Secrecy might not often lead to better quality deliberations for several reasons: (i) There 
is no warrant that all the given positions and interest groups have been represented94, 
(ii) It is not possible to ascertain  whether the participants in the discussions were not 
swayed by sectarian interests,95 (iii) Citizens might be denied important information in 
order to conduct deliberations for public policy goods, (iv) Secret deliberations might 
prove counter-productive, and might betray their own ends.96 
                                                             
93 Pozen (2009) 
94 A recent study by New York based NGO, Open Justice Society Initiative, has alleged that around 
twenty five countries in Europe and others across Asia and Africa were involved in the practice of extra-
ordinary rendition run by the CIA. This might not be possible without the assent of the existing state 
governments of those countries. It can be reasonably assumed that these practices were an outcome of 
secretive agreements and deliberations among those countries. For more 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/05/cia-rendition-report-uk-court. [Accessed March 15, 
2013]  This example clearly states that the people have not been taken as a stakeholder in this practice. 
This practice has largely operated in secret. It needs to be debated and argued whether such a practice 
would have been allowed if done in the full glare of publicity by taking in to account all the stakeholders.  
95 Sunstein (1986) 
96 One of the examples of fallouts of secret deliberations was the Bay of Pigs fiasco. ‘The Bay of Pigs 
debacle was caused, in part, by the fact that the government of the United States had entered into 
negotiations with exiles from Cuba in secret, and had planned the invasion without allowing the 
American Public to participate in the decisions regarding such a venture. The temptation is strong to 
negotiate in secret with a faction within a foreign country: perhaps a junta that is about to take over or to 
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5. Limitations to civil liberties of citizens and groups 
 Security policies, under a veil of secrecy, might severely limit the enjoyment of basic 
liberties of individuals, and in some cases, of whole groups. These limitations might be 
known to the individuals, or they might be completely ignorant of there being such a 
case. Let us illustrate this with some examples. Abu Gharib and Guantanamo97, till 
recently, are two secret prisons run by the CIA. Enemy combatants and militants 
captured from different parts of the world were kept in confinement in these prisons. 
They were not produced before a court of law and torture and extra-legal means were 
used to extract confessions and information.98  In this case the liberties of the 
individuals had been compromised; their basic right to due process and fair trial was 
denied. The limitation of their liberties was not secret to them, but it was kept secret 
from the citizens at large. That such a policy was being run by the secret agencies of the 
United States was kept secret. Such secret policies have impact not only on the liberties 
of those interned but also for the citizens. Illiberal policies of the state might endanger 
liberties of citizens at home. Citizens might be under threat from future terrorist attacks 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
be toppled, or a political party one hopes will be more friendly than others to one’s position. Yet the 
indignation that follows upon the discovery of such secret talks, both at home and abroad, bespeaks the 
sense of unfairness that they arouse.’ Bok (1983:186)  
97An Amnesty International report cited in Pogge (2008) suggests that the secret detention sites are spread 
across different parts of the world like Eastern Europe, Qatar, Pakistan, Jordan, Thailand, Uzbekistan and 
the British Island of Diego Garcia. (pp. 18-19). 
98 Citing various sources Pogge describes the ordeal of these prison inmates. “Labelled “unprivileged 
combatants,” “unlawful enemy combatants” or “security detainees,” these people have been routinely 
humiliated and degraded at will by coalition personnel: stripped naked, forced to masturbate and to 
simulate sex acts, abused with dogs, shackled in stressful positions, kicked and beaten with electric 
cables, and tortured with electric shocks, drugs, sleep deprivation, induced hypothermia and 
“waterboarding” (simulated drowning).”( 2008: 16) 
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which might be a response of the imperialist policies of their own states.99 It can be 
asked, that can a state which tramples liberties abroad be trusted to maintain liberties at 
home, since the fact of limitations of one person’s liberty in a particular instance 
threatens the equal enjoyment of that liberty, and is a future threat to total system of 
liberties.  
The detention of prisoners in secret sites does represent a fundamental limitation of 
liberty which at the same time is illegitimate. Even if the state has noble objectives,100 
acts of secrecy arouse legitimate suspicion.. As Pogge suggests about the detention sites  
At these “black sites” our governments are imprisoning so-called ghost detainees—unknown numbers of 
unknown persons for unknown reasons under unknown conditions. Our governments are telling us that 
nothing untoward is going on at such sites. But it would be irrational and irresponsible to trust that basic 
human rights are being respected in locations no one else has access to when such rights are not being 
respected in locations from which a fair amount of information is leaking out. Common sense suggests 
that, once persons have been caught in the secret prison system, their captors are reluctant to release them 
even when they become convinced of their innocence: Wholly unaccountable for their actions, these 
captors prefer innocent persons to remain missing indefinitely over their resurfacing with information 
about conditions in the secret facilities and possibly with knowledge that might be used to identify 
particular torturers, interrogators, or collaborating doctors.101  
                                                             
99 One of the prominent justifications provided by the terrorists is that of the injustice of the policies of the 
US government against them. They generally resort to providing evidence of the death of civilians and 
innocent persons in the war against terror launched by the US and its allies. In fact the death of innocent 
civilians allows the terrorists in some cases to find recruits who are willing to avenge the death of their 
near and dear ones.  
100 Citizens should beware of their threat to liberty even when the objectives of the state are well meaning. 
As Louis Brandeis points out in Olmstead Vs. United States (1928) “Experience should teach us to be 
most on our guard to protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to 
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil minded rulers. The greatest dangers to 
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding.” 
101 Pogge (2008:19)  
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It is the complete lack of transparency on the part of the state in dealing with the liberty 
of others which is worrying. The citizens cannot be sure whether innocents have not 
been incarcerated; whether the state is operating in secrecy just to hide their own wrong 
doings. In fact, policies of the state towards others might also translate into similar 
policies towards its own citizens. The killing of three US citizens, in secret, through 
drone strikes in Yemen, is a case in point. Due process was denied in the above 
mentioned case and the guilt was assumed to be proven by the state executive bodies 
themselves.102 The National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) of USA, 2012, allows 
for indefinite detention without trial of supposed enemy combatants. The Patriot Act of 
United States provides for powerful tools to the executive to collect information, which 
might mean the use of data mining and surveillance devices.103 Similarly, The Armed 
Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958 of India provides immunity to army working 
in conflict zones from civilian trial. Several abuses of the act have come to light where 
army in conflict areas of Kashmir and Manipur have enforced disappearances of 
innocent people, raped women and illegally detained citizens and tortured them.104  
 The fallouts of AFSPA in India and the continual usage of the Espionage act in USA,105 
suggest that the state can use brute force not only against individuals who are security 
threats but also against dissident voices, both at home and abroad.106 Curbing of dissent 
is justified on grounds of security. Especially vulnerable are those dissidents who reveal 
                                                             
102 For more on this case see http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jul/18/us-citizens-drone-strike-
deaths.  [Accessed Aug. 30, 2012]  
103 for more see http://www.aclu.org/reform-patriot-act [Accessed Jan. 21, 2013]  
104 See http://www.humanrights.asia/resources/journals-magazines/article2/1003/the-armed-forces-
special-powers-act-1958-in-manipur-and-other-states-of-the-northeast-of-india-sanctioning-repression-in-
violation-of-india2019s-human-rights-obligations [ accessed January 17, 2013]  
105http://www.salon.com/2012/02/09/obamas_unprecedented_war_on_whistleblowers/[accessed 
December 12, 2012] 
106 Wladron (2003)  
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the wrong-doings of the state.  Former CIA officer John Kirikaou is alleged to have 
disclosed to the media about the waterboarding and torturing of Al- Qaida suspects. 
Similarly, Chelsea Manning has been charged with handing over the information which 
led to revelations by Wikileaks. Both the individuals have been charged under the 
Espionage Act. Dissent, when it confronts the boundaries of security and secrecy might 
be termed dangerous by the secret keepers. Threats of being exposed might lead to 
curbing or silencing the whistleblowers, thus curbing their liberty to dissent.  
The treatment of dissenters is symptomatic of the way states handle dissent in general. 
When dissent tries to challenge the official line of reasoning, it is termed dangerous. 
Thus, the last resort to salvage liberty through dissent is severely restrained. Individuals 
with access to information might resort to playing safe if revealing information comes at 
a high cost to their personal interests. Public officials might just resort to play safe 
rather than be in the wrong books of higher authorities. Dissent might then be limited 
on its own volition making its future possibility seem improbable. This has severed 
implications for the enjoyment of basic liberties in the future. Liberties cannot be 
enjoyed in certainty, if possibilities to challenge its limitations are restricted, or worse 
criminalized. 
5.1 Unknown threats to liberty  
The last part highlighted those instances of liberty limitations where the individuals 
whose rights are being limited are aware of such being the case. This part will deal with 
those limitations, the existence of which is not known to those whose liberties are being 
limited. To elucidate this point, three examples would be highlighted: i) Surveillance 
and data mining, ii) no-fly list case, and iii) Secret nuclear power plant or military 
installations. 
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i) Surveillance and data mining:  
Surveillance and data mining compromises the privacy of individuals without them 
being aware of it. While making the policy public will defeat its original purpose, its 
implications for individual rights are serious. It is claimed that surveillance and data 
mining is required, in the interest of public good of security, to track a person suspected 
of engaging in a wrong act. The individual waives of their claim of privacy right by 
virtue of their engagement in illegal activities. Denying her this right is a prerequisite 
for the enjoyment of rights by others. It is done in the interest of liberty itself.107 Yet, the 
secretive nature of the operations does not give a warrant to the citizens as to whether 
the policy is being run on reasonable grounds, or if it is justifiable. Citizens are also not 
aware of the accountability structures that govern the usage of the individual data 
gathered by the state.108 The threat to liberty is equal from both external agent and the 
state; especially when the accountability structures are blurry or non-existent. Under 
conditions of secrecy, the individual is not aware epistemically: a) whether they have 
surrendered their privacy rights, and b) whether by surrendering their privacy rights 
they are actually more secure,109c) The ends to which the data will be utilized, and d) 
whether they can trust the state with the handling of the data. Secrecy creates a 
situation of epistemic uncertainty for the citizens; uncertainty regarding their own 
position vis-à-vis a security policy.  Uncertainty exists when individuals know that 
surveillance and data mining constitute part of security policy, but are unaware of its 
                                                             
107 Rawls suggests that liberty can be restricted for the sake of liberty itself, and when such a limitation 
strengthens the overall system of liberty, and such a limitation is acceptable to those with a lesser liberty. 
(1999: 222) In this case while the wrong-doer might not agree to lesser liberty, but her action since it is a 
threat to others’ liberty might require a check.  
108 Moore (2011)  
109 The recent ACLU report shows that the greater level of secrecy meant that some of the dangers which 
could have been avoided could not be because of the high level of secrecy, since there was no 
coordination between the security agencies themselves. (Stanley and German 2011)  
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potential targets. Everyone is potentially a suspect, and in absence of proper control, 
everyone’s rights are threatened. Thus, individual might have surrendered their basic 
rights, without having knowledge of it and with no proper resource to challenge those 
limitations. This violates the self-ownership, autonomy and the individuality of the 
person, and creates an uncertainty in making rational decisions and charting out future 
life plans.110 Secrecy thus denies the individuals of any kind of epistemic warrant- a 
basic precondition for enjoying any kind of privacy rights.111  
Surveillance and data mining also have important distributive consequences, when 
security policies mark out certain groups and communities as their targets. The 
surveillance of mosques in USA is a case in point: members of a certain religious 
community were marked out as a potential source of threat.112 Singling out certain 
groups or communities for surveillance violates the distributive character of security. It 
cannot be the goal of public policy to single out specific groups and communities based 
on their ethnic, religious, racial belonging, but secrecy violates this purpose. Secrecy 
obfuscates the distributive dimension of security. Thus, the community does not have 
the warrant of equal enjoyment of their liberty.113 
                                                             
110 Gowder (2005) and Pozen (2009). 
111 Rights act as ‘trumps’ (Dworkin 1977) and cannot be forfeited under any condition, even through the 
consent of the individual. If some rights are being compromised then the individual needs to be aware of 
such a condition. 
112  A law suit filed by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Council of American-Islamic Relations 
alleges that the FBI was monitoring and using surveillance mechanisms against several mosques in south 
California. For more on this read http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/23/muslims-and-aclu-sue-
fbi-_n_827339.html.  [Accessed Jan. 15, 2013]  
113 Waldron (2006)  
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ii) No fly list case: John Graham, an ex-member of the state department on security, was 
put on a no fly list of the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA).114 Due 
process was denied to him, and no reasons were assigned for the limitation of his 
freedom of movement.  The curious thing about the no-fly list is that once put on the 
list, you remain on it, even when proven as not a threat to security.115 Such a listing not 
only curtailed Graham’s liberty to move, but also his livelihood, which is essentially 
linked to travel.116 No fly list suggests one of the basic limitations of the freedom of 
movement; such a limitation is not even known to the individual until and unless they 
want to fly. Secrecy in this case, denies the epistemic warrant of the limitations of rights, 
and to contest those limitations, if and when they exist.  
 
iii) Secrecy might affect the health of its citizens: One of the essential features of secrecy 
is that it impacts individuals in incalculable ways. Secrecy can render life decisions 
uncertain and future projects at the mercy of unknown risks. Three illustrations will 
suffice to demonstrate the dangers linked with ‘risk-secrecy’: 
a) the secret nuclear power plants of Rocky Mountains, Denver:  
From the year 1952-89 a secret nuclear power plant in the Rocky flats was producing 
over 70,000 plutonium triggers. This plant was maintained under the direction of the 
Atomic energy commission (later the department of Energy) by Dow Chemicals till 1975 
and Rockwell International till 1989. This facility had serious impacts on the 
environment and the health of the citizens exposed to the threats of radiation. These 
                                                             
114 Graham (2005), See http://www.alternet.org/story/23362/who's_watching_the_watch_list  [Accessed 
July 21, 2012]  
115 ibid 
116 ibid 
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factors were hidden from the residents. Even the workers working in those factories 
were not aware of the nature of the risks they were indulging in.117 
b) Military firing squad of Salta di Quirra118:  
Evidence based on the health statistics of the individuals living around the firing squad 
shows a high rate of leukemia and different other sorts of pathologies. The danger to 
the health from the operations of the firing squad was kept hidden till some adverse 
complications started developing among the citizens living around the area.  
c) Adverse health effects from wind-turbines in Ontario:  
Information availed through the freedom of information act revealed in 2009 that the 
state was aware of the risks to health and environment which the turbines posed. The 
ministry of environment was encouraged to take a ‘consistent position’ along that of the 
company which was advocating for clean energy.119 
The first example shows a case of complete secrecy, while in the second and the third 
case the effects of operations on the health of the individuals was kept secret. The third 
case also represents the existence of private interests in denying the information to the 
public. The effects on the public health are quite clear in the demonstrated cases, but the 
above illustrations also highlight other forms of restrictions of liberty. The liberty to 
choose an occupation, knowing the dangers they were exposed to, was compromised in 
the first case.  Similarly, freedom of movement, to reside and settle, wherever they 
want, is severely restricted in all the cases mentioned above. Secrecy limits the citizens’ 
                                                             
117 For more on this read 
http://www.alternet.org/story/156223/we_had_a_secret_nuclear_weapons_plant_near_a_major_ameri
can_city_yeah,_one_of_the_most_contaminated_sites_in_america [accessed January 21, 2013]  
 
118 See Zucchetti (2005) for more details.  
119 See http://www.windaction.org/news/36973  [Accessed Feb. 1, 2013]  
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rights to be aware of the limitations of their liberty. It just creates an unsafe 
environment, from the perspective of their health and enjoyment of other liberties 
which might be an outcome of such a limitation. Governmental secrecy also limits the 
exercise of free choice; for what seems to be a free choice to live and reside in an area is 
severely limited by the non- availability of information, on the full implications of the 
range of fallouts from exercise of choice.  
In conclusion, this chapter sought to demonstrate that while secrecy is required for the 
purposes of safety of the citizens it might compromise the very good it seeks to protect. 
Secrecy, in the absence of proper accountability structure, impacts not only 
compromises democracy by granting unmitigated power to the executive, but also 
limits the enjoyment of rights and liberties of citizens; limitations whose existence 
citizens might not even be aware of. In the absence of such awareness, citizens cannot 
contest those very limitations. The insights developed in this chapter show the 
problems with state secrecy. The next chapter looks at a particular way this problem has 
been sought to be solved in the prevalent discourse on security, as drawn out in the 
balance model.  
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Chapter two  
Safety and security: a critique of the balance model  
 
The last chapter opened up the problem of secrecy for critical scrutiny. It argued that 
while secrecy can be defended on grounds of security, it has implications for the 
democratic process. Actions protected under secrecy sometimes endanger fundamental 
civil liberties. This chapter critically examines the mainstream view that accommodates 
the conflicting demands of security and liberty, thus attempting to provide a way to 
accommodate secrecy. The mainstream conception is represented by the balance model. 
The model suggests that security policy should be guided by pragmatic considerations 
of efficiency; it ought to lie at the point of balance between liberty and security. At the 
outset the model puts fear at the heart of its conceptualization, and seeks to design 
policies to overcome such fears in the minds of people. In doing so, they are willing to 
limit rights, without proper guarantees to those whose rights are being limited.  
In brief, this chapter tries to do two things: (a) To analyse the way secrecy is 
accommodated in the mainstream model, and (b) a critical scrutiny of the mainstream 
discourse for its implications on democratic practices.  
1. Liberty, security and  trade-offs 
'There seems to be something singularly captivating in the word balance as if, because anything is called 
a balance, it must, for that reason, be necessarily good, '-- John Stuart Mill120 
 
There seems to be a certain truism in the metaphor of balance post 9/11. It has been 
argued that the only way security can be ensured in a world threatened by terrorism is 
                                                             
120 Mill (1988 :263) 
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to balance it against liberty.121 The events of 9/11 made analysts as well as theorists 
think whether the new menace of terrorism could be indeed countered through old and 
time tested instruments. Politicians framed the questions in terms of the value of human 
rights for the general citizens and those of the terrorists: should terrorists have same 
protection of rights as the citizens? It was argued that the rights of the alleged terrorists 
need to be balanced against the rights of the citizens who are at the receiving end of 
terrorist attacks.122 This perspective is part of the political rhetoric which has tried to 
frame the debate of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, ‘our’ rights versus ‘their’ rights.123 Terrorists are 
seen as a threat to ‘our way of life’ and as someone who neither believes in rights nor 
respects the rights of others. In this context we are asked whether we should indeed be 
protecting their rights; rights of those who do not believe in rights. Examples of 
Guantanamo, Abu-Gharib, extra-ordinary renditions, drone strikes etc. suggest that the 
discourse is not only in rhetoric but exists in reality.  
 
                                                             
121 Dershowitz (2001), Posner (2001, 2006). The harrowing images constructed in the wake of the terrorist 
attacks construe the possibilities of a future threat and exhort us to imagine the dilemmas in the public 
policy in the face of those threats. It is generally suggested that the terrorists are capable of much more 
than what we saw in the 9/11. They can have access to Nuclear Weapons or weapons of mass destruction 
(Posner, 2006) and thus capable of inflicting large scale harms than imagined till date. The anxiety is 
peculiarly reflected in these words of columnist Kristoff ‘[T]errorist incidents in the 1970s (such as at the 
Munich Olympics) had maximum death tolls of about a dozen; attacks in the 1980s and 1990s raised the 
scale (as in the Air India and Pan Am 103 bombings) to the hundreds; 9/11 lifted the toll into the 
thousands; and terrorists are now nosing around weapons of mass destruction that could kill hundreds of 
thousands. As risks change, we who care about civil liberties need to realign balances between security 
and freedom. It is a wrenching, odious task, but we liberals need to learn from 9/11 just as much as the 
FBI does.’ (cited in Waldron 2003: 192).  
122 Dworkin (2006) See http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/may/24/comment.politics 
[accessed  Feb 14, 2013]  
123 Loader (2007) 
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The balance model is a way in which the relationship between liberty and security has 
been be framed. It is argued that security agencies always resort to balancing, even 
under normal circumstances.124 The metaphor of the balance has stayed even when the 
event of 9/11 has receded a bit in the memory. The vocabulary of balance has widely 
entered public discussions and debates in parliaments like the US, Canada, Australia 
and the European Union.125 New York Times reporter Scott Shane initiated a running 
dialogue with readers, government officials and experts about their views on the 
balance between security and liberty.126 The way the questions were framed suggests 
the purported belief in the metaphor of balance:  
What is the proper balance between liberty and security? Would you like to see the government alter the 
trade-offs of post-9/11 America? Do you fear the scrutiny of the Department of Homeland Security more 
than that of Walmart? Do you think much about the electronic trail you leave as you go about your day? 
Have you taken any steps to protect yourself from the prying gaze of the government? Or do you feel 
better when you read about the formidable security bureaucracy built up since 9/11?127 
The question necessarily frames the relationship between liberty and security in a form 
of balance, without questioning it. People who vouch for a balance between liberty and 
security consider it necessarily as a good thing, as something which is the right thing to 
do. The suggestion of balance is assumed as a mere fact of life, something which the 
policy makers and the citizens encounter and act upon in their day to day life.  128 It is 
assumed, in the words of Jeremy Waldron, that the balance is ‘always necessary—even 
in normal circumstances—to balance liberty against security.’129  
                                                             
124 Posner & Vermeule (2007)  
125 Michaelsen (2006)  
126http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/assessing-the-trade-offs-between-security-and-civil-
liberties/?ref=scottshane [accessed on March 12, 2013] 
127 ibid 
128 Philips (2010)  
129 Waldron(2003: 91-92)  
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Framing the discourse of balance as a necessity or as mere fact obscures the critical 
interrogation of the metaphor of balance itself. The choices which the citizens or the 
policy makers are made to believe is between having more security and less liberty or 
the vice-versa. Necessity implies an ‘ought’ and by this very virtue escapes critical 
scrutiny. Pragmatically, one can critique necessity at one’s own peril by inviting 
suggestions of self-inflicted harms. Normatively it can be critiqued by stripping it of the 
‘ought’; by removing it from its high point of necessity; by showing that what we 
consider as necessary might not necessarily be so. This is the same problem with the 
discourse of balance. One cannot question the model of balance, though there can be 
reasonable disagreements about:  the point of balance, who decides about this point, 
and how weights should be assigned to the competing goods. In this background the 
next part will analyse the balance model.   
 
2. The Balance Model  
Image of a balance is a term coined by Richard Posner in order to understand the 
relationship between liberty and security. The image invites us to look at civil liberties 
‘as a point of balance between concerns for personal liberty and concerns for public 
safety’.130 In times of emergency when the concerns of safety are higher the balance 
shifts in direction of security and civil liberties are narrowed, while in safer times the 
opposite happens.131 Rights are not supposed to be inalienable in this discourse, but 
their scope ‘must be calibrated by reference to the interests that support and oppose it.’ 
This could be done by locating the point ‘at which a slight expansion in the scope of the 
right would subtract more from public safety than it would add to personal liberty’ and 
vice-versa.132  
 
                                                             
130 Posner (2006:9) 
131 idem  
132 ibid: 32-3 
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Posner assigns no priority to liberty or security. For him one should not ask ‘whether 
liberty is more or less important than safety. One is to ask whether a particular security 
measure harms liberty more or less than it promotes safety.’133 The values and weights 
assigned to goods are a matter of personal preference, rather than governed by a 
principled priority rule. In case of states the decisions are to be made by the executive 
and the judges, given the demands of the situation at hand. If individuals feel that 
sacrificing of liberty is a strong demand, they will try to mitigate its loss by 
compromising on security or vice- versa. Any assessment of threat to security is based 
on a probabilistic assessment of risks involved in the future. It cannot be a complete act 
in certainty, and Posner concedes the point, yet he suggests that any threats to liberty 
from the counter-terrorists measures are also speculative at most.134  
 
The assignment of proper weights to security and liberty are problematic, but for 
Posner, these problems are similar to the one we encounter daily when we base our 
judgement on a utilitarian calculus. These judgements are not based on a real 
assignment of weights or quantification but based on a pragmatic utilitarian calculus. 
Lastly, the balance model suggests that security judgements must be deferred to the 
executive, since courts and the legislative do not have the necessary expertise, and the 
ability to make quick and efficient judgements during times of security crisis. Threats to 
national security and concomitant fears associated with it would make judges subject 
themselves to the judgement of the very executive.   
 
2.1) The trade-off thesis  
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have articulated a particular interpretation of the 
balance model as a form of tradeoff between liberty and security. The tradeoff is akin to 
                                                             
133 idem 
134 ibid  
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a pareto- frontier. Liberty and security form the two axes of the frontier which 
represents the various points of tradeoff between the two goods. Along the frontier any 
increase in allocation of security can only happen at the expense of decrease in the level 
of liberty, and vice-versa. The frontier represents points with the most efficient 
allocation of the competing goods, given the constraints. In order to achieve efficient 
outcomes governments ought to align their security policies along the frontier, and keep 
adjusting them as threats arise or wane, till they find the point of optimization that 
maximizes the joint benefits of liberty and security.135 The point of optimization is 
where a gain in security is more than the corresponding losses in liberty or vice-versa.  
 
 
Liberty- Security Frontier136 
 
                                                             
135 Posner and Vermeule(2007:27)  
136 Santoro & Kumar, unpublished manuscript.  
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The diagram above represents a typical liberty-security frontier. In the figure above 
points P2 and P3 are points on the frontier that represent the most efficient allocation of 
resources. Along the frontier a movement from the point P2 to P3 represents a policy 
choice which prefers an increase in liberty to a decrease in security, and vice-versa. 
Only P2 and P3 represent the admissible points of trade-off. P1 is a point below the 
frontier and is thus an inefficient utilization of resources. Hence the state needs to 
rethink its policies to move closer to the frontier. From P1 both security and liberty can 
be increased without sacrificing either. P4 is a policy that cannot be reached.137 The 
frontier represents optimal and efficient level of social welfare, a policy can achieve at a 
given time and with the resources at hand. Over a period of time, as emergencies come 
and go, the shape of the frontier will change.138   
 
 Tradeoff thesis is based on the assumption of that people are aware of the relative 
worth of their liberty and security. The can make interpersonal comparisons between 
their gains in security to the loss of liberty of others or vice-versa.139 This means that ‘a 
loss in liberty (security) for Jack can be compared to a greater gain in security (liberty) 
for Jill, allowing us to make meaningful claims about whether overall social welfare has 
increased or decreased as a result of government policies.’140 Posner and Vermeule are 
aware of the fact that sometimes ‘interpersonal comparisons are either unscientific or 
conceptually meaningless’, but for them ‘security policy is not a scientific subject, and 
meaningful interpersonal comparisons are made in many policy domains.’141 It is not 
important, for the authors, whether actual weights can be assigned to liberty and 
security, but rather that a security policy should use practical reasoning, similar to those 
                                                             
137 Vermeule(2011:2)  
138 Posner and Vermeule (2007)  
139 ibid, 28 
140 idem 
141 idem  
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used by people while making choices between competing goods; goods which cannot 
be quantified. Thus, a pragmatic security policy, in order to be efficient, should make 
similar comparisons in terms of the welfare gains and losses to the citizens.142  
 
2.2) The deference thesis  
At the level of policy, judgement on the optimal point of tradeoff has to be made by the 
executive, especially during times of emergency. This is the deference thesis advocated 
by Posner and Vermeule. According to them, emergencies distort the normal 
functioning of the state apparatus. Responses considered ideal in times of normalcy are 
not adequate; the urgency of the situation requires quick and efficient response so that 
the state of affairs reverts back to normal as soon as possible. Such response requires 
expertise in the matters of national security. Only the executive, given their expertise, is 
in the best position to judge and react to the enormity of the situation. This is the 
argument in favour of the deference thesis.  The thesis holds  
 
‘that the executive branch, not Congress or the judicial branch, should make the tradeoff between security 
and liberty. During emergencies, the institutional advantages of the executive are enhanced. Because of 
the importance of secrecy, speed, and flexibility, courts, which are slow, open, and rigid, have less to 
contribute to the formulation of national policy than they do during normal times. The deference thesis 
does not hold that courts and legislators have no role at all. The view is that courts and legislators should 
be more deferential than they are during normal times; how much more deferential is always a hard 
question and depends on the scale and type of the emergency.’143 
 
The thesis is based on the idea that courts and legislatures often do defer their decisions 
to the executive. The judiciary and the legislative subscribe to the decisions of the 
executive due to their superior skills in handling matters of national security. ‘In 
emergencies’, say Posner & Vermeule, 
                                                             
142 ibid 
143 ibid: 5-6 
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’judges are at sea, even more so than are executive officials. The novelty of the threats and of the 
necessary responses makes judicial routines and evolved legal rules seem inapposite, even obstructive. 
There is a premium on the executive’s capacities for swift, vigorous, and secretive action. Of course, the 
judges know that executive action may rest on irrational assumptions, or bad motivations, or may 
otherwise be misguided. But this knowledge is largely useless to the judges, because they cannot sort 
good executive action from bad, and they know that the delay produced by judicial review is costly in 
itself. In emergencies, the judges have no sensible alternative but to defer heavily to executive action, and 
the judges know this.’144 
 
Thus the judiciaries do not have the expertise to judge executive actions; whether they 
arise out of good motivation or bad, whether they are rational or irrational, or 
misguided. This inability to pass judgement over executive affairs makes deference 
inevitable and rational, and a reason judges have historically deferred to the executive. 
For Posner & Vermeule ‘the historical baseline of great deference during emergencies is 
also the right level of deference.’145 Deference is the most efficient and practical way to 
thwart emergency threats. It is not an article of faith in the executive. Their past 
misdeeds do provide enough grounds for suspicion, yet such actions would not be less 
rational, and less well motivated than is the case during normal times.   
 
The inability of the other branches of the state to judge executive action during 
emergency entails a lack of choice other than deference. The capacity to access secret 
information, conduct their actions in secret, to be more flexible regarding rules and 
method of conduct, and the ability to turn around decisions in quick time allows the 
executive to trump over courts in responding to emergency situations. Emergency 
situations allow for a departure from the normal modes of engagement, sometimes at 
the cost of the rights of a few citizens or the democratic functioning of the state. 
Executive have over-extended powers, and their operations are more secretive than 
                                                             
144 ibid: 18 
145 ibid: 6  
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normal times.  Their counter-terror operations might also cause a few rights violation of 
innocent citizens. Contrary to the civil libertarian criticisms, Posner & Vermeule argue 
that such violations are ‘tolerable when the stakes are higher’.146 In fact for them, the 
state would not be less rational, or their decision making worse than normal times 
during emergency. The states will commit some mistakes during emergency. This is 
inevitable, but similar to mistakes during normal times;147 the mistakes are ‘not 
systematic errors of cognition’148, i.e. they are not systematically biased in one 
direction.149 The errors ‘are essentially random and wash out over many decisions or 
over time’.150 Even when violations of rights happen, during time of emergency, the 
actions of the state cannot be judged on the normal templates of accountability.151 Those 
actions ought to be judged given the background conditions of the nature of threat and 
the quick and efficient response required to thwart them.  
 
3. Criticisms of the balance model  
The criticisms of the balance model can be classified into three kinds: (a) 
methodological, (b) Epistemic, and (c) Distributive concerns. I will discuss them in three 
different sections.  
3.1) Privileging security over liberty  
Economic models of tradeoff are based on methodological neutrality between the 
competing goods. The neutrality is at the point of origin. The goods are treated as 
                                                             
146 ibid: 17.  
147 ibid: 4 
148 ibid: 12 
149 ibid: 4 
150 idem 
151 ibid: 18 
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principally equal in essence, and the agent is indifferent to the specific character of the 
goods. Due to their neutrality, the frontier maps the stated preference of the consumer 
or a producer, given the budget and technical constraints. Contrary to this, the balance 
model is not indifferent among the goods. The terms of discourse are set by the 
requirements of security; liberty needs to be balanced against the assessed needs of 
security. In doing so the model does not accrue to an actual balance, since it violates the 
condition of indifference and neutrality among the goods. But, the balance model is not 
neutral between the two goods; it privileges security over liberty.  
According to the model human rights are not inalienable. Acceptance of ‘rights as 
trumps’ will impose constraints on the actions of the state, thus running counter to the 
stated goal of efficiency, to claims of quick and effective response to emergency 
situations. Thus it needs to be rejected for the model to be successful. Their claims are 
open to revisions, and need to be accommodated against the demands of security.152 In 
doing so, the model inadvertently accords a primacy to security; policy making is 
essentially geared towards avoiding emergency which requires an efficient and 
effective response to a given security situation. The model, unknowingly, assigns a 
weight to security which already outweighs the requirements of liberty.  It is from this 
standpoint that losses or gains in liberties can be evaluated. Thus, faced with situations 
where normative judgements need to be made the model largely weighs in favour of 
security. Assessment on the particular weights of liberty and security are defined by the 
context of an existential threat, and not with concerns of enhancing liberty. Thus, the 
model, cannot not be guided by the concerns of security, and will always end up 
privileging it.  
 
                                                             
152 It is this unarticulated standpoint that allows, Richard Posner, to justify torture and suspension of 
habeas corpus in extreme circumstances. (2006)  
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3.2) Problems in assigning weights  
 Pareto frontier is based on the assumption of comparability; comparison is possible due 
to quantification and the rival nature of the goods. Increase in production of one good 
at the frontier is only possible at the expense of the other good, if we are not to 
compromise on efficiency. Can liberty and security be quantified? If so how? Are liberty 
and security rival in nature? Reiterating Posner and Vermeule; comparisons can be 
based on practical reasoning akin to comparisons we make daily among competing 
choices. Such comparisons do not require quantification to be successful. Yet, the 
translation of a practice at individual level to that of a policy has severe implications. 
The choices of rational individuals are based on their own preferences, and can often be 
vague without any set criteria or principled judgement. Individuals making choices in 
isolation are responsible for the consequences that result from such choices, if those 
choices have not been interfered with. Similarly, states are responsible for the choices it 
makes, yet the choices made by the state impacts citizens and other population groups 
in adverse ways. In the case of the individual, the agent making the choice and bearing 
the responsibility are the same person, and they have to be ready to face consequences 
that result from such a choice. In case of states, population groups are affected due to 
the choices made by their representatives. In essence, even though they represent the 
choice of the citizens, there is a separation between citizens and policy makers. Thus 
policy proposals cannot be made on the line of reasoning that governs individual 
choices. It ought to take into account the preference of the citizens it impacts through its 
policy choices. Thus, the criteria used to assign weights cannot be based on those 
principles that govern individual choices. These criteria ought not to be vague, and 
should be made public.   
If, according to Posner & Vermeule, liberty and security cannot be quantified similar to 
a toy model, then the pareto frontier representation is unhelpful as a real analytical tool 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXVI Cycle                                    PhD Candidate: Manohar Kumar 
  
Page 74 
 
in guiding public policy.153 The goods of liberty and security cannot be similarly placed 
to represent a pareto-frontier. But, if the opposite is true, the balance model still does 
not specify the criteria used by the executive in assigning weights to liberty and 
security. It defers such decisions to the prerogative of the executive. The factual 
assertion, by Posner & Vermeule, that policy makers often engage in a balancing 
exercise is unhelpful, because it needs to be demonstrated that: (a) such indeed is the 
case, (b) the executive is right in doing so, (c) they can asses and assign weights to 
preferences of different groups, 154 (d) they get the weights approximately right, and (e) 
that they are aware when the balance has been struck. Point (b) Requires normative 
justification, while (a), (c), (d) and (e) require demonstrable empirical proof. Even if (a) 
is factually true it does not make it normatively right. Due justification needs to be 
provided for such an exercise. Deviations, if any, have to be explained. Contrary to this, 
in the balance model, such calculations are carried out by the executive in secret. The 
methods and rationale for it are not shared with the citizens, thus leaving space for 
arbitrary decision making by the executive. The space for arbitrariness is only enhanced 
by secrecy of decision making and actions.  
 The model assumes that citizens are indifferent between the goods of security and 
liberty; but this is far from reality. Citizens do attribute values to these goods and are far 
from indifferent. In addition, important policy matters assigning weights to liberties are 
unconstitutional at large, for liberties are inalienable, and for this reason such 
deviations need to be justified to those whose liberties are limited. Due to the secrecy, 
such an operation can neither be evaluated by citizens, nor by the legislative and the 
judiciary. It might end up assigning weights which might run contrary to the same 
interests which it seeks to protect in the first place. 
                                                             
153 Macdonald, 2008 
154 Gross (2009) http://www.tulsalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Gross.Final_.pdf  
[Accessed March 15, 2013]  
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It can be argued though, by proponents of the model, that not all preferences can or 
should be accommodated, and the necessity of quick response requires that not all 
information can be shared. In a situation of emergency citizens themselves are governed 
by fear and would allow for limited incursions in their liberty.  Though true, it still does 
not override the concern, specified above, that liberty reductions need to be justified. 
People’s perception of fear is not a legitimate justification for incursions of liberty, 
especially when they have no grounds to judge either the enormity of the prospects 
they fear, and the response of the executive to allay these fears.155 This point will be 
discussed in detail in the section on epistemic concerns.  
 
4) Epistemic and definitional concerns  
The goods of security and liberty are hardly defined in the model. Liberty and security 
are not like other comparable economic goods. Historically, these concepts have been 
contested and entail different interpretations. Binary opposition of security and liberty 
obscures the complexity of the concepts and their relationships.156 Obscurity in 
                                                             
155 Waldron (2003) 
156ibid. In the classical political thought three relationships emerge. For Hobbes, Security is the primary 
aim of society and liberty is subservient to it (1996). Contrary to Hobbes, for Locke and Rawls, the 
primary aim of society is the preservation of liberty, and any reduction in liberty for the purpose of 
security, can be justified only on the grounds of liberty. (Rawls, 1999) (Locke, 1980).  In fact for Rawls, 
liberty reducing policies are only  justifiable, if they protect the overall system of liberties. Thus liberty 
can be reduced for the sake of liberty itself and ought to be justified to those whose liberties are restricted. 
(ibid: 222) For Mill too, limitation of liberty can only be justified for prevention of harm to others, i.e. 
protection of their liberty. (1991: 14) Mill and Bentham justify security on prudential grounds. (Santoro & 
Kumar, unpublished manuscript) For Bentham, liberty is a branch of security, that protects against 
injuries from the state, (1843: ch.2). For both Mill and Bentham, security protects the expectations of 
future from arbitrary intereference in our liberty. (Bentham, 1843: Part I, ch.7) (Mill, 1991, p. 190). Physical 
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definitions precludes any possibility of a correct translation of the concept in the 
domains of public policy. Security, being an open ended and a contested concept, that 
leaving it undefined allows the policy makers enough maneuver to define it as they 
deem fit.  
Any vague characterization of the nature of threat works to the advantage of the 
security agencies and has deleterious consequences for civil liberties.157 . Conor Gearty, 
exhorting the dangers of vagueness, suggests  
“Danger lies not so much in the confusion as such (inelegant though it is), but in the freedom of action for 
power that vagueness permits. If words mean all things to all, then what matters is who has the power to 
turn their words into action, into people being locked up or put under house arrest, into police action or 
state forbearance in the name of freedom.”158   
 
Vague characterization by itself does not preclude action. On the contrary it enhances 
the power of those agents who are in a position to respond to the particular situation. In 
the case of security threats, the agent is the executive. Security agencies have an 
epistemic advantage, given their position in accessing and gathering sensitive 
information. Their assigned constitutional function allows them to translate such 
information into action as they deem fit. Thus, faced with vague definitions the 
executive has enhanced freedoms to promptly define it.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
security, Henry Shue argues, is one of the preconditions of enjoyment of any form of rights. It is for this 
reason it should be treated as a Basic right. (1996: 21) 
 
157 Even if it is considered to be acceptable that the threats posed by terrorism are something new which 
require large scale policy changes, yet the threat of terrorism has itself been very widely defined.  The 
USA Patriot Act and the United Kingdom Terrorism Act are examples of policies which define the threat 
in quite elaborate terms, thus prone to abuses of liberty. (Zedner, 2005) (Dworkin, 2002). 
 
158  (2010: 3) 
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4.1) The problem of heuristics  
A vague understanding of security results in either a generalization of the threat, or a 
certain narrow understanding of it. Empirically, the tendency is towards former. 
Security policies tend to be preventive in such situations; they try to pre-empt or play 
out the nature of future threats. They mirror possible responses to the events of past, 
and design appropriate responses. Yet, pre-emptive responses have an epistemic 
fallacy; they work on half-baked information. This creates an epistemic uncertainty 
regarding possible responses to the situation. But, such uncertainty does not preclude 
action on the part of the state. Policies deal with uncertainty by either a total curb of 
liberties, or have a limited response through available heuristic devices.  
 
Periods of turmoil present people with heuristic devices through which they try to 
understand their future. Aftermaths of emergency might be marked by a large scale fear 
about the prospects of future. Thus responses are ordered taking into consideration the 
available heuristic.159 Future prospects suddenly start looking bleak, and uncertainty 
creeps in the life plans of individuals. The possibility of future likelihood of such risks 
or emergencies is then overestimated. Attempts are made to secure oneself from the 
recurrence of such threats in the future. Competing interests or preferences are then 
sidelined or sacrificed for the sake of the presumed threat. In this atmosphere of fear the 
respect for civil rights or human rights is fragile in conditions of fear.160 Citizens and 
civil rights groups might support tradeoff with their liberty.161 States might not be 
immune from such fears too. Judges, in times of an emergency, often defer to the 
judgement of the executive i.e. they are prone to accept the decisions of the executive 
                                                             
159 Sunstein (2004) 
160 Dworkin (2002)  
161 Ibid, Silver & Davis (2004)  
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much more than they would in a peace time. 162Thus, conditions of crises often lead to a 
systemic overvaluation of the nature of threat due to the prevalence of the ‘availability 
heuristic’. As Oren Gross points out:  
‘..the pressure exerted by acute exigencies on decision makers (and the public at large), coupled with 
certain unique features of the crisis mentality and thinking, are likely to result in a systemic 
undervaluation of one interest (liberty) and overvaluation of another (security) so that the ensuing 
balance will be tilted in favour of security concerns at the expense of individual rights and liberties.’163 
The ‘availability heuristic’ presents a serious epistemological limitation of public 
security policy at times of emergencies. Punitive measures are supported and in fact 
deemed to be required at those times. These extraordinary measures are not a product 
of a real assessment of the situation, but a mere projection based on the present 
situation. Justifications abound for measures which do not hold currency in normal 
times. Cases of surveillance, data mining, illegal detentions are examples of such cases. 
It can be argued that the power of the state increases during emergencies due to the 
demands of protection placed upon it. Models like the image of balance need to be seen 
in such a background.  
4.2) The silencing of dissent  
 Can fear or a perception of threat can be an actual model guiding state action in 
emergency situations? Even if states’ actions are guided by such a perception but the 
epistemic base of such actions is flimsy at best, not supported by enough evidence. Does 
the modification of civil liberties ‘will make a difference to the prospects we fear’?164 
There is a complete uncertainty with regards to our security; whether by making a 
tradeoff we are genuinely more secure against those threats. The balance model does 
                                                             
162 Brennan (1987), Sagar (2009)  
163 Gross (2011: 3)  
164 (Waldron, 2003: 198) 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXVI Cycle                                    PhD Candidate: Manohar Kumar 
  
Page 79 
 
not account for these measures of uncertainty. On the other hand the effect on civil 
liberties of individuals and groups is quite certain. As Waldron argues:  
The balance model is imperfect not just for how it quantifies the values of liberty and security, but for it 
lacks justification: even on the (common-sense) assumption that liberty is associated to risk, it is not clear 
that a diminution of liberty will increase the net-sum of security. Therefore, if we cannot know whether it 
is worth giving up some liberties, “we cannot talk with any confidence about an adjustment in the 
balance”. On the contrary, what we know for certain is that “the immediate effects on suspects and 
dissidents are quite clear”. 165 
 
Rhetoric of security can as well be used against the internal enemies of the state; 
individuals who question the state and its illiberal policies. The example of 
whistleblowers mentioned in chapter 1 is an instance of this case. In contexts of large 
scale curbs on liberty, dissent is the last preserve of liberty. Dissent allows for 
challenging the illiberal policies of the state. Dissent in epistemic uncertain situations 
might attempt to unravel the secrecy which surrounds security policies at times of 
emergency. It might fill the epistemic lack of the citizens’ vis-à-vis the practice of the 
state, thus curtailing the total power of the state owing to the uncertain situations.166   
                                                             
165 (Waldron 2003: 209) 
166 It is important to highlight two different kinds of epistemic uncertainties which might ensue in times 
of emergency. One is a general phenomenon shared both by the state and the citizens, the other is what 
pertains to citizens in particular. The first instance is about the possible outcomes of security policies 
which might or might not ensure the safety of the citizens yet compromising on some of their liberties. 
The second is more to do with the specific aspects which link to the governmental responses to the 
security situation; about the examples and the cases where the state response leads to curtailment of 
liberties which might not be justified. The citizens might be unaware or uncertain of this situation largely, 
so dissenters might want to challenge either this uncertainty or largely the policies of the state. The state 
repression on dissent then can be on both levels; at the level of those directly challenging the repressive 
policy of the state and at the level of those challenging the information asymmetry which arises out of the 
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 Yet dissent can be seen as limiting the actions of the state; the state might term it 
dangerous since its scale of activities is often up for challenge. Thus, the attempt is to 
silence dissent, either by alleging dissenters as being in support of the enemy, or 
arguing that dissent normally curtails the effective tackling of an emergency situation. 
Largely the public can also be made to believe in the same. Civil libertarian groups 
arguing for the rights of suspects might be termed as helping the cause of the suspects. 
This is clearly present in the prevalent discourse of “our” rights versus “theirs”.  
4.3) The problems with deference   
The balance model argues for a need of deference to the judgement of the executive. 
Deference, in normal affairs, is based on the acknowledgement of authority of the 
individual or institution to which deference is made to. Deference is grounded on trust. 
The person making the deference does not know the epistemic validity of the utterance 
made by the institution or individual, yet takes it to be truthful because of the reliability 
of the source of the statement. Past instances of reliability, or the character of the 
individuals can be grounds for basing this trust. Deference can also be a result of the 
lack of expertise by the individual. People often defer to doctors, lawyers; not because 
they completely trust them, but because they lack the expertise, and have no choice 
other than deference.  
Deference to the executive, during emergency, is about absolving or withdrawing the 
judgement on part of the citizens, not because they trust them but because they do not 
have the wherewithal to act in such circumstances. The prompt nature of required 
response, the constraints of information, and the need for efficiency empowers the 
executive to take decisions.  The relationship between the citizens and the executive is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
secretive carrying out of the state policy. Thus, it would be worthwhile to make an analytical distinction 
between the modes of dissent which are available. 
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thus constrained by requirements of time, information, and efficiency. Even when the 
epistemic basis of trust is missing, the executive have to be trusted as a reliable source 
of information for reasons of efficiency. The imminent danger of the present creates a 
form of uncertainty regarding future choices and states of being. This can lead to an 
‘unconditional identification with a strong, sovereign authority, which is posited and 
looked to as the source of protection’.167 The urgency of the situation, the fear it 
generates, coupled with the immanent desire to return back to normalcy, leaves citizens 
with no other choice than to support executive prerogatives.168 Yet, this trust is not 
based on reliable information, and does not have an epistemic basis. On the contrary the 
grounds of trust are flimsy given the state’s own record of historical excesses against its 
own people and dissidents.169 But the necessity of the situation, the fear and 
uncertainties it generates leaves citizens with no other alternative. 
The balance model argues for deference not only by citizens, but by the legislative and 
the judiciary too. The grounds of deference are the same requirements of speed, secrecy 
and efficiency. Deference means an absence of prior constraints on the actions of the 
                                                             
167 Loader (2007:37)  
168 Ibid  
169 Periods of security threats might see support rallying around the need for a strong response and a 
strong entity which can protect the citizens.(Loader, 2007). In fact it might be the case that the citizens 
often do trust the state in the conditions of crises. (Silver & Davis, 2004). The condition of trust might be 
due to the fear which results from the conditions of insecurity. It might not necessarily have to do with an 
increased confidence in the state with respect to protection of civil liberties. Trust might not be a good 
category of analysis here given the fact if generally the trust was not high before the event, any increase in 
belief in the state might just be a product of fear and granting of legitimacy to an authority which is 
capable and responsible for protection. In fact there are heightened chances of state oppression during an 
increased power of the state, so any trust might have to be just seen due to the prevalence of fear. It is 
quite the case that minority groups who have not been properly assimilated are quite wary of the 
incursions of the state during emergency and for the same reason lease likely to agree for a tradeoff 
between their liberty for a greater security.(Ibid)  
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executive. This creates problems for the system of checks and balances which can 
undermine democracy. Unchecked executive actions can undermine liberty without 
enhancing security in any form,170 since not only the executive is invested with higher 
powers, but the fears that external threats evoke might also lead a general lowering of 
guard against the state. Fear might lead to concession in liberties much more than those 
democratically required to counter the threats. In addition, executive secrecy in dealing 
with emergency means that citizens can never be sure whether the prospects they fear 
are for real, and whether the actions taken by the executive will allay them.171 Thus, 
deference creates an informational asymmetry between the citizens and the state. Due 
to such asymmetry citizens can never be certain when the threat is genuinely over. The 
roll back of the security apparatus to its original state, before the emergency began, is 
not certain. The laws made during the emergency might still impinge upon the rights of 
the individuals, even under normal circumstances.172 The states might have enough 
incentives to not roll back the laws, in order to check internal dissidents even during 
times of normalcy.173 The continuity of anti-terror laws suggests that what was initially 
considered as a temporary measure, to thwart an imminent threat, has been codified 
permanently in the law.  
Information asymmetry can also lead to deception or manipulation of the citizens. 
Sometimes the curb on basic liberties might also not be known to those whose liberties 
are being curbed. The no-fly list case exhibited in chapter 1 and the recent PRISM 
                                                             
170 Waldron (2003)  
171 ibid 
172 Zedner (2005)  
173 Interestingly in India anti-terror laws have been used against civil rights activists. Civil rights activists 
fighting for the case of the tribals or against caste oppression have been termed as a security threat and 
have been booked under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act. This is a particular instance whereby a 
law made to fight terrorist can be evoked against genuine dissidents.  
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revelations by Edward Snowden show the problems with unrestrained secrecy. 
Unmitigated secrecy by the executive takes away the need for proper justification for 
restraints on liberty. The balance model does not account for such a need of due process 
requirement or burdens of justification for liberty constraints.  
 
5) Distributive concerns  
Security policies generally should have universal applicability i.e. they should be non-
discriminatory and egalitarian in character. Similarly, rights are inalienable. The balance 
model treats security and liberty, not as having an egalitarian character, but as goods 
which can be balanced on a consequentalist reasoning. Any policy which maximizes the 
security or liberty for the greater amount of the population would pass the test for these 
models. The requirements of the model can be satisfied by trading the rights of the 
minority with the security of the majority.174  Concern for equality is thus not inbuilt in 
the model. Such concerns are sought to be sorted by policy makers, this lies outside the 
purview of the model.175 The model, thus, does not ask the normative question of the 
distribution of the goods, i.e. who are the losers and gainers of such a policy. This 
violates the distributive and non-discriminatory structure of the rights.176  
Public support for liberty reducing policies, post 9/11, resulted from the fact that 
majority of citizens did not encounter major changes in their sphere of liberties, except 
for increased security checks at airports. 177 Tradeoff at a national level does not directly 
                                                             
174 Waldron (2003), Zedner (2005), Dworkin (2002)  
175  Vermeule (2011: 8)  
176 Waldron (2006)  
177 Dworkin(2002). The general silence of the majority on the incursion of minority rights can also be 
explained due to the ascriptive and associational identities that threats generates. Identities might be 
coalesced around certain notions of the collective. It is in this context that one can understand the 
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translate in to a tradeoff at an individual level.178 Thus, for many citizens, in their 
privileged dominant position as the majority, there is hardly a tradeoff or a potential of 
there being one in the near future. Thus, there is no direct association in the citizens’ 
mind with effects of such overall policies, because it is always guided towards the 
‘other’; the other who can be a minority, an ‘alien.’ It is only when citizens feel a direct 
threat to their systems of liberties that a large outcry ensues.179  
Contestations to the security policies of the state have largely come from minority 
groups or civil liberty unions advocating for minority rights.180 It is the ethnically or 
religious minorities, or aliens, who are at a receiving end of such policies which result 
from the balance model.181  Particularly vulnerable in such a situation are the aliens or 
the foreigners whose liberty might be sacrificed for the citizens to be made to feel safer. 
David Cole puts the point quite succinctly stating:  
All too often, we have sought to avoid the difficult trade-offs between liberty and security by striking an 
illegitimate balance, sacrificing the liberties of noncitizens in furtherance of the citizenry's purported 
security. Because noncitizens have no vote, and thus no direct voice in the democratic process, they are an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
branding and creation of such “affective and intimate” identities as “us” whose “way of life” or cultural 
ways of belonging are threatened by “them”. The ‘them’ could be enemies from without, or from within.  
Loader (2007: 37)  
178 Luban suggests that the suggestion of a tradeoff is a fallacy; there is no real tradeoff. The question is 
not asked in the manner in which it should really be asked to the majority: ‘how many of your own rights 
are you willing to sacrifice for added security?’ (2005: 243)  
179 Gross (2011)  
180 A survey conducted by Darren Davis and Brian Silver found that in a case of higher prospects of fear 
citizens are willing to tradeoff more liberties for increased security. Yet this finding was separate for 
separate groups. Liberals were only willing to trade liberties for only increased level of threats and not for 
lower ones, while minorities like African Americans and the Hispanic population were the most reluctant 
to trade off liberities, African Americans more than the Hispanics.(2004)  
181 Cole (2003)  
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especially vulnerable minority. And in the heat of the nationalistic and nativist fervor engendered by 
.war, noncitizens' interests are even less likely to weigh in the balance. 182 
 
The wide scale targeting of the muslim groups in USA, the proposals for military 
tribunals to convict terrorists, cases of extra-ordinary renditions would exemplify cases 
where equality has been violated. They compromise the basic right of fair trial and due 
process requirement of law of non-citizens. Dworkin challenging the metaphor of 
balance argues:  
Fairness requires, as a matter of equal concern for anyone who might be innocent, that we extend those 
rights to everyone brought into that system. Whenever we deny to one class of suspects rights that we 
treat as essential for others, we act unfairly, particularly when that class is politically vulnerable, as of 
course aliens are, or is identifiable racially or by religious or ethnic distinction. It makes no sense to say 
that people accused of more serious crimes are entitled to less protection for that reason. If they are 
innocent, the injustice of convicting and punishing them is at least as great as the injustice in convicting 
some other innocent person for a less serious crime. So we must reject the balancing argument—it is 
confused and false. If we believe that in our present circumstances we must subject some people to 
special risks of grave injustice, then we must have the candor to admit that what we do to them is 
unjust.183  
Fairness requirements are not met by the model. It requires that a certain individual, a 
group of people or a community should be willing to sacrifice their liberties in order to 
achieve the overall good of security. Such an argument sacrifices the individual or 
group welfare for the sake of the prospective fears of the majority.184 Such a 
                                                             
182 Ibid: 292 
183 Dworkin (2002: part 2, para 20)  
184 As I have argued before that the fear of a recurrence of a terrorist attack is not based on a genuine 
epistemological proof, and it cannot be testified whether taking drastic measures of security might indeed 
reduce cases of terrorist attack. The state to allay the genuine fears of the populace might need to take 
some steps, but when those fears are related or assigned to a particular identity group or a community 
group who are deemed a source of threat, then policies such as these do open up important distributive 
concerns. The state can indeed lock up or intern all the members of the minority community as happened 
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classification is based on an understanding that specific groups of people do not 
deserve the same kind of constitutional protections as others. This calculus is not only 
flawed for distributive reasons, but might in the long run be substantially harmful to 
the majority as well. David Cole citing various examples185 from American experience 
suggests that measures which were initially supposed to be used only against aliens 
were later extended to the citizens as well.186 Reflecting on this practice he suggests: 
History reveals that the distinction between citizen and alien has often been resorted to as a justification 
for liberty-infringing measures in times of crisis. In the short term, the fact that measures are limited to 
noncitizens appears to make them easier for the majority to accept-citizens are not asked to sacrifice their 
own liberty. But the same history suggests that citizens should be wary about relying on this distinction 
because it has often been breached before. What we are willing to do to noncitizens ultimately affects 
what we are willing to do to citizens. In the long run, all of our rights are at stake in the war against 
terrorism.187 
Reflections from criminal justice suggests that security policies meant to counter 
emergency threats, if sustained over a period of time, spill over in the daily practices of 
the criminal justice system.188 This is especially significant due to the shift in the crime 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
in the case of the Japanese living in US during the Second World War, while these might allay some of the 
fears which the majority might have but morally it would raise serious questions about the acts of the 
state.  
185 the World War II internment of the ethnic Japanese American citizens, the Macarthy period, the US 
Patriot Act, The anti-terrorism and the death penalty act, 1996 
186 Cole (2003: 305-09)  
187 Ibid: 309-10 
188  Zedner (2005). The distinction between normalcy and the emergency is much contingent than it seems 
at the outset, in fact they can and do feed into each other. For more see Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ní 
Aoláin, Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge U. Press 2006). Once the 
crises ensues and lasts for a long time it becomes the new normal condition and liberties are adjusted to 
this new state of affairs.(ibid)  
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policing discourse towards a preventive ‘pre-crime’ model.189  As Zedner says  
The conclusion that `people like us' have nothing to fear from security measures may thus be born of a 
naive failure of imagination. To posit our loved ones or ourselves as possible subjects of security 
measures is no abstract act of jurisprudential conjecture. Rather, it is the stark, self-interested recognition 
that where measures are defined so as to capture every instance of political protest, we too might find 
ourselves subject to the very provisions whose introduction we approved.190 
Thus, popular acceptance of a public policy that treads on minority rights might in the 
long run have disastrous consequences for the enjoyment of the rights of the majority 
too. Thus, not heeding to the distributive concerns might spell disaster for the general 
enjoyment of the rights.   
 
A security policy targeting a minority affects their beliefs in the state, resulting in 
disenchantment with the state policies.191 The targeting of innocent members of the 
                                                             
189 Zedner discussing the shift suggests “We are moving from a ‘post-crime’ society in which crime is 
thought about primarily as harm or wrong done and in which dominant ordering practices arise post-hoc, 
to a ‘pre-crime’ society in which the perspective is shifting to anticipate and forestall that which has yet to 
occur. Under the post-crime model, the dominant mechanisms of crime control are the police, the 
criminal process, trial and punishment. Dedicated to detecting offences, ascribing responsibility, 
determining guilt, they impose penal burdens either proportionate to the wrong done or consistent with 
consequentialist aims of punishment. The precrime model has a different, prospective orientation, 
concerned rather with the calculation of risk and the prevention of future harms in the name of security.” 
(2007: 259)  
190 Zedner (2005: 515)  
191 State policies might have a performative character whereby through assigning a certain kind of 
labeling on a certain group or community it might end up creating such a kind of community, for e.g. 
some of the rhetoric of the terrorists accrue to the fact of the ill treatment of their acknowledged brethren 
in those societies. When a particular group is singled out for a specific treatment, and if there is systemic 
targeting and exclusion, they might lose faith in the systems of the state. Certain individuals within the 
community might turn away from the instruments of the state to create their own instruments to fight 
against policies which they consider discriminatory. One of the usual rhetoric used by terrorist 
organization in their attempt to hire in new recruits to their cause is to show the systemic deprivation of 
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community might make the whole community uncooperative in the security ventures 
of the state.192 This results in destroying the communal enjoyment of the good of 
security193.  
 
In conclusion, this chapter demonstrated that the balance model has particular 
consequences not only for civil liberties but for the functioning of democratic 
institutions in general. The deference requirement means that citizens not only should 
surrender their judgements to the executive, but the veil of secrecy that it ensures makes 
the executive less transparent, thus ensuring less accountability. Thus, the balance 
model cannot accommodate the requirements of publicity with secrecy, but leans on the 
side of the latter. But this has deleterious consequences for rights and distributive 
justice, thus it should be discarded in favour of other models. The next chapter looks at 
alternative democratic responses to counter excessive practices of secrecy from the 
principled stand-point of publicity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
the community which they belong to. In an environment where the rhetoric of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ prevails, 
the concomitant turning away of a few individuals away from the state might threaten the security of the 
majority too. In highlighting of the performative aspect of the policy, I do not in any way want to suggest 
that this is the single reason why terrorism might flourish, in fact there might be individuals apart from 
those being hurt or injured who might take up arms for other reasons. My suggestion only reflects on the 
impacts of exclusionary policies of the state against the minority.  
192 Cole (2003)  
193 The good of security can only be enjoyed in the company of others, only when the other is deemed to 
be safe that one can really feel safe oneself. (Loader and Walker, 2007). 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXVI Cycle                                    PhD Candidate: Manohar Kumar 
  
Page 89 
 
Chapter three  
Democratic responses to counter excessive secrecy 
 
Democracy is based on procedures which are largely assumed to be self-correcting, due 
to its procedures and functioning of its institutions ought to be corrected by this 
mechanism. Secrecy is one of the democratic deficits, yet it is required for reasons of 
security. This opens up a dilemma for democracy: it ought to abide by the principles of 
publicity by accommodating the fact of secrecy.  My goal in this chapter is to see 
whether secrecy can indeed accommodate, within democratic institutions, the need for 
publicity.  While the need for publicity and openness in state affairs has been 
acknowledged and widely accepted in theory, democracies have only partially 
succeeded in limiting the abuses due to state secrecy. The demands of security and 
requirements of secretive deliberations have often trumped over the general claims of 
publicity. These limitations have been duly acknowledged in theory and attempts have 
been made to accommodate them in theories of publicity.194 In this context, this chapter 
seeks to analyze and understand particular institutional safeguards in democracy that 
try to limit excessive secrecy. In doing so, the chapter will highlight some of the 
limitations, if any, of such approaches.  
The first part of the chapter deals with the classical and the contemporary accounts of 
publicity and critically engages with them, highlighting some limitations, if any, of such 
accounts for their applicability in non-ideal settings. In doing so, this chapter does not 
aim to develop a theory of publicity but analyses the limitations of current theories vis-
a-vis the requirement of secrecy. The second part deals with some practical political 
                                                             
194 Thomson (1999), Gutmann& Thomson (1996)  
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solutions developed by contemporary political and legal theorists in order to counter 
state secrecy. 
 
1. The need for publicity: a historical view point  
Publicity is a corner stone of democratic polity. Democracy is supposed to be an open 
system where policies are open to public scrutiny. A check on excessive power can be 
maintained when policies and actions of the state are open to the glare of the public. 
Publicity in public political affairs affirms the sovereignty of the people and is an 
affirmation of their status as autonomous beings. Secrecy is allowed when it concerns 
matters of security or for the reasons of deliberation, yet publicity is considered to be 
the ideal state of affairs. Any need for secrecy has to be justified and the justifications 
ought to be open for public scrutiny. In the absence of proper justification public policy 
ought to lean in the direction of publicity and openness. In order to fulfill the 
requirement of publicity most states have passed sunshine laws or right to information 
laws, requiring that public expenditure and details of public policy are often easily 
available at the behest of the citizens.  Institutions are designed in order to confirm to 
the publicity requirements. Such being the case, the demands of publicity are not 
absolute and the exceptions are codified in the law. The exceptions define the limit to 
the exercise of the right. The limit might be overextended when the practice of secrecy is 
quite well spread.  
The need for security works as a justification for secrecy. This justification is often not 
challenged, given the fact that security as a good is coveted by all and any threat to self-
preservation considered a matter of grave importance. The fear that security evokes,  
works as a smokescreen behind which secrecy can function effectively. High 
proliferation of government data in the US which has been codified as ‘top- secret’ can 
be partially attributed to this fact. Contemporary theories on security also justify an 
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enhanced role for the executive in decisions regarding national security in times of 
emergency.195 This enhanced role gives a free hand to the executive; norms of publicity 
are considered a burden to the efficient and effective decision making, in this law and 
economics approach to security. It is argued that publicity might threaten national 
security by divulging information to the enemies of the state. The demands of security 
and the need for publicity then conflict with each other. As I pointed out in chapter 1 
that secrecy creates a democratic dilemma. The dilemma is at two levels: theoretical and 
practical. At the theoretical level the dilemma is between conflicting demands of secrecy 
and publicity. At the practical level, the dilemma is to accommodate the fact of secrecy 
to the principled requirement of publicity, and to curb the excesses that might result 
from actions protected under secrecy. The normative standpoint of publicity should 
work as a criterion to judge the needs of secrecy. This is not often the case in the current 
practices, and publicity as a virtue of public institutions has failed or subsided 
considerably.   
If publicity is a value which needs to be upheld then what kind of exceptions can be 
allowed? An analysis of the moral and normative justification of publicity will go a long 
way in explicating the limits of the norm itself. A brief survey of a few notable views196 
                                                             
195 Posner (2006), Posner & Vermeule (2007)  
196 The discussion in this part accounts for only those theories of publicity that argue for the need for 
transparency in state affairs. In doing so the discussion in this section does not account for Mill’s criterion 
of publicity which favours open ballot in order to promote public interests, (Mill, 1861), or Sidgwick’s 
covert utilitarianism which defends the need for secrecy at two levels (a) that some actions to be morally 
acceptable deems it necessary that not only those actions are kept secret but the maxims under which 
those actions are allowed should also be kept secret, (b) secrecy also needs to be maintained about the fact 
that not only certain acts have been kept secret, but their maxims are also secret. This requires a meta 
level secrecy.  (Gosseries, 2010: the part on Sidgwick’s covert utilitarianism). See also Sidgwick (1874). 
Another conception of publicity is that of John Rawls. For him, the principles of justice should be publicly 
known; the parties should know that the principles were an outcome of an agreement. The need for 
publicity is ‘to have the parties evaluate conceptions of justice as publicly acknowledged and fully 
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in history of political philosophy might be in order to provide a principled answer to 
this question.  The normative account laid by the classical and contemporary theorists 
of publicity can be judged for their applicability in practical situations.  
1.1) Bentham: Utilitarian reasons for publicity  
Bentham situates the requirement of publicity in the need for the legislators and the 
state to be publicly accountable for their deeds and words. Publicity ensures a check on 
the actions of the public officials and the legislative, constrains the political power from 
overreaching itself and falling into tyranny, and provides the instruments to challenge 
undemocratic behavior. Publicity is required due to the systematic distrust of the 
citizens in the public officials. Bentham expresses disagreement with the notion that 
citizens ought to trust the legislative and the polity. Trust is not a default position for 
him in a democratic polity since ‘Whom ought we to distrust, if not those to whom is 
committed great authority, with great temptations to abuse it?’197 The distrust is not 
based on the moral character of the officials thus elected, but due to the fact that they 
might pursue policies to serve their own ends or interests, or neglect their duties due to 
indolence since it does not concern their own affairs. Public officials ‘possess all the 
means of serving themselves at the expense of the public, without the possibility of 
being convicted of it.’198 Bentham interrogates whether such ‘dangerous motives’ can be 
thwarted by creating an interest of a higher magnitude. If at all such an interest of 
‘superior force’ exists it can only be ‘respect for public opinion—dread of its 
judgments—desire of glory?—in one word, everything which results from publicity?’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
effective moral constitutions of social life.’ (1999: 115)  In Rawls, publicity assures of mutual knowledge, 
and allows people to know between what is acceptable and what is not. See also Political Liberalism 
(1993)  for Rawls’ discussion of three levels of publicity.  
197 Bentham (1843: ch. 2, sec. 2, para 21)  
198 Idem  
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXVI Cycle                                    PhD Candidate: Manohar Kumar 
  
Page 93 
 
199Publicity thus ensures trust and the confidence of the people in the legislative and 
through its openness provides a feedback on the policies of the state. It can know 
whether its policies have the consent of the governed. Knowledge, for Bentham, is not 
limited to the legislative. Legislative can benefit from the knowledge which exists 
among the citizens; it can use the public knowledge to overcome its own epistemic 
limitations and revise policies accordingly. The citizens who use their own opinions to 
judge the elected representatives will be beneficial for the overall goodness of society. 
This contention of allows Bentham to challenge the assumption of the critics who doubt 
the competency of the citizens’ judgement in matters of public policy. This criticism 
stands only ‘when the means of judging correctly’ and ‘the inclination to judge’ were 
taken away from the public.200 On the contrary, for Bentham, people always do judge 
and if they judge wrongly, it is not because of the lack of a capacity of judgement but 
because they are devoid of the particular facts and information which are ‘necessary 
particulars for forming a good judgment’.201 If the citizens are not able to judge it is 
because particular information is concealed by the public officials. The advocates of 
secrecy thus base their argument on a faulty circular reasoning which justifies secrecy 
for its own end: ‘you are incapable of judging, because you are ignorant; and you shall 
remain ignorant, that you may be incapable of judging.’202  
While admitting the fact that secrecy ‘is an instrument of conspiracy; it ought not, 
therefore, to be the system of a regular government’, Bentham does not admit publicity 
as an absolute value governing the norms of the state.203 Bentham considers publicity as 
a rule during ‘a state of calm and security’. The same rule does not apply to the states in 
                                                             
199 Idem 
200 Ibid (ch. 2, Sec. 2, para 4)   
201 Ibid (ch.2, sec. 2, para. 10)  
202 Idem  
203 Ibid (ch.2, sec.4, para.2)   
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times of peril and emergencies, because the assembly cannot ‘foresee all the 
circumstances’ in which it will be placed during such times. One of the exceptions 
allowed by Bentham is in cases where publicity tends to ‘favour the projects of an 
enemy’. 204 
 Problems in the Benthamite conception 
The Benthamite conception of publicity does not necessarily solve the dilemma we 
began with i.e. the dilemma of maintaining public accountability in times of emergency. 
Bentham allows security as a basic justification for secrecy, while not providing 
necessary instruments to counter the ‘democratic deficit’ which owe to the practice of 
secrecy. Since the demands of publicity are not morally binding on the public officials; 
they need not adhere to it until and unless they strictly adhere to a utilitarian 
principle.205 Even if such is a case, the utilitarian calculus might not strictly weigh on the 
side of publicity, and rather admit exceptions to the rule. Security is such an exception. 
This exception itself might find favour in the popular calculus of benefits over costs. 
Thus security might trump over the demands of publicity in times of emergency.  
While Bentham’s conception justifies a need for openness, yet it is not clear why public 
officials will necessarily follow such a principle. The vested interests of the officials 
might block any move towards publicity. Security as an exception can also provide 
perfect rationale for secrecy practices even in normal times. Since the normal and 
exceptional times are not detailed out it has been left at the mercy of the executive to 
define such moments. It is thus unclear as to why they would not use it to their own 
advantage.  It can be argued in Bentham’s defence that his analysis is an attempt to 
provide a principled answer to the requirement of publicity. While this might be true, 
and it does provide a strong theoretical justification for publicity in a democratic polity, 
                                                             
204 Ibid (ch.2, sec.4, para.1)  
205 Gutmann & Thomson (1996: 98)  
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the utilitarian principle leaves the exception to publicity due to security unanswered. 
Similarly it is unclear how such principles can be applied to resolve some of the 
dilemmas which secrecy poses to enjoyment of rights etc. which I discussed in chapter 
1. In order to understand a principled view of publicity we now move on to Kant.  
 
1.2) Kant: moral reasons for publicity  
Kant presents a hypothetical test which any public policy ought to pass if it has to be 
legitimate. The test is the following: “All actions relating to the rights of other men are 
wrong, if the maxims from which they follow are inconsistent with publicity."206 For 
Kant, “there is something wrong in a maxim of conduct which I cannot divulge without 
at once defeating my purpose, a maxim which must therefore be kept secret, if it is to 
succeed, and which I could not publicly acknowledge without infallibly stirring up the 
opposition of everyone.”207 The requirement of publicity acts as a means to know ‘when 
an action is unjust to others’.208 In Kant’s own words, the test is a negative one; it acts as 
a principle to test the justness of the act. It does not necessarily follow that ‘all 
successful maxims are right’,209 but a maxim which does not follow the test is 
necessarily wrong.  
 
Kantian publicity test though is hypothetical; it is an act of ‘pure reason’ and can be 
carried out in the private. In David Luban’s interpretation, the test does not require all 
policies or the maxims governing them to be public. It requires that any maxim should 
have the ‘capacity’ and the ‘possibility’ of withstanding the publicity test.210 Any maxim 
                                                             
206 Kant (1795: 185)  
207 Idem  
208 Ibid:186 
209 Gosseries (2010)  
210 Luban (1996:156)  
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or policy thus has to pass the hypothetical publicity test either to be right or just. For 
Luban , if it does not do so then it has to be re-evaluated till it confirms to the norms of 
publicity. Kantian publicity principle, for Luban, ‘is not only a proposition of morality,’ 
but ‘a principle of institutional design as well’.211 Following Kant, institutions ought to 
be designed in a manner that they confirm to the norm of publicity. Institutions and 
public officials are thus morally bound to limit the practices of secrecy and encourage 
openness, public scrutiny and accountability. The best way to ensure that institutions 
‘could withstand publicity is by increasing the likelihood that policies will withstand 
publicity.’212  
 
Problems in the Kantian conception  
 
The Kantian publicity test is hypothetical; an act of pure reason. The maxim that 
governs publicity is universal in character. In the context of the state, this maxim tests 
the legitimacy of public policies. The justification for secrecy can be inferred from the 
maxim, when citizens, using pure reason, looking at a particular policy, argue from the 
stand point of a legislator, and infer that the very nature of the information requires the 
policy to be kept secret. 213 Secrecy, citizens would agree, is required in conditions 
where revealing the content of the information will defeat the very purpose for which it 
was kept secret, on the condition that the hidden information does not violate the 
principle of right. A necessary qualification would require making the information 
public when the immediacy requirement of secrecy diminishes. Thus, in the long run it 
might be possible to make that information public. Thus while the hypothetical test is to 
                                                             
211 Idem  
212 Ibid: 157 
213 Chambers (2004) argues that while the Kantian hypothetical publicity test does not require actual 
deliberation for it to be successful, but a close reading of his other writings might suggest that he would 
favour more deliberation in public sphere than the test itself suggests. (esp. pp. 406-08)  
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be undertaken by the public officials, secrecy is justified under the condition that if 
citizens would consent to the secrecy of the policy, if they were in a position to decide.  
 
The problem is that the onus of application of the principle lies on the public officials 
themselves, who as Bentham rightly pointed out, are the ones who are more likely to 
abuse power. The Kantian conception does not allow for a check on the abuse of power 
which might most likely follow. In non-ideal circumstances, public officials cannot be 
assumed to be following the moral law. Public officials might also deceive themselves 
in believing that they are actually following the moral requirements of publicity. They 
might ‘persuade themselves that their subjective motivations are unimpeachable, even 
if it appears to others that they had acted on disreputable reasons’.214 It might well be 
argued that the Kantian conception does not allow for such a reading.215 In conducting 
the hypothetical publicity test, if the public officials work with self-serving reasons, are 
careless or are mistaken in their motivations, their acts cannot be justified.216 Even if 
such is the case, the fact that the Kantian conception does not require public justification 
for political action,217 and the motivations governing them, causes grave problems for 
the viability of the principle in non-ideal settings.  
 
It can be argued in defence of the Kantian conception that it does not deal with specific 
instance of policies, but engages with them at a high level of generality.218 For Kant, 
publicity defines the legitimacy of a policy, not an epistemic trust in public officials. For 
Kant publicity of a policy makes it legitimate, and if a particular law is publicly justified 
then by the same measure secrecy can also be justified. It does not follow from this that 
                                                             
214 Ibid: 169 
215 Gutmann & Thomson (1996)  
216 Ibid: 100 
217 ibid 
218 Luban (1996)  
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public officials ought to be trusted in their acts of secrecy. Epistemic trust is required for 
the Kantian conception to be realised in non-ideal circumstances. It is this applicability 
of the maxim in practical circumstances that creates problems.  
 
2)  Gutmann & Thomson’s publicity requirement  
 
Gutmann and Thomson agree that while a policy itself ought to be public, the particular 
details of the policy can be secretive provided proper public justification is provided for 
them.219 For them public knowledge of the policy is not sufficient ground for accepting 
it. The policy ought to be publicly justified and deliberated for it to pass the publicity 
test. According to them, necessity cannot be the grounding reason for secrecy. The need 
for secrecy ought to be properly deliberated and publicly justified if it has to pass the 
publicity test.  The need for necessity itself ought to go through the publicity test to 
decide its actual need and the form of the necessity. Matters of necessity ought not to be 
left to be defined by the public officials but should be open for public deliberation and 
debate.220  Thus, if the general principles of a policy have been publicly justified and 
accepted then the specificities of a particular policy can be kept secret.  
 For the purpose of this chapter let us scheme out the publicity condition: There is a 
general policy G (for example, troop movements along the border). X is a specific detail 
of the policy (the troop movement on a specific date). X is known to R (security 
agencies) and hidden from C (citizens). Thus, under the publicity condition, X can be 
kept secret, if and only if G has been publicly deliberated, justified and the justification 
is acceptable to C, and C recognizes that as a consequence of such acceptance R is right 
in keeping X as a secret. In this picture, the legal nature of the secret and the prerogative 
of the agencies in maintaining it are an outcome of a deliberative process of democracy. 
                                                             
219 Gutmann & Thomson (1996) 
220 ibid: 104 
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This view, though, has four problems: (a) The premises of publicity are ideal, (b) the 
premises require trust in public officials, (c)  this creates problems of inapplicability in 
non-ideal settings, and (d) Finally the publicity principle lacks breadth: it does not cover 
all accounts of secrecy. (b) and (c) are independent problems but they follow from (a), 
while (d) is a separate problem which is not inherent to the publicity principle but it 
shows its lack of breadth with dealing with problems of secrecy in general. (a), (b) and 
(c) will be covered in this section, while the next section will cover (d).   
 
2.1 ) Problems with the premises of publicity 
The premises on which the discussion on publicity is based are shaky, for they either 
assume a moral agent who ought to divulge the requisite information for any 
deliberation to be possible, or they assume that citizen groups have alternative sources 
of information to make informed judgements, both of which are not available in non-
ideal settings. It can be argued in defence of the theory that the theory starts with ideal 
conditions, assuming rational citizens, deliberating on general policy matters and 
establishing guidelines which ought to govern any policy. If that indeed is the case, the 
problems related to secrecy will still remain. This will still impact judgements on actual 
policy matters, not only at the level of specificity but also at the level of generality. How 
ought the state to behave in times of emergency or when facing the security threat? 
Such policy directions can only be decided if the nature of the threat is known. Thus in 
matters of security, it might be argued that it is the secret information itself that guides 
the direction of the policy G. The holder of the secret information has informational 
resources to manoeuvre the outcome of the direction which the general policy ought to 
take.  
 
Since the citizens in general lack such information, they might not have anything to 
contribute, or they would have to be dependent on the information which emerges from 
within the secrecy apparatus itself. It is only under such a reading that cases like deep 
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secrecy are possible; for the information required to deliberate on a general policy itself 
is absent. If this is true then at least for the specific instance of security, the order in 
which a judgement on a public policy is based on adds another crucial component 
which might be missing on general policy deliberations on other matters, largely which 
are the concerns of the publicity condition of Gutmann and Thomson. Let us show it 
with an example. Let us assume that citizens need to deliberate on allocation of funds 
on education. First they might agree on the budgetary requirement for a good 
educational system, follow it with an assessment of the resources at hand, finally 
agreeing upon how the available resources ought to be allocated, or find alternate ways 
to pump in more resources if required. In the example mentioned above the given 
circumstances are known, while in the case of security often the circumstances are not 
known to the public, so the desired security policy might vary from the desired 
outcome of deliberative politics. The publicity condition does not take into account the 
specific requirements which limit the possibility of deliberation while dealing with 
security issues where the level of secrecy is much higher than other affairs of the state.  
 
2.2) Problems of inapplicability  
 
The publicity condition is a normative account which requires the condition of publicity 
as a precondition and as an outcome of deliberative democracy. Thus the principle of 
publicity established develops a normative account of the need for publicity in 
democracy. The nature of secrecy is not analysed in detail. This poses a problem in the 
way publicity criteria can be put into practice. In the absence of such an analysis the 
publicity criteria just becomes a principled stand point from which the existing practices 
of secrecy can be judged. Publicity thus becomes a norm in the ideal circumstances, and 
a boundary condition for non-ideal ones.  
A specific analysis of the nature of secrecy ought to tell us when the publicity condition 
will or will not work. Secrecy by its very nature resists independent evaluation, because 
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it will defeat the very purpose of keeping a secret. In such an instance it is not certain 
that the secret held by a security agency is the same which has been mandated by the 
citizens under the policy. Thus it can be the case that while the policy G allows only X to 
be kept secret, there is no way for citizens to know whether the assigned mandate has 
not been violated. The general policy G only lays down the general guidelines; it does 
not take into account the specificities of the application of G. Thus, a general agreement 
on G does give a scope to maintain secrets (say Z) which are other than X, even though 
maintaining secret Z is not legally allowed.  For example, let’s say that G allows for data 
mining of a particular individual B. Here X represents the information about B. But 
citizens have no way to ascertain that R is also not obtaining information B*. The recent 
revelations of PRISM point out exactly in this direction.   
The particular nature of secrecy allows R to hold Z without necessarily requiring her to 
make it public. In the absence of countervailing conditions, it just depends on the good 
faith of R whether she wants to make it public or not. The publicity condition does give 
us demanding reasons for publicity, but does not ensure that those reasons will be 
followed by those who ought to follow them. In fact if Z hides a particular interest or 
wrong doing of R, they might have sufficient reasons to hide it. The success of the 
publicity condition, in its application, thus requires trust in public officials. There are no 
independent reasons to assign trust to them. In fact, due to threats to liberty that emerge 
from the state, there might be enough grounds to doubt them. The publicity criteria fails 
because it requires, in the end, trust in the same officials who might have sufficient 
reasons to maintain secrecy.  
It can be though argued in defence of the publicity condition that it only specifies 
institutional solutions and does not pertain to specificities. It can be said that 
institutions ought to be designed so that they adhere to the requirement of publicity 
and other institutions and citizen groups ought to act as a watchdog to ensure that they 
do. This argument though sounds convincing, but it does not still answer the question 
as to why would institutions not have incentives enough to maintain secrecy? Why 
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would not institutions follow the same paths as individuals and flout the requirements 
of publicity if it is in their interests to do so?  Secrecy provides the ideal ground for such 
maneuvers to be possible, as we have argued in detail in the first chapter. Security 
agencies can also deny information to legislative and courts alike, who might defer to 
their judgement owing to fears that security threats evoke in the minds of judges and 
citizens alike. Publicity requires deliberation among rational individuals but reasons of 
security almost always work as a conversational stopper. In such circumstances 
publicity can only be possible through the acts of agents from within R. The publicity 
condition does not generally deal with individual acts of leaking by agents within R, 
though such acts might remotely find justification within the condition. It still needs to 
be specified, otherwise the criteria, does not respond to the demands of publicity in 
non-ideal circumstances. For publicity to succeed in such circumstances we have to look 
beyond the normal institutions, and morally argue for the right of individual agents to 
leak information which I will do in detail in the next chapter.  
 
2.3) Problem of trust in public officials 
 The publicity condition makes it mandatory for public offices to be open for the 
scrutiny of the citizens in general. It provides a normative framework for why citizens 
in a deliberative democracy ought to have access to information regarding the policies 
and the actions of the state. Such condition of publicity deals in the last instance with 
the moral character of the agent R who has access to the secrets. Morally R ought to 
reveal the information, but in non-ideal cases they are governed by other motives, 
interests etc. which we highlighted in the previous section.  If R has access to X, R can: i) 
completely hide it, ii) completely reveal it, iii) reveal part of it, iv) reveal information 
which is false. The model of publicity works on the assumption that the information 
available in the public, about G and X, is transparent. But, in reality this may not be 
true. Citizens have no way of differentiating between information which is partially 
true, completely true, and false or is misleading. They are left to trust the judgement of 
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the executive in this matter. The publicity condition fails to specify the reasons why the 
executive ought to be trusted in such matters. The executive need not be a moral agent 
to follow dictates of publicity, and has complete freedom about the way to use the 
information. “The structural position of the executive” argues Sagar  
 
makes it pivotal not only to the formation and distribution of informed first-order judgments by virtue of 
its monopoly over second-order judgments, but the same monopoly also allows it to preempt public 
scrutiny of the decision making process. Thus the monopoly exercised by the executive creates an 
environment in which it can selectively publicize bits of information in order to generate public support 
in favor of policies it prefers.”221  
 
The first order judgements relate to taking policy decisions, in this case pertaining to 
national security matters. But the first order judgements are based on another level of 
second order judgements which is related to the assessment of the threat or the 
situation at hand. This second order judgement depends on the availability of the 
information pertaining to the threat in real situations. This information is solely 
available to the executive, in this case R. Given that this information itself is of a 
secretive nature R can decide to what extent the information ought to be divulged or 
shared with the public and in what form.222 It thus puts R in an epistemic privileged 
position even in terms of the formation of even first order judgements. They can use 
such a position to maneuver public opinion. The publicity condition can thus only be 
successful if it ascribes a moral authority to public officials, but then the success of the 
condition does not depend on any independent criteria which can be controlled by the 
citizens, but on the need of trust in public officials, to control whose excesses publicity 
is required in the first place.   
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3) Breadth of secrecy  
Gutmann and Thomson acknowledge the fact that there are different aspects of secrecy 
viz. deep and shallow.223 Shallow secrets are the ones the presence of which is known to 
the general public, but the details are hidden. In the above example X represents a case 
of shallow secrecy. Deep secrecy represents those cases of secrecy the presence of which 
is completely hidden from the public.224  In practices of deep secrecy the general policy 
as well as its specific details is hidden from the public. The Gutmann and Thomson 
account of publicity only works for complete publicity cases, and in some instances for 
policies which are relatively public. To understand the problem better let us understand 
it with the table given below. It lays down a general taxonomy with examples of 
different kinds of publicity and secrecy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
223 I use the taxonomy of deep and shallow secrecy as developed Gutmann and Thomson (1996) . David 
Pozen (2010) uses the term shallow secrecy refers to cases whereby the audience from whom the content 
is being kept secret is aware of such being the case, but is not aware of the content of the secret. On the 
other hand the audience, from whom the secret is being kept, is not aware of the existence of a secret and 
the content of it. (262). Deep and shallow do not exist as binary discontinuous categories but are seen by 
Pozen as lying on a continuum. He argues that there is no bright line separating these categories. (265-66). 
For him ‘a government secret is deep if a small group of similarly situated officials conceals its existence 
from the public and from other officials, such that the outsiders.’ ignorance precludes them from learning 
about, checking, or influencing the keepers.’ use of the information. A state secret is shallow if ordinary 
citizens understand they are being denied relevant information and have some ability to estimate its 
content.’ (274)  
224 Pozen (2010)  
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Degrees of 
publicity  
General 
Policy  
Content of 
the policy  
Public Control  Example 
Completely public  Public  Publicly 
available   
Possible  Public expenditure in 
education  
Relatively public 
(shallow secrecy) 
Public  Not public  Depends on the 
case  
Surveillance, no fly list 
& data mining  
Not public (deep 
secrecy ) 
Not 
public  
Not public   Not possible  Extra ordinary 
rendition & drone 
strikes  
 
3.1) Complete Publicity  
 
Complete publicity cases are perfectly compatible with the publicity criteria of 
Gutmann and Thomson. In this case the policy can be considered to be an outcome of 
public deliberation. The general details of the policy are public, the specific details, in 
this case the expenditure on education, are accessible on demand to the citizens. The 
citizens can use this detail to further question the state and pressurize it, if required, to 
change the policy in their desired direction.  
 
3.2) Relatively Public (shallow secrecy)  
 
Cases of shallow secrecy may or may not be compatible with the publicity criteria. It 
depends on the specific instance of the secrecy. Cases like data mining, surveillance and 
no-fly list are constitutionally justified, under this version of secrecy. Incursions in the 
privacy rights of citizens are justified with some limitations, if those citizens pose 
security threats or have been involved in cases of fraud or wrong doing. 
Constitutionally though such cases have to follow the due process of the law and 
require legitimation from the courts. Enhanced cases of surveillance for groups of 
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citizens have to be deliberated in the legislative and legitimated through the judiciary.  
That the specific content of the policy, if the general policy is public, ought to be kept 
secret in such cases has been publicly justified, deliberated upon and has been accepted. 
The general policy thus passes the requirement of publicity.  
 
Epistemically, such a policy is based on the limitations on the actions of the executives 
by the legislative and the judiciary. It is considered that any policy that seeks to 
maintain shallow secrets ought to be validated through the actions of the latter two 
branches of the state. It is assumed that the particular details of the policy will pass the 
scrutiny of these two branches. Yet, in practice it is quite possible that the secret keeper 
has sufficient freedom, allowed by the very nature of secrecy, to keep away information 
which the keeper deems fit, from whosoever is concerned. It is possible since the only 
form of regulation which secrecy allows is self-regulation. Revelations of the contents of 
the secret is completely based on the discretion of the secret keeper. So, if the secret 
keeper, in this case the executive does not wish to reveal certain contents, they are 
perfectly capable of doing so. The judiciary in this case has no way to know the possible 
violation of the law by the executive. This is a case of a violation of law, but in this case 
the violation goes unnoticed.  
 
Thus, the problems with this shallow secrecy emerge at the level of the details. Shallow 
secrets are problematic since they might allow particular violations of the stated policy 
to remain unchecked. The citizens, judiciary and the legislative might be unaware of the 
circumstances when the limits laid down by the law have been breached. They do not 
have any epistemic warrant against possible violations of the law. It might be difficult 
to rein in the over extension of secret policies when the details of the programme are not 
available for public scrutiny.  Recent revelations of the PRISM by Edward Snowden 
point towards such violations. Data mining and surveillance by the NSA was not only 
used against potential wrong-doers but against general citizens as well. In doing so, the 
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policy extended itself beyond the limits set by the law.225 Similarly, the discussions of 
the no-fly list case and the Salto di Quirra in the first chapter also point towards 
instances where the particular details of the policy were hidden.  
 
Instances of shallow secrecy compromise the rights of the citizens without any access to 
the due process of the law. Denied any epistemic warrant or information regarding the 
possible violations of the law, citizens can often be rendered helpless in challenging 
such policies. Yet, on the other hand it can be argued that since the general policy itself 
is public, a rational response would require that citizens and other branches of the state 
ought to be responsive towards the dangers which such secrecy entails.226 It would 
require an active seeking of the contents of the secrets. Courts and the legislative have a 
special role to play, i.e. to scrutinize and separate legitimate and non-legitimate cases of 
secrecy. The role though will be limited given the nature of secrecy, yet a proactive step 
can seek to limit the abuses to a minimum level.  
 
3.3) Deep Secrecy  
 
Deep secret policies are an outcome of the executive using its prerogative in matters of 
national security. In this case both the policy and the details of the policy are hidden 
from the public, as well as the judiciary and the legislative. These policies have neither 
been publicly deliberated with the citizens nor with the legislative. Thus, any form of 
oversight is impossible into the workings of this policy. As discussed in chapter 1, the 
Iran-Contra affair, drone strikes and extraordinary rendition are some examples of such 
kinds of secrecy.  
 
                                                             
225 See http://www.policymic.com/articles/47355/edward-snowden-interview-transcript-full-text-read-
the-guardian-s-entire-interview-with-the-man-who-leaked-prism [Accessed Aug. 10, 2013] 
226 Ibid  
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Deep Secrets, argues Pozen, “renders their targets especially vulnerable by depriving 
them of information needed to make rational decisions. No amount of vigilance or 
cleverness would allow the target of a perfectly deep secret to defend herself against the 
keeper, prospectively, or to avenge herself, retrospectively.”227 The point Pozen seems 
to be mentioning here relates to the uncertainty which deep secrets are capable of 
generating. Deep secrets are not products of policies which have been publicly justified 
or articulated. Thus citizens are in no position to determine their rational expectations 
regarding such a policy. Rational expectations about future are built around a trust that 
certain life choices and decisions will not be arbitrarily interfered with. If policies are 
not public, arbitrary interferences with freedoms of individuals is possible. It creates an 
uncertainty regarding the position of the individual with regards to a policy. In the 
absence of proper proofs no challenge to the policy is possible, it might be guided by 
intuitions which lack any substance, and can be easily stuck down in a court of law. 
Such uncertainties can only creep in when an individual has some inkling of a 
particular violation or has observed the violation with regards to other individuals. It is 
not possible in conditions of complete secrecy. It creates a doubt about one’s own 
situation. Imagine the situation of cases of extra-ordinary rendition where individuals 
were picked up for being placed in a certain location and belonging to a certain 
minority group. Certain knowledge of such an act on others might make one’s own 
future uncertain.  
 
This is not particularly a problem with deep secret policies per se, but might also be 
with shallow secrets as well. In justification of the leaks of the PRISM, Edward Snowden 
mentioned that how surveillance mechanisms collect data which might be used against 
an individual. Individual data, in itself harmless, can be pooled together over a life 
time, and even minor hints can be used against them, making them guilty in the eyes of 
                                                             
227 Pozen (2010: 263)  
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the secret services.228 Such revelations makes uncertain lives of those billions whose 
data has been collected by the agency i.e. they know they are being watched, but do not 
know what act of theirs, or what words they have uttered, or what searches or 
footprints they have left on the internet that can be used against them. Publicity 
principle though theoretically does critique policies which might be hidden or which 
are a result of arbitrary policies, but does not take into account deep secret policies 
which might aid such arbitrary actions.  
 
4. Democratic alternatives against excessive secrecy  
 
If the above analysis is correct, secrecy is not only perfectly compatible with the 
demands of publicity, but also excessive forms of secrecy can exist in a regime of 
publicity. This point is often missed by the scholars of publicity since they have not 
taken sufficient care to understand and analyse the nature of secrecy. An analysis of its 
nature evokes problems with the dominant understanding of publicity in combating 
excessive secrecy. This particular limitation has been quite understood by democratic 
theorists who propose alternative institutional solutions to check the abuse of power. 
These institutional solutions have often take recourse to empowering the judiciary or 
the legislative in such matters to work as an oversight over the affairs of the executive in 
times of emergency. In the following sections, I will critically analyse some of the 
institutional proposals offered to combat excessive secrecy.  While this section will deal 
with the legislative oversight, section 5 and 6 will deal with the judicial oversight and 
the role of the media respectively.  
 
 
 
                                                             
228 See infra ft.32 
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4.1) Legislative oversight: Ackerman’s Emergency Constitution  
 
Informational control and access by the executive during emergencies can severely 
compromise the democratic checks and balances. It can particularly limit the 
functioning of other branches of the state apparatus. This problem has been well 
acknowledged by Bruce Ackerman in “The Emergency Constitution”. In order to limit 
the abuse of power by the executive and by the president Ackerman designs what he 
calls the emergency constitution.  He argues that an emergency to be sustained over a 
period of time should need the consent of supermajorities. This would allow for the 
minority to have a stake in the decision making process and would severely curb the 
extended powers of the state during the emergency. Yet, the presence of 
supermajorities, and the need to get their consent for the emergency might work as a 
‘perverse incentive’ for the executive to hide information, especially when it concerns 
their wrong doings.229 The executive might mislead the legislature in believing the need 
to continue with the emergency regime through their careful control of information. 
Thus, for Ackerman, ‘the legislature cannot act effectively if it is at the mercy of the 
Executive for information’.230 The minority can only be ‘well- informed’ if they are 
granted ‘a majority of seats on the oversight committees’, and the chairperson of such a 
committee come from the opposition.231 The executive is required under the emergency 
constitution to provide ‘complete and immediate access to all the documents’.232 
Oversight committees would be structured to ‘make the tradeoff between publicity and 
secrecy in a politically responsible fashion’ and would not have any strong incentives to 
suppress information as might be the norm with the party in the government.233 Such 
                                                             
229 Ackerman (2004: 1050)  
230 Ibid: 1051 
231 idem 
232 Ibid: 1052 
233 idem 
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an arrangement in the oversight committees might go a long way, according to 
Ackerman, to counter the threats which might arise from executive secrecy. Such being 
the case, Ackerman is aware of the upper hand which the executive might still have 
with regards to the control of information which might lead it to abuse its privilege. 
Thus, if such circumstances do indeed hold, ‘judicial intervention may sometimes be 
desirable to enforce legislative demands’.234  
 
The proposal for a legislative oversight seeks to work out checks and balances between 
different branches of the state. The control over informational resources tilts the balance 
in favour of the executive. Ackerman’s proposal largely tries to aim at a balance, 
understanding the limitations imposed by the informational control. Yet, the 
transparency that he seeks to build in the model through legislative oversight runs 
through different problems. The objections to the proposals are of two kinds:  (a) 
Legislatives lack expertise in dealing with security, (b) the emergency constitution does 
not account for the capacity of potential arbitrariness that secrecy grants to the 
executive. Let us call these two problems: (a) the problem of expertise, and (b) the 
problem of potential arbitrariness.  
 
a) The problem of expertise  
 
Let us assume for a moment that classified information is indeed presented on demand 
to the committee. It can still be asked whether they would have the necessary expertise 
to judge the matter at hand. Ackerman assumes that the oversight committee will have 
the necessary expertise and know how in matters of national security to engage with the 
executive.235 But this not true, since, empirically, during times of emergency the 
                                                             
234 Ibid :1068 
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deference to the judgement of the executive is often higher than during normal times. 236 
Such deference is based on the fear that security threats arise in the minds of the people 
and the legislatures arise, and the lack of expertise in providing a quick and effective 
response to the situation.   
 
b) The problem of potential arbitrariness  
 
The proposal by Ackerman does not take into account the nature of secrecy. The hidden 
character of secrecy does allow for potential arbitrariness to the agent who has the 
access to information. The agent can decide how to utilize the information, the parts of 
information to be shared, and the parts that can be hidden. In fact until and unless 
information is handed over to the oversight committees, they might not be aware of its 
existence. Ackerman assumes that such will be the case, that the oversight committees 
will have access to all the information, if and when they demand it.  He fails to mention 
the fact that the executive might not have any incentive to share the information.237 In 
fact, especially in the case of deep secrets the incentives work in the opposite direction. 
Ackerman acknowledges the problem of perverse incentives yet has not found a way to 
get around it. The assumption of executives handing over information on demand 
seems untenable. Until and unless all files of the executive are open to scrutiny, the 
oversight committees might be unaware of presence of different kinds of secrets.  
 
The judgements of the committee can only be based on the informational resources 
available to them. Executive is thus in a position not only to decide the amount and the 
nature of information which could be handed over, but the information which is 
presented can itself limit the range of judgements and policy choices available to the 
                                                             
236 Ibid, Posner & Vermeule (2007: 18) 
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committee. Oversight committees can only shoot an arrow in the dark about 
information which is hidden or can rationally analyse the inconsistencies in the 
evidence presented to them. Apart from these the range of actions are severely limited. 
It can thus be a guess as to whether a proper judgement can indeed be formed in such 
circumstances. It seems that the only possible alternative left would be to either defer to 
the judgement of the executive, or to base judgement on half baked information, or on 
the political platform and the ideas which the members on the committee subscribe to.  
 
The general practice though points in a different direction. Empirically it has been 
found that the presidents and the executives often use their discretionary power to 
classify information238, they often circumvent laws passed by the legislative, or mislead 
them in affairs of national security and policy.239 At times even when the information is 
produced, it is with a delay or after long negotiations which thwarts any possibility of 
making judgements.240 Thus, it is contended that even a presence of oversight 
committees might not ensure accountability on the part of the executive.241  
 
5. Judicial Oversight  
 
Legislative are often limited in their attempt to curtail executive secrecy. In this section I 
try to consider if the courts can work as an effective watchdog in cases of executive 
secrecy. Judicial review and oversight has been suggested as an effective way to counter 
                                                             
238 Stanley & German (2011)  
239 Schulofer (2010: 5) Historically the misuse of the executive privilege has been exemplified by the cases 
of misuse of domestic surveillance by the Church Committee in the 1970s, then famously in the Iran-
contra affair, recently in CIA’s outsourcing of torture to countries with histories of employing torture and 
the surveillance programme of the National Security Agency. (Berman, 2009)  
240 Ibid  
241 Bok (1983)  
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXVI Cycle                                    PhD Candidate: Manohar Kumar 
  
Page 114 
 
practices of secrecy.242 The courts have an important role to play, as they have to 
maintain a vigil over the wrongdoings that emerges from such a practice, check cases 
where the secrecy compromises constitutional rights of the individuals, and lastly the 
courts ought to ensure that due process is granted to the supposed guilty. Can the 
courts curb the excesses of secrecy? It is often argued that courts might be in a better 
position to do so since some of the practices of the secrecy require jurisdictional control, 
especially the ones related to surveillance operations. Surveillance operations have to be 
justified under a special court and show a probable cause if they have to pass the test of 
law, since they constitute a particular violation of the rights of privacy. The necessity to 
explain the actions or the reasons behind them often can have a ‘salutary effect‘ on the 
powers of the executive.243 By insisting on better explanations and the rationale for 
classification of information the courts can limit cases of over-classification.244  
 
Empirically, though courts have been increasingly deferential to the executive in 
matters of national security.245 Two reasons have been cited for the need for deference: 
(a) the lack of expertise of the court, and (b) revealing of secret information to an open 
court will divulge information to the enemies. The rationale for such deference has been 
the lack of expertise of the judiciary in matters of security.246  Meredith Fuchs, on the 
other hand, finds the rationale of expertise ‘quite odd’. Undertaking a historical survey 
of judicial deference to the executive, she suggests that “if the government were an 
ordinary litigant, its past practices might cause a court to consider secrecy claims with 
some level of skepticism.”247 She argues that courts do have experience in examining 
                                                             
242 Fuchs (2006)  
243 Fuchs (2006: 169)  
244 Ibid :170 
245 Ibid, Sagar (2009) 
246 Posner & Vermeule (2007:18)  
247 Fuchs (2006:156)  
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‘facts for the sorts of warning signs that are sometimes present in secrecy cases and that 
should trigger increased pressure on the government’, especially when such cases relate 
to infringement of minority rights and violate constitutional guarantees to rights.248  
 
Despite the fact, the deference of the judiciary has in fact increased post 9/11. Part of 
the reason is to do with the fact that the courts are not immune to the popular panics 
that follow cases of emergency.249 Secondly, the courts often take it for granted that the 
executive are in the best position to judge the material at hand. The litigants who 
challenge cases of secrecy are often required, by the state, to present ‘compelling need’ 
or ‘breaking news story’ in order to access the content of the information.250 Lack of 
intervention by the court in such cases also reveals how the executive is let off scot free. 
Interestingly such cases reveal how secrecy curbs the right to assess a situation of 
potential abuse of power.  It is only the executive who has the access to the information. 
It thus can assess whether certain information does or does not relate to a potential 
abuse or is indeed sensitive. The executive thus acts as a gatekeeper and does sort out 
the information which ought to be kept secret from the one to be revealed. The only 
way other agencies can have access to such information is through the cooperation of 
the gatekeepers themselves which leaves the entire discretion in the hands of those who 
are bound to potentially misuse it.251  
 
If the courts accept the argument of the executive at a face value, which they most often 
do, it defies a rational recourse as they have not looked at the background evidence or 
                                                             
248 Ibid: 170 
249 Waldron (2003)  
250 When the Abu Gharib revelations were leaked out the media, civil liberty groups asked for the 
information to look into potential abuses. The Department of Defense refused the information arguing 
that they could not show ‘compelling need’ or ‘breaking news story’ for the material. (Fuchs 2006: 153-4)  
251 Sagar (2009: 179)  
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the information which might show the executive guilty. The rationale of a revelation of 
information to the court being revealed over to the enemies is often used to keep the 
information secret. Even pieces of not sensitive information have been withdrawn from 
the scrutiny of the judiciary. The mosaic theory of information generation has been cited 
as a reason behind such secrecy.252 It is argued that while individual pieces of 
information, in themselves harmless, might be joined together with similar other pieces 
to create a mosaic of information. Such a mosaic will hence divulge important 
information to the enemies of the state. As Pozen succinctly puts it “for courts and 
agencies alike, since 9/11 the mosaic theory has at the same time manifested, justified, 
and exacerbated a new reticence to publicize government-controlled information.”253 
After 9/11, with the number of detentions of suspects linked with terrorism on the rise, 
the refusal of the courts to review information, claimed to be secret, has denied the 
possibility of a fair trial to the victims, thus compromising their civil right to fair trial. 254 
The recent PRISM revelations show how the FISA court went along with the executive 
rationale of “reasonable suspicion”, rather than look into the details of the surveillance 
programme, to allow for collection of individual private data of millions of 
individuals.255 The court has surrendered important judicial functions to the privileges 
                                                             
252 Pozen (2005)  
253 Pozen (2005: 631)  
254 Stanley & German (2011). See also   http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-mosque-spying-
20120815,0,7626350.story  [Accessed on Aug. 23, 2012]  
255 It has been argued that the FISA court itself has been weakened with the amendment of the FISA act, 
2008 and the executive itself does not need to show “probable cause” but just a “reasonable suspicion” to 
get a court order to conduct the surveillance. For more look at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/prisms-legal-basis-how-we-got-here-and-what-
we-can-do-to-get-back/276667/ [Accessed July 18, 2013]. Yet such being the case the court generally 
allows for cases of surveillance against individuals who are supposed to be suspects, but they are not 
supposed to pass a blanket general authorization for surveillance which they did in the case of PRISM. It 
thus challenges the efficacy of such control over the executive for the court showed a collusive behavior. 
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of the executive. Thus, even gross violation of the secrecy privilege has not led to a 
change in decision of the courts to treat such cases with greater suspicion, which it 
generally ought to do. 
  
The alternative suggested by Pozen is to narrow down deep secrecy cases to a shallow 
level and to develop inter-agency regulations so that the access to secrecy is spread out 
across different actors. Courts can play an important role at the beginning of a policy 
process and reduce cases of secrecy to specified content. 256 Citing the Vaughn court, 
Fuchs presents alternatives which are available to the judiciary. According to the 
judgement the court ought to lay down certain rules for secrecy: “(a) that the agency 
submit a “relatively detailed analysis” of the material withheld, (b) that the analysis be 
presented in “manageable segments”, and (c) the analysis include an “indexing system 
[that] would subdivide the document under consideration into manageable parts cross-
referenced to the relevant portion of the Government’s justification.”257 The courts also 
ought to demand an in-camera inspection of the documents procured.  
 
It is not clear though whether the processes specified here have actually managed to 
overcome the gatekeeper objection as raised by Rahul Sagar.258 The specific nature of 
secrecy might still allow the executive to hide information. Such institutional safeguards 
might only help in cases of shallow secrecy, or when particular violations of certain 
rights are visible and known.  These safeguards might not work in circumstances of 
deep secrecy.259 It is important to remember that potential cases of abuse or limitation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Such collusive behavior, if it was one, was possible because the decisions of the court itself are secretive 
and not open for public scrutiny.  
256 Pozen (2010: 326)  
257 Fuchs (2006: 171)  
258 Sagar (2009)  
259 Pozen (2010: 326)  
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rights might not be known till quite late or maybe never, if the policy itself is hidden 
from the public view.  
 
It is clear from the above cases that the epistemic asymmetry of information does work 
in the favour of the executive. The epistemic asymmetry works at two levels: (a) the lack 
of information, (b) the lack of knowledge that one lacks information. If the court is 
aware that it lacks information it can demand it, though it can be misled or provided 
with limited information. In the case of (b) the agency of the court is completely limited. 
(b) is typically the case of the knowledge of the asymmetry which determines the 
agency or the freedom of an agent. If the condition under which (b) exists is arbitrary 
then the executive seeks to control the directions of the judiciary. But in conditions of 
(b) the court cannot distinguish between arbitrary and constitutional control of 
information, which is part of the conundrum with secrecy. The epistemic base to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate cases of secrecy is missing. 
Consequently, courts are limited in their judgement to decide between arbitrary and 
constitutional interference with freedom of individuals and groups by the executive. 
 
The only epistemic relevant agent in these cases is the executive. The court in order to 
pass a judgement will have to depend on the epistemic agent in order to garner 
information. Thus action by the court is only possible if it has access to the information 
which the epistemic agent has every incentive to block or deny. For the court to even 
demand information requires a hint or an idea of the existence of such information. 
From an epistemic point of view, the courts are in no position to assess the information 
without the collaboration of the gatekeeper or dependence on leaks from one of the 
epistemic agents. Thus the courts’ response can be critically determined by the 
information provided by the agent. The correctness of the response depends totally on 
the moral attitude of the agent. The political system of checks and balances will 
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ultimately be dependent on the moral and ethical approach of the agent in question, 
rather than on an external control on their powers.  
 
Critiques of such an approach argue for the courts to use their constitutional authority 
to demand information from the executive. Judicial authority to be effective requires 
reasonable doubts or possible knowledge of violations. If the actions or the violations 
are public, judiciary can demand information which pertains to such violation, but 
when the act and the violation are hidden then courts might be equally powerless. The 
evidence to ground suspicion is absent in deep secrecy cases. In surveillance cases even 
the primary experience of the violation of a right is absent. In the absence of such 
information suspicions might not be well founded which might tilt the scales towards 
deference to the executive. Such deference is not a product of trust but might be well 
grounded in the constitutional separation of power. The judiciary can only intervene if 
it has sufficient grounds to do so. The advocates for judicial oversight in secrecy cases 
miss the primary point of the epistemic preconditions required to use constitutional 
authority.  
 
6. The role of the media 
 
The media plays an important role in democracies in keeping the citizens informed 
about the affairs of the state. In the face of rampant secrecy, manipulation and 
deception the media acts as a watchdog by providing information which separates truth 
from deception. States and especially the executive branch have enough incentives to 
keep certain embarrassing details away from the public lest it causes uproar. Citizens 
can access some relevant details about the acts of the executive through the Right to 
Information laws, but the Right allows for constitutional limitations on the exercise of it. 
Executive acts of secrecy related to security are some exceptions to the sunshine laws. 
Thus, the citizens in order to deliberate on the affairs of the state might sometimes 
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require information which is limited under the right, especially when the information is 
related to the abuse of power. Through their networks the media can and indeed do 
access to secret information which is not available to the general public. Press 
disclosures have played an important role in checking the power of the executive. Some 
of the notable examples of media revelations of the executive wrong doing relate to the 
CIA role in overthrowing the Allende government in Chile, the role of the US in secret 
paramilitary operations in Cambodia, the Iran-Contra affair and revealing the extent of 
surveillance on anti-war dissidents.260  
 
The above examples clearly state a case of media playing a vigilant role in controlling 
state excesses. Defendants of media freedom suggest that the press ought to be free to 
publish any secret documents they have access to. It is argued that it is only through a 
free press, having no fear of prosecution from the state that accountability can be 
ensured on the acts of the executive. One of the particular defenses of the freedom of 
press comes from the equilibrium model interpretation, presented by Alexander 
Bickel261, which represents a free market like model of information. According to the 
model, the state prerogative of secrecy and control over informational resources comes 
in conflict with the requirements of transparency.262 This conflict represents a 
competition over the same informational resources between the executive and the 
media. According to this interpretation, the state is legitimate in asserting its control 
                                                             
260 J. R. Ferguson suggests that “Press disclosures of executive misdeeds thus played an important role in 
fostering congressional oversight of both the President's warmaking powers and his use of the 
intelligence agencies. With these precedents firmly established, Congress continued throughout the post-
Vietnam era to impose constraints on the President's conduct of foreign affairs. For example, Congress 
narrowed the peacetime use of the President's national emergency economic powers;" created new 
procedures for the domestic surveillance of foreign intelligence activities; and prohibited the expenditure 
of funds for military operations in Cambodia, Vietnam, Angola and Nicaragua.” (1993: 473) 
261 Bickel (1975)  
262 Sunstein (1986:898)  
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over the informational resources till it falls in the hands of the media or any other 
individual, in which case the state has no right to stop them from publishing the 
available information. Does this model help us in curbing secrecy?  The model provides 
a justificatory ground for press freedom but it is not sufficient in curbing secrecy. Such a 
model provides the states with enough incentives to withhold information rather than 
legitimately provide it even when the information is owed to the public. The state will 
use all the resources and power in its hands in order to stop the leakage of 
information.263 Under such an argument the state would make it very difficult for the 
outflow of information to the media.  
 
Media cannot be an equal power to the state in the competition over informational 
resources. Classification of secrets, under the model, will be left over to the arbitrary 
decisions of the executive and no constitutional checks can be exercised over the control 
of informational resources. Self-regulation by the executive would be the only form of 
regulation possible in such circumstances. The equilibrium model interpretation should 
be dispensed with since it does not provide an effective solution to the problem of 
secrecy, on the contrary provides enough rationale and incentives for hiding even those 
bits of information which ought to be accessible to the public under normal democratic 
procedures.  
 
Even though the media ought to be free under a democratic system it is not always 
necessarily the case. It might resort to publish leaks which support the state agenda. 264 
                                                             
263 Ibid: 903 
264 An example of such a kind is the revelations on the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq 
which was aimed at swinging the public support in favour of the war. The leaks cited anonymous sources 
and were later found to have been without any credible evidence of there being such a thing. See also 
Sunstein (1986: 902) on the possible alliance between media and the state.   
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The press can be mislead or deceived into believing into a story which might be an act 
of selective leaking from the state. Secrecy precludes any possibility of checking the 
background sources of the story. Often it is difficult to tell between evidence that is true 
and reliable, and the one that is planted by the state to support its own agenda. 
Possibility of assessing the veracity of the informer or the story is very bleak. The access 
to a credible story might be very difficult in circumstances where the state punishes any 
whistleblower.265 Any whistleblower would then resist making the content public or 
take recourse to the media. If the content of the media is being monitored by the state 
for possible leakages of secret documents, the media under scrutiny might often take 
recourse to safe options than face the wrath of the state which it ought to do in such 
instances. 266 
 
In conclusion, the quandary of secrecy that we began creates epistemic limitation in 
democratic procedures which seek to overcome or control it. The epistemic nature of 
the secret allows it to go unnoticed without any correlative check on the freedom of 
action it allows for the agent who controls the secret information. Judges, the legislative 
and even the media appear to provide a semblance of control over the abuse from 
secrecy but they can only go so far, not completely breach the fort of secrecy. Even 
though limited they create accountability structures which are not so easy to overcome 
and provide for prospective grounds of redress when the abuses finally see the light of 
the day. If secrecy does limit the possibility of democratic self-correction, and 
manipulate democratic procedures to the benefit of the executive, is there no way out of 
the quandary that we present? Is the situation so dismal as to not provide any 
                                                             
265 See http://www.salon.com/2012/02/09/obamas_unprecedented_war_on_whistleblowers [Accessed  
July 21, 2013]  
266 The defense secretary of USA ordered the Pentagon to keep an eye on leak of classified documents. For 
more on this see http://rt.com/usa/news/pentagon-monitor-media-leaks-classified-645/ [Accessed on 
July 23, 2013]  
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alternative? I would argue that, within the given democratic structures the possibility of 
redress is always prospective. It can always be an ex-post phenomenon. Any checks and 
controls induced in the procedures to limit the abuse ex-ante will always have to 
overcome the hiddeness inherent in the epistemic nature of the secret which makes it 
impossible for it to be known beyond the individual or the group which holds the 
secret. Does it really mean that limitations cannot be imposed on the practice of secrecy? 
Procedurally it might be difficult. Any limitation can only come from the self-induced 
regulation of the executive apart from the constant vigilance of the other branches of the 
state and the media. This leaves us with the group of individuals who constitute the 
executive. I have so far refrained from analyzing the group of individuals who 
constitute the executive and analyzing one of the most important ways through which 
executive abuses come to be known, that of whistleblowing or leaks, except in the 
context of the media. It is assumed that the information within the executive is spread 
over different individuals and one of them can and often do leak information due to 
several reasons, one of which could be the wrong doing which is hidden within the act. 
In the next chapter I will analyse whether such cases of leaking can indeed be treated 
within the moral framework of disobedience, especially when the leaks reveal gross acts 
of wrongdoing on the part of the state.  
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Chapter 4 
Whistleblowing: A case for Civil disobedience 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the normal institutional mechanisms to curb 
excessive secrecy often do not work. In the absence of such structures does it mean that 
the gaps left by secrecy would remain? Do democracies not have other instruments 
through which this gap can be filled? This chapter aims to look at one of the alternate 
systems through which the deficits caused by secrecy can be filled. This is the 
instrument of whistleblowing. In the absence of normal institutional democratic 
procedures of self-correction, dissent is the last resort to salvage democracy. It is in this 
context that whistleblowing needs to be studied. Thus, the goal of this chapter is to 
study the activity of whistleblowing, the reasons for it, and its role in a democracy. 
Further the chapter aims to analyse and understand whether whistleblowing can be 
understood as an act of civil disobedience, under some instances. The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of Wikileaks and PRISM revelations as a legitimate act of civil 
disobedience. 
Ideally public policies ought to comply with the demands of publicity. Yet, in non-ideal 
circumstances full compliance is often not possible, for it would require an entitlement 
to complete information on every activity of a modern state. But security reasons offer 
countervailing considerations to full publicity. Full publicity implies the risk of the 
information being spilled out to the enemies of the state. The need for secrecy must then 
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be weighed against the countervailing considerations of publicity. Secrecy, on the other 
hand, in virtue of its peculiar role in the functioning of a modern state, can easily 
outstrip the purpose for which it is ordained, and become – in particular circumstances 
-  an end to itself or a way of   protecting the wrong-doers . In other words, secrecy, in 
non-ideal settings, is a necessity, and – at the same time – a constant risk.  
In ideal circumstances, secrecy threatens the ex-ante ‘epistemic entitlement’ which 
underlies any conception of rights. Yet, secrecy can be justified in non-ideal settings, 
only on the condition that the action protected under its rule does not unjustifiably limit 
rights. I argued that the rights of individuals ought not to be limited unless such 
limitations can be justified to those whose rights are being curbed. Thus, in non-ideal 
cases a ‘right of assessment’ guarantees the legitimate limitation of a right.267 It follows 
that real world democratic institutions have a political duty to curb the excessive 
practices of secrecy, when those practices hide unjust acts and limit the balance between 
constitutional powers. In fact, any act of secrecy, to be legitimate, ought to pass the test 
of the ‘right of assessment’.      
 Yet, as the previous chapter demonstrated, the epistemic nature of secrecy means that 
neither the constitutional controls, nor media vigilantism can work towards checking 
the abuse of power. It is inherent in the epistemic nature of secrecy that the 
informational asymmetry favours the individuals or members of the group who have 
                                                             
267 See also Santoto & Kumar (unpublished manuscript)  
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access to that information. Hiding under this feature of secrecy, executive abuses of 
power and rights violation can go unnoticed. We face then the following dilemma: 
either democracy needs secrecy, but lack instruments to challenge the malpractices due 
to excessive secrecy, or they do not need secrecy, but lack instruments to protect the 
fundamental interests of safety, security, and – more in general – the fundamental 
interest protected under democratic institutions, from the threats of potential enemies.  
The dilemma cannot be resolved from within the democratic institutions. In the absence 
of institutional controls it might seem that democracy cannot correct the deficit that 
results from secrecy. Yet such an institutionalist reading of democracy is at best narrow. 
It does not account for channels outside institutions that work towards strengthening 
democracy. Thus, in order to find the missing link to resolve this dilemma, we need to 
look outside the normal institutional frameworks. The missing link, I argue, is the role 
that individuals can play in checking the abuse of power. In the context of the 
discussion of secrecy, this role is that of a whistleblower. A whistleblower, while 
working within an institution, deviates from the legal oath of secrecy to expose the 
wrong-doings within the institution. The act of exposing wrongs is aimed at correcting 
the necessary deficit that occurs due to secrecy. In absence of institutional checks, it is 
only by recognizing the role played by a whistleblower that we can argue in favour of 
democracy being a self-correcting form of government. Thus, whistleblowing is a 
necessary modality of democratic self-correction.    
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXVI Cycle                                    PhD Candidate: Manohar Kumar 
  
Page 127 
 
In the sections that follow I will defend the view that whistleblowing constitutes a core 
aspect of democracy.  In some crucial instances, whistleblowing constitutes more than 
an act of leaking secret information. When a gross violation of rights and systematic 
abuse of power is concerned, whistleblowing is an act of civil disobedience. This is the 
line of the argument I would be taking in the rest of the chapter. To this purpose, I will 
first show why whistleblowing arises in the first place. An examination of this sort 
requires discussing the role of the agents involved in secret practices, and their 
motivations for leaking information. However, some distinctions need to be made 
between different cases of whistleblowing (since not all of them can be categorized as 
an act of disobedience) and confronted against the existing dominant conceptions of 
civil disobedience. The purpose of this analysis is to evaluate whether the dominant 
framework of civil disobedience is suitable to capture all relevant cases of whistle 
blowing or, rather, a more robust account needs to be designed to argue in favour of 
them. I will finally argue in conclusion for Wikileaks and the recent PRISM revelations 
as instances of civil disobedience.   
1. Secrecy and Whistleblowing  
In order to understand whistleblowing one needs to answer the following questions: 
what is whistleblowing? Who can blow the whistle? Why does it take place? What are 
the background conditions for Whistleblowing? Is it an act of last resort?  Is 
whistleblowing legitimate? We also need to show that whistleblowing, under 
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conditions of executive secrecy, ought to be an act of last resort, if it does not have to 
undermine the democratic systems of checks and balances. Thus, the leaks ought to 
strengthen democracy, rather than undermine its basic structures. Any deviation from 
the previous requirement (whistleblowing being an act of last resort) needs to be 
justified through an overriding reason that explains the necessity of side-stepping the 
democratic procedures. Such reasons should be either political or moral, but should not 
concern individual interests of the whistleblower.  
1.1 Whistleblowing: definition   
According to Sissela Bok, Whistleblowing is an act “meant to call attention to 
negligence, abuses, or dangers that threaten the public interest.” Whistleblowers  
sound an alarm based on their expertise or inside knowledge, often from within the organization in 
which they work. With as much resonance as they can muster, they strive to breach secrecy, or else 
arouse an apathetic public to dangers everyone knows about but does not fully acknowledge.268  
On the other hand, Elliston suggests four different definitions of whistleblowing:  
(a) going public with information about the safety of a product; 
(b) sounding an alarm from within the very organization in which they work, aiming to spotlight neglect 
or abuses that threaten the public interest; 
(c) (when) the employee, "without support or authority from his superiors... independently 
                                                             
268 Bok (1983: 211)  
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makes known concerns to individuals outside the organization"; 
(d) a whistle blower is an employee or officer of any institution, profit or non-profit, private or public, 
who believes either that he/she has been ordered to perform some act or he/she has obtained knowledge 
that the institution engaged in activities which (a) are believed to cause unnecessary harm to third parties, 
(b) are in violation of human rights or (c) run counter to the defined purpose of the institution and who 
inform the public of this fact.269  
 The definitions underlined here, except for Bok, are a result of practices of 
whistleblowing in a business setting. Except for definition (a), all other accounts 
mentioned above can qualify as a general definition of whistleblowing. Definition in (a) 
generally concerns with a product; unless security is considered as a product, our 
discussion in this chapter is not concerned with these cases.270  
A perusal of the definitions given above suggests that Whistleblowing has six inherent 
elements: i) it is a deliberate act, ii) often done by an insider having access to 
information and an expertise in assessing the information; iii) the information is directly 
related to threats to citizens’ rights, their obligations or harm the public interest; iv) it is 
                                                             
269 Elliston (1982: 167)  
270 The act of providing security by the executive is not a case of a provider-customer relationship, as in 
the case of a business enterprise. Provision of security is one of the function for which executive branch is 
formed in a democratic state. According to the social contract tradition, one of the reasons hypothetically 
individuals bind themselves in a contract is that for the purpose of obtaining security and the protection 
of fundamental rights. Security, according to this understanding, is not a product offered by the state to 
the citizens, which the citizens can accept or reject or bargain at competing prices. Citizens do not 
conceive of security as a product, but as a right the state is bound to provide.  
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assumed by the whistleblower that withdrawing such an information from the public is 
a grave wrong done to the citizens;  v) the information is such that the public ought to 
know, and vi) it is in form of appeal to the higher authorities, through publicity, with an 
intention to generate public pressure  to correct the wrongs done.  
1.2 Whistleblowing: intentionality and responsibility 
Whistleblowing is an intentional act done with the purpose of revealing secret 
information to the public. If the information is leaked through gross negligence, it 
would not be termed as whistleblowing, even if the information concerns wrongs done 
to the citizens at large. Whistleblowing is a form of action a rational autonomous person 
undertakes, by going through a process of self-deliberation and reasoning- where such 
reasoning is often the consequence of a moral commitment. Yet, it is only often moral, 
since the intention behind leaking a set of information might not always be guided by 
the public interest. Leaking might be also done to achieve personal ends. Yet, 
sometimes even when leaking is done for narrow ends, it might inadvertently end up 
promoting the public good by virtue of the information revealed.   
Whistleblowing acts as a communicative tool to elicit change in the existing state of 
affairs. When guided by concerns of public good, the intention behind the leaks is to 
generate debate among citizens about practices that the whistleblower thinks is 
essentially wrong. The intention to alter the malpractices cannot happen if institutions 
are not held accountable for their practices. Thus, the act of leaking is insufficient if the 
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institutions responsible for the wrong-doing are not pin-pointed. Thus, the intentional 
act of whistleblowing is about attributing responsibility, to the individuals who are 
complicit in the wrong-doing and to those who can bring about the desired change. 
Elliston describes two kinds of responsibilities:   
a descriptive one referring to those who cause something to happen; and a normative one identifying 
those who should do something about it. The first sense looks to the past, as part of an explanation. The 
second looks to the future as a coping strategy. Whistleblowers must to some degree locate responsibility 
in at least one of these senses if their statements are to be more than mere warnings.271  
Responsibility might be ascribed either to individuals or to institutions; the revelation 
might also pin-point a structural flaw in the institution. In pin-pointing responsibility, 
the whistleblower aims to change the existing state of affairs. It is an effort to “enlist the 
support of others to achieve social objective”.272 The whistleblower understands that 
under the given condition, change can only be brought about through leaking; she 
might neither have the power, nor the legal authority to push for change from within. 
In the act of leaking she fulfills her role as a conscious citizen, providing information so 
that those public officials, civil society groups, who are in position to press for more 
transparency or enforce culpability for the wrongs, assume responsibility. Leaking itself 
does not guarantee the change; it has to be brought about by a conscious deliberate 
                                                             
271 Elliston (1982: 169)  
272 Ibid: 170 
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political action on the part of those to whom the information is communicated to. When 
the citizens fail to act on the information often the state of affairs remain the same. 
  1.2 The who of whistleblowing 
The definition provided above describes whistleblowers that are part of the institution 
they blow the whistle on. Yet, does a whistleblower necessarily have to be an insider? It 
need not always be so. Whistleblower is someone who has access to the information, 
has necessary expertise in handling the secret content, and can evaluate the gravity of 
wrongs being committed under the veil of secrecy. Internal accounts of whistleblowing 
exclude instances of information leaking from sources outside those of the culpable 
institutions. However, the outsider, in order to be categorized as a whistleblower, needs 
to intentionally act on the information, test the veracity of the leak, and then make it 
public through channels they deem fit. Instances in which an insider transmits 
information to an outsider, the title of whistleblower ought to be accorded to both.  
It might be argued that the anonymity of the insider takes away the credibility out of 
the leaks; i.e. the leaks might not be judged as authentic. In the same vein it is argued 
that the whistleblower stands public scrutiny and submits to the law. Two points can be 
made in opposition: the leak ought to be treated in its own right, disregarding 
references to the motivation or the identity of the person concerned.273 Secondly, 
                                                             
273 ibid 
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impetus ought to be on testing the veracity of the information rather than the moral 
character of the individual.  
1.3. The why of whistleblowing  
Why do individuals having access to secret information have a duty to leak the 
information? The two conditions under which the whistleblower can decide to leak the 
information depends on the following: (i) the moral demandingness of the situation. 
The moral requirement of the situation overrides or outweighs the fear of reprisals that 
might follow from the act, thus suggesting that the act is sincere and not guided by 
personal motives. (ii) the personal benefits that might accrue to the whistleblower. 
Whistleblowing, even if done with a motive of personal gain, might end up benefiting 
others as well.  
To understand the motivations behind whistleblowing, let us take the following two 
similar looking examples delineated below.  
Example 1: A decides to leak, out of personal malice, secret information about B to C. 
The information concerns a wrong done by B to C. The leak thus helps C to know of the 
wrong done, at the same time allowing A of her revenge.  
Example 2: Suppose a public employee decides to blow whistle on the mismanagement 
of funds within her institution. She might be motivated due to ill-treatment by her 
superiors. Her leak exposes the public to the wrong-doings of her institution.  
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In both the examples we see that as a consequence of the leak a good occurs, but the 
motivation behind the act is particularly sinister. Thus, while for a consequentialist the 
act is moral, for a Kantian it is not, because in both the instances the primary intention 
of the whistleblower was not to help C (in example 1) or to act towards a common good 
(example 2). These examples raise a fundamental concern regarding whistleblowing: 
how can we ensure that the motivation guiding the action is not governed by personal 
interests? I argue that moral motivations are difficult to know, until and unless the 
actions of the whistleblowers are publicly scrutinized and held accountable for their 
actions. Allowing anonymous whistleblowing precludes the possibility of discerning 
the motivations governing the act. Yet, sometimes the threats of personal harm might 
lead the whistleblower to be anonymous. Should such acts then not be considered as 
legitimate? In my contention the act still fulfills a political purpose of strengthening 
democratic institutions. It initiates necessary corrections in the fissures in the 
institutions. Thus, even if we disregard the act as moral, depending on our own moral 
commitment, its political significance ought not to be lost to us. While questions of 
moral motivations should be raised, but they should not override the political actions 
required to fill the exposed democratic deficit.274   
                                                             
274 The majority of responses to Snowden’s revelations tried to discredit the act by showing bad 
motivations or a chequered personal history.  For more see 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/opinion/brooks-the-solitary-leaker.html?_r=2& [accessed on 
Aug. 30, 2013] 
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In ideal conditions the whistleblower should publicize the reasons behind the 
revelations, and be able to face public scrutiny for her actions. In non-ideal 
circumstances though, the prevailing power relations might force her to undertake the 
action in anonymity; the reasons, if any, have to be discerned from the revelations 
themselves. In absence of public justification the content of the leaks should itself count 
as sufficient reason, for political purposes, if not for moral ones. The question more 
important for me is: what are the reasons that justify an act of whistleblowing? In other 
words, under what conditions whistleblowing ought to be undertaken? It is to this 
inquiry that I move next.    
1.4 Reasons for whistleblowing  
The background conditions for whistleblowing has to do with the following: a) the 
particular nature of secrets; b) the act protected under the secret; c) the epistemic agents 
having knowledge of such acts; d) the reasons for whistleblowing. The first three 
conditions fulfill the requirement of the “why” of the whistleblowing. Secret 
information by its very nature limits the information to a particular individual(s) or a 
group of people working within an institution. Not necessarily all members within an 
institution might know the information. Secrecy grants autonomy to the agents having 
the information, they can either share it with others or keep it to themselves. It is only 
when an individual from within the institution decides to reveal the information that 
others acquire the knowledge of it. The whistleblower is such an agent who decides to 
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hand over classified information to the citizens. Thus, she makes the knowledge 
available, hitherto limited to a subgroup of people, to the citizens. Let us understand the 
reasons for whistleblowing.  
The argument from rights  
The first reason has to do with the burden of justification that secrecy creates within a 
democratic set-up. If publicity is the ideal norm in democracy, then any need for secrecy 
has to be justified. The possibility of abuse, under a veil of secrecy, means that the 
burden of justification is on the institution hiding the information. The need for 
justification is higher if the secret information hides from a person or groups the 
information of harms done to them, or the sources of such harm. In conditions where 
the source of the harm is the state itself, the burden of justification is higher. The need 
for a special justification arises due to the public good nature of state information. Any 
deviation from its public nature requires due justification. Reasons of security mark 
exceptions to the publicity requirement, but do not take away the justification owed to 
the citizen. Security in general cannot be a justification, especially when secrecy 
measures are used to hide wrong-doing.  
The need for justification arises out of the entitlement, right holders have, to know the 
conditions under which their rights are being limited.275 Secrecy limits the knowledge of 
right limitations, thus affecting the capacity of the agents to act autonomously. 
                                                             
275 Santoro & Kumar (unpublished manuscript)  
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Autonomous action requires ‘that a person should possess all the relevant information 
concerning the options available to her in pursuing the conduct protected under a 
specific right; for  if a person had such knowledge, she might have chosen to act 
differently or could have possibly contested those limitations.’276 Thus, to exercise the 
capacity of free action, protected under a right, the individual has an entitlement to ‘full 
knowledge of the circumstances that may impede the enjoyment of a right.’277 This is 
the epistemic entitlement of rights. Secrecy violates the epistemic entitlement by 
limiting the knowledge of the conditions under which a right is limited. Yet, under 
certain circumstances the nature of secrecy operation requires that providing the 
information to the right holder might betray the very purpose of the secret action. This 
is the case of surveillance operations. In such cases citizens ought to be granted an ex-
post assessment of the conditions under which their right was limited.278 This is the 
right of assessment which fulfills ex-post, the ex-ante requirement of the epistemic 
entitlement.   
Right of assessment creates correlative obligations on those who aim to limit these 
rights. The obligation, in general, lies with the institution aiming to limit individual 
rights; they might be unwilling to enact it due to threats to their interests.  On the 
contrary, a whistleblower refuses to take part in the harm protected under the secret. 
                                                             
276 Ibid: 18 
277 Ibid:19 
278 Ibid: 20 
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Even if she is not the direct source of the harm, the access to information creates a 
complicity in the harm, which though less than the actual harm, is nonetheless 
important. This is a direct derivation from Mill, where he suggests: ‘A person may 
cause evil to others not only by his actions but by his inaction, and in either case he is 
justly accountable for the injury.’279 
The knower can either withdraw their services from the institution responsible for the 
harm (such is the case with a conscientious refusal) or blow the whistle, but she cannot 
escape from being complicit in the harm, even through her silence. Whistleblowing is 
thus a positive duty towards the individual whose rights are being limited. This duty 
derives from the contention of Mill. It is a moral duty that admits no exceptions. It 
overrides the constraints of the positive legal duty to maintain secrets. The demands of 
the moral duty to act and reveal information overrides the duty that legally binds the 
whistleblower. The whistleblower, by acting on behalf of the right holder, fulfills her 
obligation by providing them the information to assess their limitations of rights. 
Through the active leaking of information she not only exculpates herself from the guilt, 
but fulfills the active duty to uphold the rights of the individual. Yet such duty does not 
require that leak be aimed at the individual who is harmed. Ideally, the leak should 
reach those individuals and groups harmed, but in some cases it is not possible. In such 
cases, it would suffice to say that whistleblowing reveals a systemic democratic deficit, 
a deviation in the function of the institution from its stated constitutional mandate. 
                                                             
279 Mill (1991: 15) 
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Limitation of a particular right by the state, in the absence of justification, suggests that 
the state has deviated from the constitutional requirements it ought to uphold.  
If secrecy hides violation of rights of groups or minorities, it undermines the 
distributive structure of rights. In such circumstances the threat to a particular right of 
an individual or a group is a violation of the equal enjoyment of that right in general, 
thus undermining the very system of rights. The whistleblower upholds the spirit of the 
constitution by exposing the deficits within the institution. In fact the act of leaking 
reveals that the state has turned away from its role as a protector of constitutional 
rights. On the contrary, the state fails the minority population who are the most 
vulnerable in such cases. Thus, the authority vested by the citizens in the state is 
undermined. It creates a deficit of democratic legitimacy. Such deficits, if gone 
unnoticed, might not only undermine the basic democratic structure, but might lead to 
a potential future violation of rights in general. The act of leaking is thus not a 
communication about a particular harm, but about a threat to system of rights and the 
basic structure in itself. Thus, for a leak to be successful it is not binding that it reaches 
to the individuals harmed, but that the information of the harm be made public. It can 
then be picked up by civil liberty groups, media, the legislative, and the judiciary who 
are agents who champion the cause of rights, and restrain the state from turning away 
from its democratic duty. Yet even if undemocratic policies of the state are not 
contested, it does not undermine the democratic nature of the leaks, which provide a 
necessary tool for a change in the existing practices. Such change can only happen at the 
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level of politics, the whistleblower is a necessary cog for this politics to begin in the first 
place. Whether the politics begins or not depends on factors outside the control of the 
whistleblower, though she can initiate a dialogue for it to begin. Thus, the validity of 
whistleblowing does not depend on the fact that the intended change was brought 
about or not, or whether the individuals who have been harmed are the audience being 
communicated to, but it lies in the revelation of the moral wrongs being committed 
within democratic institutions, that creates a deficit in democracy which needs to be 
pin-pointed in its own right.   
The argument from political obligation 
Consider the case where the information relates to democratic flaws, wrong doings on 
part of the institutions, i.e. the institution diverting from their stated objectives. Such a 
wrong, if publicly known, would have invited punishment or checks from democratic 
institutions. Secrecy presents democracy with a serious flaw. Wrong doings cannot be 
checked by other institutions, it can only be checked through self-regulation of the 
institution maintaining the secret. But, self-regulation requires trust in the same 
individuals who have incentive enough to misuse it.  In the absence of stronger inner 
moral constraints on the part of the individuals, secrecy gives rise to abuse of power as 
has been explicated in chapter 1. In the last instance, whistleblowing is an attempt to 
correct the flaw.  
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXVI Cycle                                    PhD Candidate: Manohar Kumar 
  
Page 141 
 
In a democratic institution the information is meant for the public. Even if in the short 
run the information is kept away from the citizens, retrospectively they ought to have 
access to it. Secondly, the information that ought to be kept secret, constitutionally 
should not concern grave wrong doing on the part of the executive. Secrecy is 
permissible constitutionally only to the extent that it extends the interests of the citizens. 
When it becomes inimical to the very interests it seeks to protect or undermines the very 
structures it seeks to uphold, secrecy loses its democratic and constitutional 
justification.  
Citizens ought to know whether a particular institution is fulfilling the function for 
which it is designed and democratically legitimated. Deviation from constitutional 
norms breaks the terms of social cooperation which binds the institution with the 
citizens who impart authority to it. General harms to others- by a state working on 
behalf of the citizens- implicates the citizens in the harm caused, since the citizens being 
ultimate authority ought to assume responsibility for the actions of the state. 
Information in such cases provides the citizens with the necessary tools to potentially 
check the abuse of the power of the state. It thus becomes the prerogative of the 
individual who has access to such information to revert back to the citizens about the 
breach of trust.  
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1.5 Is whistleblowing an act of last resort?  
It is often argued that the whistleblower ought to exhaust all possible options of 
deliberations, within the group, before leaking the information. Reflecting on the recent 
Prism revelations by Edward Snowden, David brooks insists that such cases of 
whistleblowing often erode the basic trust in institutions, the terms of social cooperation 
which has been agreed to, and deference to common procedures which are required to 
keep these institutions functioning.280 It betrays the honesty and trust which are the 
grounding stone of any cooperative enterprise.281 While he does not rule out the need 
for whistleblowing when the information being hidden is “grave”, he finds this typical 
case of Edward Snowden to be an obsessive act not guided by democratic values.  
This is the standard critique against acts of whistleblowing. The argument suggests that 
whistleblowing, if at all required, should be an act of last resort. The typical 
whistleblower should exhaust all possible institutional channels before making the 
information public. Another strand of criticism suggests the whistleblower betrays the 
duty towards the institution she is working in. It is also argued that the whistleblower 
has access to the information only by the virtue of being part of the institution, so 
leaking is an act of stealth.  
                                                             
280 See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/11/opinion/brooks-the-solitary-leaker.html?_r=2& [Accessed 
Aug. 30, 2013] 
281 Ibid  
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Such arguments miss the point for the following reasons: even though the terms of 
contract bind an employee to an institution, the terms do not apply if the original 
condition under which the contract was made has changed. If the employee is 
implicated in a certain wrong doing, which was not part of the original function within 
the organization; she has every right to blow the whistle. As argued before the moral 
duty to expose the harms overrides the legal duty to obey the institutional rules. 
Similarly, the information within a democratic institution is public in nature, and ought 
to be known to the public, so it not an act of stealth.282 Any information which concerns 
harms is stripped off its necessity of secrecy by its very virtue of the harm that it 
protects.  
Dissent within the institution also might not work; the institution might have enough 
incentive to keep the secret.283 Institutions might not respond to moral reasons due to 
                                                             
282 For more see O’Neill http://mises.org/daily/6474/ and http://mises.org/daily/6475/The-Ethics-of-
State-Secrecy  [accessed on Nov. 04, 2013] 
283 As Edward Snwoden asserts why dissent within the organization does not work. “[W]hen you talk to 
people about [abuses] in a place like this where this is the normal state of business people tend not to take 
them very seriously and move on from them. But over time that awareness of wrongdoing sort of builds 
up and you feel compelled to talk about [them]. And the more you talk about [them] the more you’re 
ignored. The more you’re told it’s not a problem until eventually you realize that these things need to be 
determined by the public and not by somebody who was simply hired by the government.” 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/15/the-banality-of-systemic-evil/ [Accessed on Sept. 30, 
2013] Similar was the case of Chelsea Manning who first tried all possible internal ways to bring the 
wrong-doing to the light of the administration. Only when the attempt was frustrated that she made it 
public.(ibid) 
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the special privilege that secrecy grants. On the contrary, if the potential whistleblower 
is a subordinate it might harm her career chances, as blowing the whistle might come at 
a high cost she might be unwilling to take.284  
Whistleblowing does not amount to a lack in trust in the institution, it represents a lack 
of trust in that particular instance where the whistleblower has compelling reasons to 
believe that the desired changes will not be brought about through internal dissent. In 
fact, a typical whistleblower imposes faith in the democratic procedure to correct itself, 
and to that end appeals to the sense of justice shared by the citizens. The social terms of 
cooperation that binds her to the citizens provides a compelling ground for her to revert 
back to the citizens when normal channels to correct wrongs are missing. Rather than 
encourage blind obedience to the law and terms of duty, the whistleblower often fulfills 
her obligation as a citizen. Such an act shows faith in the democratic institutions, but 
challenges their way of functioning. The harm to social cooperation, in the long run, 
comes not from the whistleblower but the grave wrongs that are preserved under a veil 
of secrecy.  
 
                                                             
284 See infra note 17 for the case of mathematician William Binney and NSA analyst J.Kirk Weibe who 
tried institutional mechanisms to reveal the wrongs protected under the secret. They were frustrated in 
their attempts and only in the last instance they decided to blow the whistle. They have faced deleterious 
consequences for their actions through law suits brought against them and their security clearance being 
revoked. In fact the article shows empirical cases where the NSA was spying on the legislators and FISA 
court judges (the ones who are supposed to have an oversight over surveillance operations)  
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2.  Civil Disobedience: Three accounts   
When does an act of whistleblowing become civil disobedience? In order to answer this 
question, let us first begin with the existing theories of civil disobedience and try and 
see if cases of whistleblowing indeed fit within the existing conception of civil 
disobedience. If such is not the case, then we would have to see whether the conception 
of civil disobedience needs to be elaborated to apply to cases of whistleblowing.  
 
2.1 The liberal account 
According to John Rawls, Civil Disobedience is defined as “a public, nonviolent, 
conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing 
about a change in the law or policies of the government.”285 The Rawlsian conception of 
civil disobedience only applies to a nearly just society governed by a liberal democratic 
polity.286 For him, conditions of Civil Disobedience obtain only when current 
arrangements “depart in varying degrees from publicly accepted standards that are 
more or less just; or these arrangements may conform to a society’s conception of 
justice, or to the view of the dominant class, but this conception itself may be 
unreasonable, and in many cases clearly unjust.”287 Civil Disobedience acts as an appeal 
                                                             
285 Rawls (1999: 320)  
286 Ibid: 319 
287 Ibid : 309. On the other hand, for Joseph Raz in a liberal democratic state there is no general right of 
civil disobedience. The argument goes that the liberal states protect the right of political participation of 
its citizens and any critique of the laws will be protected by the state. It does not mean that, when faced 
with iniquitous laws in a liberal state, citizens cannot disobey. (2009:273)  
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to the society’s ‘sense of justice’ when the current arrangements deviate from ‘publicly 
recognized standards’288 and threaten the “principle of equal liberty” and “violates the 
principle of fair equality of opportunity”.289 It is an appeal, based on the ‘shared 
conception of justice’ and justified through political reasoning, by a minority or an 
individual, to the majority to bring to their notice the existing unjust arrangements.290 It 
is hoped that the act of defiance or resistance would bring to notice the injustice and 
proper measures would be taken to correct it. Civil Disobedience, according to Rawls, 
should be undertaken in the public and the disobedient should be willing to submit to 
the laws of the polity and be willing to bear any punishment ordained for the law’s 
violation. The act of submission suggests a general fidelity to the law on the part of the 
disobedient; it suggests that the disobedient is against a particular law or policy but not 
against laws in general.291 Fidelity to law ascribes a necessary faith in the democratic 
process and in its ability to redress the wrongs done, for civil disobedience when 
undertaken with “due restraint and sound judgement helps to maintain and strengthen 
just institutions”292 The civil disobedient necessarily acts in good faith and ascribes to 
uphold the cause of justice and build just institutions. In doing so, she seeks to actively 
engage with the existing institutions in order to change it. 
For Rawls, civil disobedience has five general characteristics: a) it should be public, b) 
non-violent, c) conscientious political act, d) contrary to the law, and e) should be done 
with an intention to change the law. Fidelity to law is a requirement of civil 
disobedience but does not define the act itself. It is a requirement which stems from the 
near justness of the constitution and the society in general i.e. when the society does not 
                                                             
288 Rawls (1999: 310)  
289 Ibid:366 
290 Ibid: 321 
291 Ibid: 322 
292 Ibid:336 
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deviate largely from the ‘shared conception of justice’ or when the laws are not in 
general ‘unreasonable’.  
The general literature on civil disobedience tends to agree on the fact that for an act to 
be termed as civil disobedience it should necessarily be public, and contrary to the law 
i.e. illegal.293 Civil disobedience ought to be public since both the “public and the 
government should know” what the disobedient “intends to do”.294 The public nature 
of the act and the willingness to pay the penalty not only shows the fidelity to the law, 
and a basic support of the constitutional democratic process but is also required to 
“enlist support, sympathy and admiration” in favour of the cause that the civil 
disobedient espouses.295 Fidelity to law, for Habermas, shows that the “civil disobedient 
recognizes the democratic legality of the existing order.”296 It is only through a 
participation in the existing political order that the civil disobedient can expose a law 
which is illegitimate, and seek to correct it.297 It ascribes a necessary faith, through an 
appeal to the majority’s sense of justice and reason, in the possibility of democratic 
institutions to revise and correct themselves, and works as a “morally justified 
experiment”, an innovation in the current existing constitutional doctrines.298 The 
reasons for civil disobedience, for Habermas, derive from the fact that “even in the 
democratic constitutional state, legal regulations can be illegitimate”.299   
                                                             
293 Cohen (1972: 284), Habermas (1985:99), Bedau (1991: 655) 
294 Bedau (1991:655) 
295 Cohen (1972: 285). For Raz, publicity and submission to punishment is not what necessarily defines 
Civil Disobedience, but submission to punishment “…proves the purity of one's motives; a trial or a term 
in gaol may serve as a focal point for the mobilization of more opposition to the law or policy protested 
against.” (2009: 265)  
296 Habermas (1985: 103)  
297 ibid 
298 Ibid:104 
299 Ibid:103 
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2.2 The Republican account  
The liberal account of civil disobedience is based on the idea that citizens are generally 
right in disobeying authority when certain laws and policies are unjust. Citizens have 
every right to disobey existing laws, and appeal to the majority conception of justice to 
the extent that the act does not undermine the overall basic structure of the society and 
seeks to bring about the desired change through democratic means of persuasion and 
appeals to reason. Contrary to the liberal model of disobedience, which Daniel 
Markovits calls as “democracy limiting”, he proposes an alternate model of “democratic 
disobedience”, based on a republican conception of government, which seeks to correct 
“democratic deficits in law and policy that inevitably threaten every democracy”.300 For 
him, the need for democratic disobedience stems from the fact that in democracies often 
public policies depart from the “sovereign will” and the “individual authorship of 
collective decisions sometimes fail.”301 This creates democratic deficits due to the chasm 
between individual authorship of sovereign will and the public policy which does not 
confirm to it. Thus, for democratic authority to be legitimate, it ought to build in the 
possibility of disobedience which is a necessary step in correcting this deficit.302 
Sometimes democracies deviate from the collective will due to “manipulation and 
abuse by special interests.”303 Secondly, democratic deficits might owe to the fact that 
citizens tend to believe that their preferences have not been accounted in the process of 
the sovereign will formation. Democracies ought to be deliberative at all levels in order 
to include all voices, but often in the process of engagement, which is a long and 
arduous one, the old sovereign will does not include the new engagement required due 
to the presence of new citizens or changed preferences or the new sovereign will does 
                                                             
300 Markovits (2005: 1902)  
301 Ibid: 1903 
302 Ibid:1904 
303 Ibid:1922 
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not represent the preferences of the old. Thus democratic deficits might accrue due to 
the “distance from any past sovereign engagement” or “resistance to a new sovereign 
engagement” or a combination of the two. 304A citizen who comes across such deficits 
might “wish to reintroduce into the political agenda preferences and ideals that have 
been excluded by the collective decision”. 305 But they might be frustrated by the normal 
democratic procedures (i.e. legal protests), or such procedures might not be adequate to 
account or anticipate all forms of democratic deficits and correct them.306 In absence of 
proper procedural safeguards citizens might not have other options rather than to 
disobey.307 Thus, “political disobedience might, in appropriate circumstances, be 
justified as a counterweight to the inertial institutions and practices that correct and 
cure democratic authority but that inevitably misfire on occasion and produce 
democratic deficits”, but perhaps such disobedience, “if appropriately employed serve 
to correct these deficits and in this way enhance democracy.”308 
2.3 Deliberative disobedience  
Contrary to the liberal and republican accounts of disobedience, Will Smith defends 
civil disobedience within the framework of deliberative democracy. Deliberative 
democracy requires participation of citizens to deliberate on public policies which have 
significant impact on their lives. Civil Disobedience, for him, becomes justifiable when 
“processes of public deliberation fail to respect the principles of a deliberative 
democracy in the following three ways: when deliberation is insuﬃciently inclusive; 
when it is manipulated by powerful participants; and when it is insuﬃciently 
                                                             
304 Ibid:1927 
305 Ibid:1934 
306 Ibid:1934-5 
307 Ibid:1936 
308 Ibid: 1928 
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informed.”309 Disobedience is not only needed for citizens group to challenge policies 
which are insufficiently participatory, but also to challenge at the level of civil society 
when such groups do not include different interests groups. Thus, civil disobedience 
operates at two axes: vertical and horizontal. The vertical plane represents the 
engagement of civil society groups with the state. At this plane, civil disobedience is 
about persuading the state “to enter into a dialogue about law and policy in the light of 
perceived failings in existing deliberative procedures”.310 The civil disobedient hopes 
“to persuade the state to engage in deliberative uptake, by encouraging a response on 
the part of political actors to concerns expressed within civil society.” 
The horizontal plane relates to the engagement within the civil society to make it 
inclusive. Thus, the horizontal dimension represents the intention of the civil 
disobedient “to stimulate processes of communication and argumentation within civil 
society itself. A citizen engages in civil disobedience to communicate concerns to other 
citizens in civil society, to raise awareness of issues and to secure support for his or her 
viewpoint.”311  
The republican and the deliberative account append on the liberal account of 
disobedience by extending the theory to cases that might not be cases of injustice but 
represent certain procedural flaws in the democratic process itself. An overarching 
understanding of civil disobedience indicates four criteria: a) it has to be illegal; b) its 
purpose should be to change the law or correct democratic flaws (either in the 
procedures of policy making or deliberation); c) it has to be public; d) it ought to be 
communicative in order to gather support in their favour. 
 
                                                             
309 Smith (2004: 363-4)  
310 Ibid: 363 
311 idem 
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3. Secrecy and disobedience  
Does a pervasive presence of state secrecy create valid conditions for civil disobedience? 
To answer this question, let us recall some of the epistemic pitfalls of secrecy. Secrecy 
creates an epistemic gap, an informational asymmetry between the citizens and the 
executive. Such an epistemic gap has the following consequences:312 limitations of 
citizens’ rights often go unnoticed, and hence they are denied the information required 
to know between legitimate and illegitimate limitation of their rights, and hence unable 
to challenge those limitations. Secrecy violates the equal enjoyment of civil liberties and 
equal access to opportunities. It thus precludes participation by those who are most 
affected by the actions protected under it.  Citizens do not have full information to 
deliberate and contest important policy decisions. A basic condition of deliberative 
democracy (the publicity requirement of the law) is unmet, thus limiting the political 
obligations and political judgement of citizens thus limiting their participation. Under 
the cover of secrecy powerful interest groups can usurp government functioning in 
their favour. Secrecy precludes the knowledge of policies which are hidden from the 
public and its impact on the citizens. Recall the examples from chapter 3 regarding 
surveillance and extra-ordinary rendition. The first represents a case where the actions 
protected under secrecy overreaches the extent protected under a policy. Thus, 
surveillance measures can be used to target innocent people without any correlative 
checks on them. Similarly, secrecy becomes a veil under which policies can be 
undertaken which might not be justifiable under the glare of publicity. Extra-ordinary 
                                                             
312 The preceding outline of limitations due to secrecy is based on the following line of reasoning: a) 
Individuals are autonomous beings who should not be subjected to arbitrary power, b) any exercise of 
power or control has to be justified to the person on whom it is exercised, c) the public nature of 
informational resources owned by the state, d) access to information as a requirement for citizens to fulfill 
their political obligations. e) access to the knowledge of any possible impediments in the enjoyment of 
rights. 
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renditions, drone strikes, Guantanamo, the surveillance by NSA are examples of such 
kind. Secrecy precludes in such circumstances the citizens’ duty to dissent on behalf of 
the others (non-citizens, aliens) who are the most affected by their state, but who have 
no recourse to challenge such policies at a deliberative level.  
Secrecy does represent a test case for the outlined accounts of civil disobedience. The 
primary requirements which justify the need for civil disobedience are met by the 
deficits caused by the pervasive presence of state secrecy. Secrecy represents a 
‘democratic deficit’ under which the democratic procedures can deviate from the 
collective will of the citizens. Particular interest groups can usurp the functioning of the 
state to favour their own interests. This particular characteristic of secrecy creates a gap 
between the collective will and the state policy. Citizens’ particular wills might not find 
representation in important security policies which might have significant impact on 
their lives. If the following observation is well-grounded, then secrecy passes the test for 
‘democratic disobedience’ since it impacts the autonomy of the citizens and exposes 
them to arbitrary laws which are not a product of their collective wills. Thus, the 
policies are not a product of self-authorship by collective citizens, and this limits not 
only sovereignty based in the will of the people, but also exposes them to harm from 
arbitrary policies. It thus in essence compromises their freedoms.  
Similarly, meaningful deliberation is absent under conditions of secrecy. Particular 
interest groups tend to influence the policy in their favour. Citizens can be manipulated, 
deceived or insufficiently informed regarding particular details of a policy. Thus, 
secrecy also fulfills the test for ‘deliberative disobedience’. On the other hand as stated 
before, secrecy can also act as a veil to protect injustices. Additionally, if the secret 
services deviate from the democratically accepted norms and violate the rights of those 
whom it claims to protect it becomes unjust. Thus, it can be said that the liberal account 
of disobedience can also account for cases of secrecy.  
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4. A different argument for disobedience  
Existing arguments for disobedience account for secrecy due to the consequences that 
result from it. Disobedience is justified only if the consequence of hidden information is 
a violation of right, a democratic deficit or failure to accommodate requirements of 
deliberation. Yet, the above mentioned three accounts are far from consequentialist. 
They approach the issue of disobedience from the perspective of justice, rights, will of 
the citizens or the fundamental right of participation at deliberative levels. In fact it can 
be argued that they might argue against secrecy if it goes against these above stated 
perspectives. So secrecy creates democratic deficits, compromises the rights or 
precludes democratic participation. Until this point secrecy can be accommodated 
within the existing accounts. The problem arises because they do not look at secrecy per 
se. So if no wrong occurs, secrecy might not provide for a justifying ground for 
disobedience, even if the practice of secrecy might be inimical from a principled stand 
point. Thus, the existing accounts, at best, rely on a particular consequence or wrong 
that results from secrecy, but not deal with the nature of secrecy and the impact it has 
on the autonomy of the citizens and for functioning of the democratic structures. It is 
my contention that these problems need to be spelt out if existing accounts have to 
accommodate secrecy. Yet they cannot do so because their fundamental premises do not 
allow for accommodation of the specific aspect of secrecy. Thus, either the existing 
accounts need to be discarded or enlarged to account for this fact. In the arguments that 
follow I tend to append the existing accounts with a version of disobedience which is 
epistemic, that can accommodate the fact of secrecy. The epistemic account does not 
aim to discard existing accounts but should be read as a necessary addition in them. 
Thus, under conditions of secrecy, only an account of epistemic disobedience can 
accommodate the peculiar problems that arise from hidden information.   But before I 
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move on to the epistemic account I need to show what are the particular premises in the 
existing discussions of civil disobedience that do not accommodate for secrecy. 
All the three theories outlined above are based on two premises. It requires that the 
citizens who engage in disobedience are aware of the background conditions (i.e. 
injustice, democratic deficits etc.) and that such deficits are potentially accessible to the 
citizen groups at large. The second premise is that of autonomy. Existing conditions of 
civil disobedience assume that the citizen groups largely act with autonomy and they 
make their choices in complete freedom. Even when complete conditions of autonomy 
might not obtain, citizens are free to the extent that they are aware of the limitations on 
their autonomy, know under what conditions the autonomy has been limited, can pass 
judgements whether such limitations are justified, and if they are not legitimate then 
can engage in dissent or disobedience to reclaim their lost autonomy.  
Autonomy, under the existing theories, does not depend on epistemic considerations. 
This epistemic precondition is the knowledge about the limitation of their rights, or 
knowledge about existence of democratic deficits. This knowledge is largely available to 
the citizens. Thus, under normal accounts of civil disobedience, epistemic preconditions 
to engage in disobedience are met. The disobedient, under such circumstance, only 
highlights a particular law or policy that she considers unjust with an intention of 
changing them. These states of affairs are publicly known, and potentially anyone can 
engage in an act of disobedience if they believe that the policy deviates from the shared 
conception of justice. Thus, potentially everyone is in a position to disobey.   
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5.  Disobedience and the epistemic relevance of secrecy 
 Under conditions of secrecy, citizens do not have the knowledge of the extent of the 
limitations of their rights, or whether they completely enjoy the range of actions 
protected under that right. Thus, limitations of rights or knowledge about democratic 
deficits are not publicly known. Any deviance from the publicly shared conception of 
justice is only available to the insiders of the information.  Citizens cannot know about 
such limitations until an insider to the secret informs them about it.  It is thus only the 
insider to the information who can be a potential disobedient. In short, thus 
disobedience under secrecy does not begin with a shared knowledge of: limitations of 
rights; or democratic deficits, thus making the epistemic preconditions to disobey 
different from the existing accounts of disobedience.  
The need of disobedience arises because of the informational asymmetry that secrecy 
causes between the executive and the citizens. Such asymmetry hides the wrong done 
from the citizens. Thus, disobedience, under conditions of secrecy, is about revealing 
this secret information in public. In doing so the disobedient intentionally disobeys the 
law protecting the secret information. The legal duty to protect the secret is overridden 
by the moral duty to reveal the harms. The disobedient thus also refuses to take part in 
the harms, even just by the virtue of being a silent spectator to the secret information.  
Disobedience becomes a communicative act in order to elicit support against the unjust 
policy that protects the harm. The disobedient might not necessarily be against the 
particular law. On the contrary, she might believe that secrecy privileges are justified, 
but she might just be against the particular information regarding a harm that is 
protected by state secrecy privileges. Additionally, the civil disobedient might argue 
that, while the particular policy is democratically justified, in this particular instance, it 
has overextended its democratic mandate.  
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Thus, under conditions of secrecy, any theory of disobedience has to take account of the 
particular characteristics of the act. Disobedience under such circumstances relates to 
revealing of information about: a) a general wrong doing or harms done protected 
under a secret; b) information is kept secret to manipulate or mislead public opinion in 
a desired policy direction; c) secrecy protects an illegitimate law or policy; d) when a 
policy under secrecy overextends its constitutional mandate and no checks are in place 
to control its abuse.   
Under these conditions, if a person is exposed to sets of information that reveal a series 
of injustices, disobedience not only is a right, but a duty of justice. The person, by the 
virtue of being in an epistemic privileged position, be it as a government employee or as 
a journalist, is able to assess the circumstances and the weight of the information in 
question. She then needs to assess her role as an active political subject, moving beyond 
subjective considerations,313 and reason out the urgency of making the information 
accessible to the public. The disclosure of unlawful conduct should be made even if it 
threatens national security.314 In doing so, the disobedient rises above the narrow 
constraints set upon her by the calls of professional duty and restraints of the positive 
law.315 Thus she, as a citizen, not only affirms her status as a moral and epistemic 
agent,316 but as a political being she uses the right granted to her by the constitution.317 
                                                             
313 Brownlee (2007) 
314 Stone (2011) makes the case based on the first amendment right of the citizens for freedom of speech. 
This argument generally stems from a fundamental liberal suspicion of threats to civil liberties both from 
the state as well as outside entities. See especially   Liberalism of fear by Judith Shklar (1989). The citizens 
need to be especially skeptical of the claims of the state, especially when they are done in their name.  
315Constitutionally, the state cannot force individuals to surrender their rights. A voluntary agreement on 
the part of the individual does not undermine her position as a citizen guaranteed certain rights by the 
state. The rights of free speech in this case are inalienable. For more see (Stone, 2011)  and (Sunstein 1986) 
316 Parekh (1993) 
317 Stone (2011) 
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She in the process reinstates the epistemic agency of the other citizens and takes a step 
towards correcting the democratic deficit which occurs due to this epistemic lack.318    
Civil disobedience, under secrecy, has an epistemic character. Its need arises out of the 
informational asymmetry between the executive and the citizens. We can call it epistemic 
disobedience. We can define epistemic disobedience as an illegal act, done on behalf of 
others, to expose the wrong done under conditions of secrecy, with an intention to bring 
about change. Thus, it is an act performed by a whistleblower, on behalf of others, 
whose rights or political obligations might have been compromised due to the absence 
of information. Epistemic disobedience is illegal, in so far as such revelations are not 
protected under the right to information laws. The disobedient, on the contrary, 
believes that she has sufficient reasons to reveal such information.  
The revealed information fulfills the right of assessment of the citizens; it provides them 
with the epistemic resources to be in the best position to judge the limitation of their 
rights. Epistemic disobedience is premised on the reasoning that information is a vital 
good for enjoyment of rights, and fulfillment of political obligations. The disobedient 
highlights that part of democratic deficits and injustices that owe their presence to 
informational asymmetry. The assumption is that such information would potentially 
                                                             
318 I do not claim that citizens do not have autonomy and agency, on the contrary they do. In the specific 
instance of secrecy citizens lack the knowledge about the limitation of their rights, and this is a severe 
limitation on their autonomy to act as they deem fit. In the absence of the given information citizens 
cannot act to reinstate the lost autonomy. Only when the information is made available that they can act 
regarding this limitation on their rights. It might also be the case that citizens might not agree with the 
disobedience in question and might want to withdraw their assumed consent in this matter - since the 
author of the disobedience, especially in conditions of secrecy, can only assume the consent, as seeking 
active consent might actually undermine the cause of the disobedience itself. She can only assume what 
rational citizens would agree in such circumstances. Contrarily, Pitkin suggests that deliberation to 
disobey is never based on the consent of the governed but by the nature and the quality of the 
government and the justness of its policies. For more see Pitkin(1966) 
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provoke corrections in the existing unjust state of affairs. I say potentially, because not 
often the issues raised by the disobedient would be taken up by citizen groups or civil 
society organizations in their attempt to correct wrongs. In fact, epistemic disobedience 
can potentially provide a pathway for disobedience of the other three kinds. Revealing 
information about the deficits caused in democracy by secrecy could potentially lead to 
democratic disobedience,319 or calls for more deliberation in some kind of policy 
making. Individuals who have been harmed might also engage in disobedience against 
unjust policies.320 
6. Justification from autonomy  
Epistemic disobedience is an attempt to provide knowledge of the illegitimate 
limitations on the autonomy of the citizens; it ensures that they are in the best position 
to judge the import of public policies not only on their rights but also on their political 
obligations. In order to prove that the disobedience in an epistemic sense ensures 
autonomy of the agent, I would have to prove that secrecy has epistemic fallouts. That 
these epistemic fallouts have implications on the rights and obligations of the citizens, 
that the disobedience provides them the ground to reassess these fallouts and finally, 
that this disobedience is not paternalistic. The last charge comes because epistemic 
                                                             
319 Post PRISM revelations by Edward Snowden, has seen that there has been considerable gap created in 
the democratic process by secrecy. Such fact was even acknowledged by the President Obama who came 
under considerable pressure from civil society groups, civil libertarian groups and the public who held 
considerable disregard for such high scale surveillance. Though, not clearly an act of democratic 
disobedience, but the information did reveal a democratic deficit which generated lot of debate and 
discussion and considerable pressure from civil society groups 
320 The occupy Wall Street movement and the Arab spring used a lot of information revealed by 
Wikileaks in order to challenge the unjust policies of their state. The Pentagon Paper revelations provided 
a lot of impetus to the already ongoing civil disobedience movements against the war in Vietnam. 
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disobedience, as I claim, can only be done on behalf of someone but not by the agent 
who herself is wronged.  
That secrecy has epistemic fallouts has already been shown before. The informational 
asymmetry caused by secrecy has grave implications on the choices that an individual 
makes. In making the implications of the informational asymmetry clear I closely follow 
the line of reasoning developed by Santoro and Kumar in their recent, yet unpublished 
paper. A decision or choice which an agent considers to be an outcome of a deliberate 
rational plan might be interfered with due to secrecy. The consequences of an action 
that the agent perceives to be an outcome of their own reasoning and conduct, might 
have been a result of a deliberate interference on the part of an agent, working in 
secrecy, trying to manipulate or govern those choices. Even in the absence of 
manipulation, the agent might not have complete information regarding the 
consequences which might result from a set of actions. The background conditions of 
information required to undertake a decision is thus be hidden from the agent. This lack 
of knowledge is not due to the normal epistemic neglect or faulty reasoning on the part 
of the agent, but due to information which has been actively subtracted from the 
rational calculation of the agent. Even if no interference is made, or no background 
information is actively subtracted from the agent, the veil of secrecy allows the 
executive to exercise potential interference in the choices of the individual. Such 
potential interference not only goes against the basic rights of privacy, but also 
compromises the range of actions protected under a right, which an agent in normal 
circumstances believes she should have access to. The only way an agent can know that 
the range of actions have not been interfered with, is by an access to the knowledge of 
the prior conditions under which the action is taken, and that those prior conditions 
have not been interfered with.  
To enjoy a right fully an agent ought to have access to the full background epistemic 
conditions of the extent of rights and the possible limitations on them. This is the 
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epistemic entitlement mentioned before.321 Such an entitlement though might be 
counterproductive in cases where active information is subtracted from the agent, like 
the cases of surveillance. In such conditions, the agent ought to be allowed an ex-post 
right to assessment of the reasons and the conditions under which her rights have been 
limited. Thus secrecy, in non-ideal settings, does not directly constrain the autonomy or 
the rights of the individuals but constrains their right to be in a best position to judge 
when rights can be legitimately limited.322   
If the following argument is right, then we see that a consequence of secrecy is that it 
compromises the autonomy and the enjoyment of the rights of the citizens even when 
no willful interference is made by the executive, but when the potential of interference 
exists. Secrecy, in fact does worse: it takes away the citizens’ ability to be in the best 
position to judge whether a rights limitation is legitimate or not. Secrecy thus affects the 
capacity of judgement of citizens both at the level of enjoyment of rights and in 
fulfillment of obligations. In such a scenario they cannot judge between just and unjust 
policies. Epistemic disobedience in a way works towards providing conditions to judge 
between legitimate and illegitimate limitations on autonomy. In cases where the normal 
demands of right of assessment are not fulfilled, disobedience might be the last resort to 
restore the right.  
The argument for disobedience from autonomy is mostly negative. Epistemic 
disobedience is justified because secrecy can illegitimately curb the autonomy and 
rights of the agents. Such a curb can be exposed through disobedience. Disobedience in 
epistemic conditions only provides the agent with resources to challenge such 
limitations on autonomy; it does not directly reinstate the lost autonomy. The lost 
autonomy can only be reinstated if the citizens use such information to challenge the 
                                                             
321 Santoro & Kumar (unpublished manuscript)  
322 ibid 
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policies limiting their rights. Thus, epistemic disobedience, even when done on behalf 
of others is not paternalistic,323 because it only provides the agent with information 
which they are unaware of, and which they will remain unaware of if not for the 
revelations. The disobedient in no ways tries to influence the choices or preferences of 
the citizens or the agents as some autonomy based arguments for civil disobedience 
do.324 On the contrary, it just shows that what the citizens consider to be a well formed 
belief or political judgement based on an autonomous choice might not be the case, 
because their rights or obligations might have been tampered with or manipulated. 
Since the citizens lack the essential information to judge on the actual enjoyment of a 
right, epistemic disobedience is meant to provide them with those resources to judge 
those instances when such choices have been maneuvered. Thus, the disobedience itself 
does not restore autonomy or prescribes a path of action or coerces individuals to 
undertake an action, but it only provides a basic precondition required to challenge 
limitations of rights and obligations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
323 When disobedience is done on behalf of others, the consent can never be obtained. It is epistemically 
impossible, as well as practically falls into varied problems. It will defeat the very purpose. As Pitkin 
suggests, that deliberation to disobey is never based on the consent of the governed but by the nature and 
the quality of the government and the justness of its policies. For more see (Pitkin 1966) 
324 See Moraro (2013) for civil disobedience as using force to enhance the autonomy of citizens by forcing 
them to notice their second order desires, which they would not do so if not compelled to do so by the act 
of disobedience.  
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7. Whistleblowing as epistemic disobedience 
Whistleblowing cases are generally not considered as instances of civil disobedience 
except when some of the revelations relate to ‘unlawful and dangerous practices’ and in 
doing so the whistleblower openly violates ‘the oath of secrecy they have sworn’.325   
Contrary to this position I maintain that many instances of whistleblowing can be seen 
as cases of epistemic disobedience. Whistleblowing is epistemic disobedience if it 
represents one of the following cases: a) about a general wrong doing or harms done 
protected under a secret; b) information is kept secret to manipulate or mislead public 
opinion in a desired policy direction; c) secrecy protects an illegitimate law or policy; d) 
when a policy under secrecy overextends its constitutional mandate and no checks are 
in place to control its abuse.  Under this reading Whistleblowing cases like Pentagon 
Papers, Wikileaks and the recent PRISM revelations would be categorized as epistemic 
disobedience.  
                                                             
325 Sisella Bok makes the following distinction between Whistleblowing and Civil disobedience: 
First, whistleblowing resembles civil disobedience in its openness and its intent to act in the public est. 
But the dissent in whistleblowing, unlike that in civil disobedience, usually does not represent a breach of 
law, it is, on the contrary, protected by the right of free speech and often encouraged in codes of ethics 
and other statements of principle.  
- second, whistleblowing violates loyalty, since it dissents from within and breaches secrecy, whereas 
civil disobedience need not and can as easily challenge from without.  
-Whistleblowing, finally, accuses specific individuals, whereas civil disobedience need not. A 
combination of the two occurs, for instance, when former CIA agents publish books to alert the public 
about what they regard as unlawful and dangerous practices, and in doing so openly violate, and thereby 
test, the oath of secrecy they have sworn.  See notes (1983: 214)  
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Wikileaks revealed extended torture and abuse in Iraq, the killing of innocent 
civilians326, and civilian deaths on an unprecedented scale,327 extra-ordinary renditions 
among other things.328 In a similar vein the Pentagon papers revealed the 
unprecedented levels of lying and manipulation that the US government was engaged 
in order to keep the war in Vietnam going. The recent PRISM scandal revealed the 
unprecedented level the National Security Agency of the United States has reached in 
gathering private data.329 The above three represents instances where the basic 
autonomy of the citizens either in enjoying their rights or fulfillment of their obligations 
is compromised. Some of the revelations relating to extra-ordinary rendition, 
Guantanamo, drone strikes also suggest limitations of rights of others. In the case of 
PRISM revelations the basic rights of assessment of the citizens has been denied.  
These kinds of revelations create new form of accountability structures towards 
transparency from the state and multi- national corporations.330 They challenge the 
boundary line between legitimate and illegitimate forms of secrecy and the imbalance in 
power relations that results from it. These kind of revelations also open up a radical 
space for rethinking over the control of epistemic resources and their distributive 
consequences. The disproportionate control over epistemic resources by the state and 
                                                             
326  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=25EWUUBjPMo [ accessed on August 8, 2013]       .  
327  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-1161273 [accessed Oct. 9, 2013]             
 
328 for more see here 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/06/04/bradley_manning_trial_10_revelations_from_w
ikileaks_documents_on_iraq_afghanistan.html   [Accessed on Oct. 11, 2013] 
http://www.salon.com/2010/11/29/wikileaks_roundup/ [Accessed on Oct. 11, 2013]   
329See Edward Snowden’s interview with the Guardian here        
http://www.policymic.com/articles/47355/edward-snowden-interview-transcript-full-text-read-the-
guardian-s-entire-interview-with-the-man-who-leaked-prism  [Accessed Aug. 5, 2013] 
330 Moore (2011) 
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multinational corporations has led to greater amounts of social control of the masses. 
Such revelations, as epistemic disobedience, are a plea for struggle against these forms 
of control.  
Whistleblowing cases like the Pentagon papers, Wikileaks, PRISM scandal do not find a 
justification under the current readings of civil disobedience. They merely remain as a 
case of whistleblowing. Civil disobedience theories have not been able to accommodate 
whistleblowing cases in their ambit of disobedience.331 Part of the reason is that most of 
the whistleblowing does not ascribe to the norms of publicity,332 or the whistleblowers 
often do not submit to the law.333 But, the need for publicity or submission to the law is 
not a necessary condition for an act to be civil disobedience. For Brian Smart, publicity 
can be counterproductive if it thwarts the very possibility of the act happening in the 
first place.334 In some instances the very prospect of whistleblowing itself can be 
thwarted if it tries to fulfill the publicity condition. Howard Zinn and David Lyons 
argue that there is no blanket moral obligation to obey an unjust law; the disobedient 
need not submit to a law which deviates from the norms of justice.  335 Sometimes the 
                                                             
331 The exception is Bok (1983) 
332 The case of Edward Snowden was public, so was the Pentagon papers while the case of Wikileaks 
revelations was done in anonymity. See Morozov(2010) for this criticism of Wikileaks.  
333 Exception is Daniel Ellseberg. Chelsea Manning never came out openly, only later confessed about his 
involvement when he was already under prosecution         . 
 
334 Smart (1991)  
335 Zinn disagrees that a civil disobedient need to submit to the law: “Why agree to be punished when 
you think you have acted rightly and the law, punishing you for that, has acted wrongly? Why is it all 
right to disobey the law in the first instance, but then, when you are sentenced to prison, start obeying” 
(1990: 914). David Lyons (1998) on the contrary shows that there is no blanket moral obligation to obey 
the law, especially when the policy being objected to is unjust. It can be a strategic choice on the part of 
the disobedient but it does not bind him morally to submit to the law. 
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best way to inform citizens is through anonymous whistleblowing. The underlying 
reasons of the act can be fathomed from the revelations themselves. The public nature 
of the revelations can act as fulfillment of the publicity criteria. Publicity and fidelity to 
law, though desirable, do not constitute as essential conditions for an act to be civil 
disobedience but just are an attempt to garner support in their favour by showing that 
they respect the democratic procedures. They obtain in conditions of near perfect 
conditions of justice where full compliance is possible. In conditions of partial 
compliance civil disobedience can deviate from the requirements of publicity and 
fidelity to the law. If the criminal justice system is bent over criminalizing acts of 
dissent, as has been the case in recent times with Chelsea Manning and Edward 
Snowden among other whistleblowers, anonymity might be a way of informing public 
about the ensuing unjust practices. Criminalization of whistleblowers happens due to 
the same reasons of maintaining security and it is the fear which the discourse of 
security produces in the minds of the citizens that can hamper the public support which 
such revelations ought to get. In such instances the only way whistleblowers can be 
encouraged or protected is through being anonymous. Only when democracies start 
appreciating whistleblowing as genuine moral acts of democratic dissent, and 
champion such causes that revelations can be done in open.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXVI Cycle                                    PhD Candidate: Manohar Kumar 
  
Page 166 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The questions posed by the Wikileaks and PRISM revelations are far too important for 
a democracy that can be ignored at our own peril. Ideally it can be argued that 
democracies do not need whistleblowers. The argument in favour of this claim follows 
this line of reasoning: democracies are embedded with institutions which are largely 
self-correcting. The fallacies that appear in one institution are restrained by the 
countervailing powers of others. Thus, no institution has absolute control over power. 
Any excessive control is brought under check through mechanisms which are 
embedded in the democratic procedures themselves. Thus, any external source is not 
required to provide these checks. The critiques of Wikileaks and Edward Snowden have 
followed the same line of thought. But I have argued that this reasoning is flawed 
precisely because the democratic controls have not worked in regard to executive 
secrecy. I also argue that if we take into account the hidden nature of secrecy, normal 
democratic procedures hit a roadblock in its efforts to subvert the abuses that result 
from the actions protected under classified information. The hidden nature of the 
information allows access to only those individuals or institutions with whom the agent 
controlling the secret shares with. This nature of secrecy allows the executive to play a 
gatekeeper role in maintaining its control over classified information.  
It is precisely because of the gatekeeper role that classified information permits abuses, 
without any countervailing controls. This enhanced power imbalances democratic 
checks even under normal circumstances. Thus, reading the abuses as an aberration 
misleading. Even if misuses do not result, lack of an oversight over executive power has 
disastrous consequences for democracy in general. Trust cannot be the ground to vest 
such powers, since it does not have an epistemic rational given the past tendency of the 
executive to misuse it.  Secrecy thus allows the executive to circumvent normal channels 
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of accountability. Thus, the revelations open up a conundrum which does not emerge 
out of a specific practice in a given space or time, or which is contextual, but it is a 
symptom of a democratic flaw, a flaw which cannot be accommodated within the 
existing set of procedures. In other words, democracy does not have self-correcting 
mechanisms for a secrecy practices that are justified on democratic grounds. If secrecy is 
indeed required, and justified on the grounds of democracy, then institutions ought to 
be in place to control its excesses. Yet, secrecy allows for outmaneuvering such controls. 
Can we argue then that such a flaw cannot be tackled within democracy itself? I argue 
against this notion, because, in my reading, we are only looking for institutional 
solutions. This account of democracy is based on its procedures. It is precisely the 
design which cannot accommodate secrecy with publicity. Does it mean that we ought 
to change the institutional design? No, alternate institutional designs would also face 
similar problems. If a design leans towards publicity, it will do so only at the cost of 
genuine requirements of secrecy. The moment we admit certain secrecy as legitimate, 
we allow for the fissure to creep in the institutional design. But, we can argue against 
secrecy only at our own peril.  
If secrecy is a fact of democratic institutions, how ought it to be accommodated against 
the democratic requirements of publicity? It can be argued that we need to make the 
design flawless and democratic theorists and policy makers ought to work towards it. 
But, in my contention, any such attempt will still face the roadblock of secrecy. I, thus 
argue that the current reading of democracy ought to be broadened to take into account 
another important factor, that of dissent. Dissent strengthens democratic institutions 
through its critique. It is only by including dissent in our analysis that we can have 
hopes to salvage democracy from being undermined by executive power. It is only 
under this reading that whistleblowing cases like Wikileaks and PRISM revelations 
make sense. I argue that these instances should be read as epistemic disobedience. In 
the absence of democratic controls dissent is the last resort to salvage democracy. Yet, 
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dissent can only be justified, if used as a last resort, in absence of other correcting 
mechanisms, which indeed is the case sometimes with secrecy practices. Yet, dissent to 
be legitimate should work towards strengthening democracy, and should come from 
individuals having faith in democracy. They ought not to work towards undermining 
the basic structures of society, if those structures are largely just. Dissent is thus based 
on the premise that democratic institutions might not function properly in some 
instances, and citizens or individuals who are in position to point out the flaws or 
correct them, ought to intervene. Thus, only under an enhanced understanding of 
democracy, outside that of institutions, that sometimes efforts can be made to limit 
abuses due to secrecy.  
Under this reasoning, public officials working within the secrecy apparatus have a 
moral duty to disobey, when classified information hides actions relating to harms to 
individuals or when such actions threaten to undermine the democratic controls. In 
conditions of abuse of power, the narrow requirements of a legal duty to obey the law, 
to uphold the pledge of secrecy, does not hold. It is overridden by the moral 
requirement of not only upholding the rights of the others, and inform the citizens at 
large when the system of rights is being curtailed, but also by the demanding condition 
that one ought not to participate, even unknowingly, in harms done to others. 
Maintaining silence, by alluding to the fact of legal duty, only makes the individual 
complicit in the harms. Public officials working in secret services, by the virtue of being 
part of the secrecy apparatus, should reveal such information when it comes to their 
light.  
 The revelations by Wikileaks and Snwoden unveil the practices of secrecy within the 
state apparatus and the deleterious consequences it has for the rights and obligations of 
the citizens. It is in this context that the thesis makes a contribution in the debates in 
political philosophy. While political philosophers have hitherto tried to justify the 
requirements of publicity in a democracy, the focus on secrecy has been miniscule. 
PhD Dissertation in Political Theory – XXVI Cycle                                    PhD Candidate: Manohar Kumar 
  
Page 169 
 
Publicity has been justified either on grounds of protecting substantive autonomy of 
citizens, or to ensure accountability on the part of public officials to the citizenry. 
Publicity also allows citizens to take part in deliberative sphere of policy making. Yet, 
the practice of secrecy and its fallouts for democracy have been relatively understudied. 
The temptation to make a principled standpoint often ignores the empirical fact of 
secrecy. This is a gap in political philosophy which this thesis aims to partially fill.  
Secrecy has been justified on the grounds of security. If we try to accommodate the fact 
of secrecy to the normative demands of publicity, the following conclusions follow. 
Either we accept the balance model interpretation that completely undermines the need 
for publicity in times of emergency. Accepting this model requires deference to the 
executive in matters of security, due to their superior expertise and efficiency in dealing 
with security matters. Yet, this deference can only be based on trust which does not 
have a rational epistemic ground. Additionally, the balance model interpretation leaves 
a lot of scope for undermining civil liberties that only gets exacerbated through 
deference. Civil liberties are far too important to be treated under a model of balance. 
They are not open to revisions as the model suggests. Any limitations to liberties has to 
be justified to those whose liberties are being limited, such limitations should be based 
on the requirement of liberty itself, as Rawls suggests. The limitation of liberty is only 
justified on the grounds that it protects the overall system of liberties. The diminution of 
liberties ought to be justified to those whose liberties are justified. The balance model 
completely does away with the need of justification, and its consequentialist reasoning 
allows for diminution of liberties of minorities in order to make the majorities safe, thus 
having distributive implications. Thus, we ought to discard the balance model for such 
failings.  
Alternative accounts, that attempt to accommodate secrecy with publicity, either 
advocate for deliberative policy making or create institutional mechanisms for ensuring 
transparency. The first approach is that of Gutmann & Thomson. They propose that 
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only those public policies are legitimate that go through a test of publicity under 
deliberative circumstances. Secrecy is justified only when the general policy, under 
which it has to be maintained, has been accepted by the citizens. This line of reasoning 
follows the hypothetical Kantian test, but requires it to be tested at the deliberative 
level. Thus, if the citizens had known the specific details of the policy then they would 
have agreed for it to be kept secret. The specific details cannot be made public, without 
letting the enemies know, thus the citizens ought to agree for a specific policy to be kept 
secret at the level of generality. This approach does not take into account the practices 
of deep secrecy where even the general details of the policy might be kept secret. By 
allowing the specific details to be kept secret, this theory allows freedom of action to the 
executive at that level, which might result in the concealment of harms, even against 
citizens. Cases of surveillance under PRISM are examples of such a kind.  
 The other three approaches are more institutional and argue for an enhanced role of 
legislative, the judiciary or the media in terms of keeping a check on the secrecy 
practices of the executive. Yet, they all fall into a similar problem. They too do not take 
into account the problem of deep secrecy that allows information to be equally hidden 
from all other institutions, and not only from the citizens. The media can only rely on 
leakers for its sources of information or it can be used to manipulate the citizens 
through careful leaking. It is also not clear from the above approaches why the judiciary 
and the legislative would not show collusive behavior. The threats and the fears that 
security situations evoke might even allow them to defer to the judgement of the 
executive. Recent revelations have also shown that the NSA has been spying on the 
legislatives and the FISA court judges who themselves are responsible for maintaining a 
check on the surveillance operations.  
It is in this context that we can understand the revelations by Wikileaks and Edward 
Snowden. If democracies cannot rely often (and it indeed will remain the case 
sometimes) on the existing institutions to provide for checks on executive power, then 
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Whistleblowing becomes justifiable if the revelations illuminate upon the gross wrong-
doings of the state. The thesis argues that cases of this sort ought to be treated as that of 
disobedience. Under this reading breaking the legal oath of secrecy is not only justified 
on political grounds but is a moral duty. To understand Whistleblowing as an act of 
disobedience we need to move beyond existing accounts. They do not account for the 
epistemic aspect of secrecy which is quite relevant for our purpose. They assume a 
measure of autonomy for the citizen that is not present in this specific instance. In fact 
secrecy creates an asymmetry between those possessing information and those without 
it. This creates particular problems of autonomy for the citizens in general. Thus, 
disobedience under conditions of secrecy has to take into account this following feature 
which is absent in other theories. Disobedience is justified, under conditions of secrecy, 
when revealing of information: a) is about a general wrong doing or harms done 
protected under a secret; b) is about information that is used to manipulate or mislead 
public opinion in a desired policy direction; c) unravels an illegitimate law or policy; d) 
unveils a policy that overextends its constitutional mandate and no checks are in place 
to control its abuse.   
 
This act of disobedience I call epistemic disobedience. Epistemic disobedience is 
contrary to the law, done on behalf of others, with the purpose that such revelations 
will lead to change in the policy. Epistemic disobedience is an attempt to provide 
information, about the systemic wrong doings of the secret apparatus, to relevant actors 
who can thus challenge the illiberal policies of the executive. It does not directly follow 
though that the message itself will reach to those directly affected, but it will taken up 
groups or individuals who are concerned about threats of civil liberties in general. Since 
it is assumed that a threat to liberty of a few individuals is a threat to the equal 
enjoyment of that liberty in general. The revelations only show that democratic 
institutions have deviated from their constitutionally assigned duties. This deviation 
creates a deficit in democracy. It does not affect only those who are at the receiving end 
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of such illiberal policies, but can affect potentially everyone in the future too. Any 
deficit in the democratic institutions ought to be corrected, if democracies do not have 
to mimic tyranny in the long run. The information thus revealed is a step towards a 
necessary correction in the democratic deficit. It is assumed, as well as intended, by the 
whistleblower that the relevant actors in the civil society, judiciary, the legislative, and 
media will pick up the information and challenge the state in order to change the 
existing state of affairs. Having said that, the relevance of the leaks cannot be judged by 
the outcome they have achieved, for information might not itself transform into action 
in the first place. It requires politics at the level of institutions, as well as deliberative 
public sphere to bring about the desired change. The disobedient is a necessary cog in 
this process, who provides the resources for this politics to begin in the first place.  
 
Thus, in summary, Wikileaks and PRISM revelations present a hard case for existing 
institutional design and procedures. They even represent a test case for existing theories 
of civil disobedience. Moving beyond legal and moral claims, the thesis makes a case for 
disobedience on political and epistemic grounds. The argument, in a nutshell, proceeds 
in the following way: since secrecy precludes democratic virtues of participation and 
can lead to arbitrary forms of control over citizens, it does not account for any 
substantive notion of autonomy in democracy, which would require, beyond mere non-
interference, a constitutional guarantee from potential interference. Under this light, 
civil disobedience becomes justifiable in circumstances which make it impossible for 
citizens to fairly know the procedures through which the state governs them, that is not 
only when  actual breach of justice are committed, but also when potential threats to  
justice  are at stake. 
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